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Abstract 
 
Behavioural Monitoring via Network Communication 
 
Gaseb N. Alotibi 
 
 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that using Internet applications is an integral part of an 
individual’s everyday life, with more than three billion users now using Internet services across 
the world; and this number is growing every year. Unfortunately, with this rise in Internet use 
comes an increasing rise in cyber-related crime. Whilst significant effort has been expended 
on protecting systems from outside attack, only more recently have researchers sought to 
develop countermeasures against insider attack. However, for an organisation, the detection of 
an attack is merely the start of a process that requires them to investigate and attribute the attack 
to an individual (or group of individuals). 
 
The investigation of an attack typically revolves around the analysis of network traffic, in order 
to better understand the nature of the traffic flows and importantly resolves this to an IP address 
of the insider. However, with mobile computing and Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP), 
which results in Internet Protocol (IP) addresses changing frequently, it is particularly 
challenging to resolve the traffic back to a specific individual. 
 
The thesis explores the feasibility of profiling network traffic in a biometric-manner in order 
to be able to identify users independently of the IP address. In order to maintain privacy and 
the issue of encryption (which exists on an increasing volume of network traffic), the proposed 
approach utilises data derived only from the metadata of packets, not the payload. The research 
proposed a novel feature extraction approach focussed upon extracting user-oriented 
application-level features from the wider network traffic. An investigation across nine of the 
most common web applications (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Dropbox, Google, Outlook, 
Skype, BBC and Wikipedia) was undertaken to determine whether such high-level features 
could be derived from the low-level network signals. The results showed that whilst some user 
interactions were not possible to extract due to the complexities of the resulting web 
application, a majority of them were. 
 
Having developed a feature extraction process that focussed more upon the user, rather than 
machine-to-machine traffic, the research sought to use this information to determine whether 
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a behavioural profile could be developed to enable identification of the users. Network traffic 
of 27 users over 2 months was collected and processed using the aforementioned feature 
extraction process. Over 140 million packets were collected and processed into 45 user-level 
interactions across the nine applications. The results from behavioural profiling showed that 
the system is capable of identifying users, with an average True Positive Identification Rate 
(TPIR) in the top three applications of 87.4%, 75% and 61.9% respectively.  
 
Whilst the initial study provided some encouraging results, the research continued to develop 
further refinements which could improve the performance. Two techniques were applied, 
fusion and timeline analysis techniques. The former approach sought to fuse the output of the 
classification stage to better incorporate and manage the variability of the classification and 
resulting decision phases of the biometric system. The latter approach sought to capitalise on 
the fact that whilst the IP address is not reliable over a period of time due to reallocation, over 
shorter timeframes (e.g. a few minutes) it is likely to reliable and map to the same user. The 
results for fusion across the top three applications were 93.3%, 82.5% and 68.9%. The overall 
performance adding in the timeline analysis (with a 240 second time window) on average 
across all applications was 72.1%. 
 
Whilst in terms of biometric identification in the normal sense, 72.1% is not outstanding, its 
use within this problem of attributing misuse to an individual provides the investigator with an 
enormous advantage over existing approaches. At best, it will provide him with a user’s 
specific traffic and at worst allow them to significantly reduce the volume of traffic to be 
analysed.   
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1 Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years, using internet services and applications has become a part of our daily life, 
whereby a major development process is undertaken to fulfil the majority of essential tasks via 
such applications, such as utilising phones, managing the booking of air flights, purchasing 
goods from supermarkets, acquiring utility services (e.g., water and electricity) and online 
banking transactions. All these activities and others can now be done easily and quickly through 
internet services and applications. Therefore, the number of internet services being used across 
the world has been impacted accordingly and increased from 361 million in 2000 to 3.5 billion 
in 2016, this proportion representing about half the world’s population (Internet Lives State, 
2016). In addition, the use of e-commerce, whereby products and services are traded via the 
internet, has escalated dramatically in recent years. According to Ecommerce news, in 2016, 
this European e-commerce umbrella organisation announced that e-commerce revenue had 
increased among European countries, with, for instance, real revenue from e-commerce trade 
for the UK in 2015 was €157.1 billion, expected to reach €173 billion in 2016 (E-commerce 
news, 2016). 
 
As this dependence on computers and Internet applications has grown, however, have the 
threats against them. Consequently, information security has become increasingly important as 
technology consolidates its position into our everyday lives and keeping information safe from 
external or internal threats has become a significant issue. Indeed, approximately 82% of large 
organisations have considered information security to be a high priority concern that must be 
addressed (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). McAfee reported in 2014 that the estimated annual 
cost of cyber-crime to the global economy was more than $400 billion, across companies and 
individuals (MacAfee, 2015).  
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Whilst external threats remain an issue, much focus by both researchers and industry has seen 
the development of security controls to protect outsiders from getting unauthorised access into 
systems. However, these tools often do not help organisations against insider threats. Insider 
threats have grown to be an increasingly significant problem; this is due to the privilege and 
knowledge in which an insider has compared with an external attacker (Silowash et al. ,2012). 
While, research has grown in the area and many techniques have been proposed to detect 
insider threats such as Data Loss Prevention (DLP) tools, they have often focussed upon the 
detection rather than the response to the attack. Those studies that have focussed upon the 
response, tend to take a network-centric perspective where it is assumed the IP address is 
directly attributable to a user (Rouse, 2012). However, with the widespread use of the Dynamic 
Host Control Protocol (DHCP) and (more importantly) mobile computing, the Internet Protocol 
(IP) address is subject to change on an increasingly frequent basis. As such, whilst the detection 
tool will provide an IP address for the specific detected attack, for an analyst to take the next 
step of the investigation and understand the traffic profile of the insider – in order to provide 
complete coverage of the attack, identify other perpetrators, impact upon the organisation, is 
an incredibly challenging task. Therefore, a need exists for an approach that is able to 
effectively identify the network traffic associated with an individual (rather than the IP 
address). 
 
1.2 Aim and Objectives 
This thesis is specifically on the subject of behavioural biometrics. The research aims to 
investigate and determine whether a behavioural-based user profiling system would be capable 
of identifying users from network traffic. The objectives of this research are as follows: 
• To review and identify the current state of the art regarding insider misuse detection 
and response. 
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• To create a novel feature extraction process focussed upon extracting user-oriented 
actions from the wider network traffic data. 
• To examine the feasibility of developing a behavioural profile of users based on these 
user interactions. 
• To develop and evaluate practical-based algorithms to determine real-world 
performance. 
 
1.3 Thesis Summary 
Chapter 2 provides a background of insider threats. It presents a definition of insider threats 
and reveals the scale of the problem based on statistical research and cases studies. This 
provides an impression of how insider threats can influence business and become a serious 
problem on an international scale. It also explains the mechanism of how existing tools are 
being utilised to tackle this issue by discussing pros and cons of each of them. The chapter 
concludes by highlighting the need for a security mechanism that can protect organisations and 
the need to be able to attribute this to the right person who committed the misuse. 
 
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the feasibility of utilising biometric techniques as a solution 
to deal with the identified issue. The chapter begins with discussing the requirements of 
biometric systems, their performance and characteristics. A comprehensive summary of each 
category is then provided. Also, a detailed analysis and critique of behavioural profiling are 
presented to understand the current state of the art and what can be achieved to date. Then, an 
overview of the two main approaches that can be utilised to detect the insider misuse through 
network traffic analysis. It presents the concept of how these approaches work and highlight 
the serious limitations that made them incapable to identify users. 
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Chapter 4 proposes and explains in detail the concept of user interactions which provides the 
basis for identifying the discriminative information amongst users. An investigation is 
undertaken to analyse the extent to which it is possible to derive application-level user 
interactions from low-level network packet data. The chapter concludes by providing a list of 
user actions signatures that were determined at an application level from different Internet 
applications.  
 
The main focus of Chapter 5 is to design and evaluate a behavioural-based profiling system 
that can utilise the aforementioned user interactions to identify users. It also explains the 
process flow of the classification and evaluation tasks, in addition to each component of the 
system and the analysis of the outcomes. The experiment utilises a data collect from 27 
participants over 2 months to evaluate the performance and uniqueness of the feature extraction 
and classification processes. 
 
Chapter 6 builds on the success of Chapter 5 by proposing two further techniques that can be 
applied to the behavioural profiling system, with a view to improving the performance. 
Biometric fusion is utilised at the output of the multi-classifier (more than one classifier) to 
provide a more refined classification decision. The second technique develops an algorithm 
that utilises the timeline and the IP address (over very short time periods). The chapter provides 
an evaluation of both.   
 
Finally, Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of the research, highlighting the main 
achievements and limitations. The future research opportunities and directions of this project 
are also discussed.  
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2 Insider Misuse and Incident Response 
2.1 Introduction 
The insider misuse issue becomes a major concern for many organisations; hence this chapter 
presents a number of research studies that were carried out regarding insider misuse to provide 
greater clarity and granularity to the problem. The chapter begins with various definitions of 
insider misuse and then recognition of the scale of the insider threat situation, supported by a 
number of surveys, followed by well-known examples that have emerged in recent years. The 
final section will address the pros and cons of the existing tools that are being utilised to 
respond to any insider misuse incident. 
 
2.2 Definition and Type of Insider Misuse 
There are two kinds of attacks which may occur to any organisation; internal and external. Both 
of them can damage the system, but the intentional insider threat is arguably more dangerous 
than other attacks because the insider knows more details about the sensitive information and 
is familiar with the kind of system valued within the company or organisation more than others 
(Phyo and Furnell, 2004; Hunker and Probst, 2011).  Thus, Insider misuse defined as “a current 
or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access 
to an organization's network, system, or data and intentionally misused that access to 
negatively affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information 
or information systems” (NCCIC, 2014) 
 
Researchers have categorised insider threats into different types, some of them are based on 
their level of access whilst others according to their role. One of the first researchers who 
suggested to categorise insider abuse was Anderson (1980). He describes three types of internal 
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threat, namely; masqueraders, clandestine and misfeatures. Masqueraders are internal users 
who have the authority to access the system but use their privilege to exploit the weaknesses 
of the authentication system, thus gaining the identity of another legitimate user account. A 
clandestine user is connected to an authorised user, where such a user can have capabilities to 
evade audit, control and access resource mechanisms in a specific computer system. Finally, 
misfeatures are insiders who abuse the system by misusing their privileges. Magklaras and 
Furnell (2002) suggested that insider threats can be classified into three classes as follows, 
system masters (includes all the authorised users who have full administrator privileges), 
advanced users (includes all the authorised users who have wide knowledge of the 
organisation’s internal system and processes) and application users (includes all remaining 
authorised users within the organisation). This category clearly clarifies that user is the key 
element of the organisation in different levels and shows the level of privilege that may each 
level has, thus the consequences of insider threat mainly relies on in which level the user 
located in and this is due to the privilege that system masters have. Furthermore, Cole and Ring 
(2005) have divided insiders into four categories based on the level of access as follows: pure 
insider (users with full privileges and access), insider associate (users with limited authorised 
access), insider affiliate (a friend or partner who compromises an employee`s identification to 
access the system) and outside affiliate (an outsider person who tries to exploit open access to 
gain access to an organisation`s resources). One of the important point that organisations try to 
mitigate and control it is limited the access to their resources from outside. However, there are 
some issues may occur from users who inside the originations, thus dividing the insiders based 
on their access might control the kind of information and boundary that need to be available 
for them.  
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Even though the aforementioned researchers have discussed the insider misuse from a 
theoretical point of view, a number of surveys have categorised insider misuse based upon 
incidents that were committed by employee misuse in which various scenarios were designed 
based on the collected data as outlined below:  
 
1. Espionage: is a method which includes human sources (agents) or technical means to 
gain information which is not normally available to the public (Security Service, 2014). 
2. IT Sabotage: is an insider incident in which the insider utilises information technology 
to target an organisation or individual (Capplli et al. 2012). This kind of attack could 
go beyond targeting individuals to target governmental agencies (Chee, 2007). 
3. Fraud: is a set of activities against an organisation that can be committed by an 
employee, such as falsely claiming for expenses, colludes with an outside 
accomplice(s), and stealing a database containing personal details of customers, which 
is used by a criminal gang to obtain money, credits, goods or services   fraudulently 
from other organisations (The Security Company, 2013). 
4. Intellectual Property Theft: an insider who uses the IT systems to steal intangible assets 
that were generated and owned by an organisation which is important to attaining its 
mission (Capplli et al., 2012). 
5.  Lack of compliance with policy:  all employees must comply with the information 
security policy and guidelines. This can be carried by monitoring the daily activities of 
the users where any lack of compliance needs to be addressed by management 
(Hostland et al., 2010).   
6. Unauthorised Access is to gain access to other computers or using someone else's 
account to gain access without any permission. 
7. Misuse of Confidential Information: is an unlawful use of sensitive information.  
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8. Loss or Leakage of Confidential Information: describes the action of intentionally or 
accidentally leaking confidential information to the public. 
 
It is evident that user is the key player for the majority of the incident. However, the intention 
or the purpose to do that is altered. In addition, the way of employee misuse is also subject to 
change based on various elements such as privilege, skills and so forth. 
   
2.3 The Level of Impact of Insider Threats  
According to the Information Security Breaches surveys that were conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in 2013, 2014 and 2015, insider attacks have become serious 
threats to organisations. Figure 2.1 reveals how insider threat incidents have gradually 
increased during the three years period. Indeed, unauthorised access to systems in organisations 
represents the highest threat in the last three years, whilst, information leakage has achieved a 
significant increase in a number of incidents with a 15% increase to 66% in 2015. Also, there 
is a steadily rising in the misuse of information incidents between 2013 and 2015 as can be 
seen in figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure	2.1:	Level	of	Insider	Threats	incident	in	organisations	in	3	years	(PwC,2015)	
 
These threats have originally originated from inside the originations by one of the employees 
as mentioned above, thus the consequences may be quite costly due to the knowledge and 
privilege the insider has. PwC (2015) stated that individual security breaches can cost 
organisations more than £1 million in damages. It can be quite difficult to specify the exact 
impact of insider threats that would occur within an organisation because many may prefer to 
solve this kind of problems internally rather than prosecuting the insider for a malicious attack. 
According to the PwC (2011), about 88% of the respondents in a survey they conducted stated 
that insider threats had been solved internally without an intervention from any third party 
regardless of whether it was private or public. This was done to avoid further risks or 
consequences and to maintain the organisation’s reputation. 
 
As shown in figure 2.2, both small businesses and large organisations have suffered from the 
insider misuse threat, with the latter being impacted more seriously (i.e., large organisations 
have achieved high numbers of incidents when 81% of them have experienced various security 
breaches in 2015). This is due to the number of employees that are working within this type of 
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organisations and mobile computing which increased the possibility to be exposed to the insider 
misuse (Saed.F, 2016). In addition,  
 
Figure	2.2:	Insider	Misuse	Incident	staff	between	2013	and	2015	(PwC,2015)	
 
Although organisations have tried to hide insider misuse incidents from the public and solve it 
internally, there are various cases that are well known across the world either in the private or 
public sector. The cases that are going to be discussed refer to common incidents occurred in 
the private and public sectors. Indeed, they describe to what extent insider misuse could be 
harmful even for the advanced organisation that supposed to have a strong security 
infrastructure such as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the USA that can be explained and 
discussed as outlined below. 
  
Edward Joseph Snowden was an American systems analyst and a former employee of the CIA 
and National Security Agency (NSA). While he was working for these two agencies, he 
uncovered some illegal actions that, in his opinion, had breached the Internet usage privacy. 
The agencies were using Internet surveillance programs, such as PRISM, XKeyscore and 
Tempora, as well as intercepting the US and European telephone metadata (CNN, 2013). He 
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felt obliged to bring this story into light by speaking to the press in order to shame the US 
government and put an end to this kind of surveillance programs. As a result, he had leaked 
secret NSA documents to different media outlets. 
 
Since Snowden was a specialist in information security, and he was responsible for the 
computer network in one of the US embassies in Europe; this gave him an opportunity to access 
a lot of confidential information up until leaving in 2009. This means he followed the policies 
and instructions of these agencies and did not arouse any suspicion at that time. However, he 
had copied all the documents that he was interested in. As an IT expert, he could collect 
information from the system in one of the most secret agencies in the world without arousing 
any suspicion that would indicate that there was a serious problem with the internal security 
policy of the organisations.  
 
Another example happened in the middle of August 2012, there was an attack on a Saudi 
Arabian Oil Company (known as Saudi Aramco), one of the 10 biggest oil companies in the 
world (Borken and Ringas, 2013). The attack utilised a Shamoon virus, which affected around 
30,000 windows-based personal computers operating on the company`s network. The main 
aim of the attack was to stop all Aramco’s activities, especially the flow of oil and gas to local 
or international markets (Infosecurity, 2012). Shamoon spread through the company's network 
and wiped the computers’ hard drives clean. Saudi Aramco stated, “damage was limited to 
office computers and did not affect systems software that might hurt technical operations” 
(Finkle, 2012). However, it took Aramco around two weeks to completely restore the network 
and recover from the disruption to its daily business processes caused by data loss and disabled 
workstations resulting from the incident (Borken and Ringas, 2013). Although the results of 
the final investigation into this attack have not yet been released, a source familiar with the 
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investigation and forensic examination said, "It was someone who had inside knowledge and 
inside privileges within the company" (Finkle, 2012). This idea is supported by different 
parameters, such as the attack was launched during a national holiday and the external detection 
tools did not raise any threat could have occurred from outside the organisation.  
 
A further example of a dangerous insider threat case comes from the military in the US. Bradly 
Manning leaked a diplomatic cable and other classified documents to WikiLeaks website, 
which included, “an unprecedented look at back-room bargaining by embassies around the 
world, brutally candid views of foreign leaders and frank assessments of nuclear and terrorist 
threats” (Shane and Lehren, 2010). Bradly is an authorised user who had accessed top secret 
information and saved it for more than 3 years before releasing it on the Internet. In doing so, 
he utilised the privileges given to him to cause damage and abused the trust of the organisation. 
Nobody can imagine the scale of damage to the US government in terms of their reputation 
and relationship with other countries and the time taken for the US government to regain trust 
(Shane and Lehren, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, Abdulkader Smires was a chief software engineer at Internet Trading 
Technologies. Smires was not satisfied with what he had earned from his employer, so he 
complained about his low salary and asked for a pay rise with additional benefits, but his 
request was denied. Thus, he decided to take revenge against the organisation by using his 
previous account at another organisation (Queen College) to launch a Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack. Internet Trading Technologies lost 3 days of revenue due to the consequence of this 
attack (Radcliff, 2000). Smiles's case shows us how an expert individual may retain sensitive 
information in his mind until he decides to utilise it. Smire knew the infrastructure of Internet 
Trading Technologies very well, and he had the ability to exploit the vulnerabilities in the 
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system to launch a DoS attack. Another point is that he used his previous legitimate access to 
another organisation (Queen College) when this account should have been removed from the 
system since the employee had left the organisation. 
 
In 2001, an infamous insider misuse case occurred in the US. According to (CSC/FBI, 2001), 
former FBI agent Robert Hanssen abused the trust of the FBI by using his authorisation to 
access the FBI system than handing over some important information about ongoing 
investigations that he retrieved from the system to Russian agencies. His motivation for doing 
this was financial gain. Using his IT expertise, Hanssen utilised an unusual technique to hide 
the information so that only advanced digital forensics could find it. His technique relied upon 
using a special process to hide the information in 40 track diskettes, where it appeared as a 
blank space. By using this method, he handed sensitive information that might have been used 
to damage U.S. National Security over to the Russian Intelligence Services for 22 years 
between 1979 and 2001. 
 
Based on the previous cases it is quite evident that when someone intends to misuse 
information, different attack vectors will be used to achieve the aim. The above cases were 
intentional because all the perpetrators planned the misuse; however, their motivations for 
doing so vary, for example, revenge, money or personal opinions about certain issues. Indeed, 
what they all have in common though is that they utilised their legitimate user status to commit 
this kind of crime and abused the trust of the organisation they attacked to commit a crime. 
 
Subsequently, identifying the individual insider misuse is the challenging and major concern 
of organisations in different sectors and countries. According to a survey that was conducted 
by CERT in the US, among 557 respondents, 75% of insider intrusions are handled without 
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legal action while just 10% of insider intrusions handled with legal action (CERT, 2014). This 
is due inability to determine the individual responsible user as well as lack of evidence. In the 
same survey, 37% of respondents think that insider threat cannot identify the individual 
responsible for committing Crime. Consequently, a further research needs to be carried out 
regarding identifying individual insider threat in order to gain people’s trust. 
 
2.4 Incident Response  
In a normal response to the increased number of insider threats, both public and private sectors 
have been seeking a technique that can reduce the scale of insider threats, thus, minimise the 
damage they may cause. The following sections will discuss two types of technologies that are 
commonly utilised for incident response process of insider misuse threat; Data Loss Prevention 
(DLP) and Security Information Event Management (SIEM), which is considered to be a core 
solution of these types of threats and being used in incident response.  
 
2.4.1 Data Loss Prevention 
DLP is a tool that incorporates predefined policies and requirements for monitoring and 
utilising the sensitive information held in different locations in the organisation’s system (Sans, 
2008). DLP first emerged on the market in 2006 and became popular in early 2007 (Sans, 
2008). It is described as a plan that encourages end users to not send sensitive, confidential or 
critical information outside of the responsible official network. It is also utilised to describe 
software products that contribute to a network administrator being able to control what data 
end users can transfer (Rouse, 2012). Other definitions from the security companies of DLP 
are more comprehensive. For instance, Symantec has recently defined DLP as a comprehensive 
data security solution that discovers, monitors, protects and manages information wherever it 
is stored or used (Symantec, 2015). Data in the system can be found in different situations, 
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across the network, storage and endpoint systems, and DLP can be used to prevent losing data 
from those situations. Figure 2.3 below describes the concept of how DLP tools work to keep 
the data safe. The tool classifies data location into three parts: data at rest, data in motion and 
data at the endpoint, and in each part, there are a number of actions such as Databased which 
is representing data at rest, email represents data at motion and USB driver that represents data 
at Endpoint. Moreover, the predefine policy is the core task that controls the status of the data 
in each part. 
 
 
Figure	2.3:	DLP	Design	(Imagined	Security,	2014) 
 
Preventing information leakage is one of the most important aims of companies and 
governmental organisations. Any leakage might harm a company's competitiveness and 
reputation and lead to lawsuits or regulatory consequences of poor security (Liu and Kuhn, 
2010). Data protection has become an important issue, and therefore, sensitive data needs to be 
protected against leakage and improper handling. The majority of security systems try to 
protect data from external attacks and prevent the data leaks from outside the organisation. 
However, the insider threat is considered as a critical issue for organisations in terms of the 
disclosure of sensitive data (Wuchner and Preschner, 2012). In addition, most insider threats 
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that culminate in the disclosure of sensitive information can be attributed to the accidental or 
deliberate activities of company employees (McCormick, 2008). According to the Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) (2010), three key objectives are included in 
most DLP solutions: 
 
1. Identify and list confidential information stored throughout the enterprise. This means 
there is a predefined policy of where the sensitive data is located and who has an 
authorisation to access these data. 
2. Monitor and control any movement of sensitive information inside the organisation 
network. So that any department that has an access to this type of data will be covered 
by DLP tool. 
3. Monitor and control the movement of sensitive information on the end user system 
which means there is a restriction on the user usage of the data 
 
Since, the sensitive information needs to be defined based on a cooperation between IT and 
business departments in order to rectify what the sensitive information is and who should be 
granted access to it, to avoid any leakage or loss (ISACA, 2010).  Liu and Kuhn (2010) indicate 
that data loss can be divided into two categories; leakage (when the data is not under the 
organisation’s control) and disappearance or damage (when an accurate data copy is no longer 
available to the organisation or company).  Therefore, keeping sensitive information under 
monitoring during its movement in the network is quite important to protect it from any loss. 
 
The capabilities of DLP can be described in four functionalities as outlined below.  
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1. Managing; which includes the different issue that needs to be handled properly, such 
as defining important data, usage policies, establishing reports of data loss incidents 
and define who has authority to access what and how. 
2.  Discover; is a second capability which includes identifying where the sensitive data 
will be stored and managing deleted requests for these data completely or partly.  
3. Monitoring which means how can data be monitored at all times. 
4.  Enforce some policies to keep the data inside the system safe from any change from a 
unauthorised person by restricting printing, saving, coping and downloading (Liu and 
Kuhn, 2010).  
 
Although DLP provides some kind of support to help the organisation to keep their information 
safe, it has some key limitations. These fundamental limitations are: DLP does not support any 
encryption, which means it cannot decrypt existing encrypted files, if a user who has an ability 
to encrypt a file, DLP will not be able to decrypt it unless it puts this in the tools itself, in 
addition, it controls certain data while other parts of the system could be exposed to attacks. 
Moreover, it cannot identify the individual who’s responsible for the misuse; because, it 
focuses on data and provides monitoring and reporting about it. Any attempt to change from 
one vender to another or integration with an acquired organisation’s solution might require 
significant work to imitate, such assert the same rules in different devices and the ability to 
monitor one application in one system may not be done in synchronisation with other 
application (ISACA, 2010). 
 
DLP has made a significant contribution to reducing the leakage of sensitive data from inside 
local networks. However, it relies on the predefined polices and instructions that manage and 
control the mobility of the data inside local networks. Hence, it cannot be considered to be a 
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perfect solution. This is due to some of these policies might change and new methods may 
emerge to counter the instructions and these changes might happen intentionally or accidentally 
from legitimate users, thus sensitive data may be exposed to insider threats. In addition, these 
instructions are unable to prevent loss of data from users who have authority to see and utilise 
it, this is a vulnerability if the leakage comes from them. Moreover, identifying individuals 
who commit this type of crime is out of scope and as explained before, one of the main reasons 
that organisations do not tend to reveal or report insider threats is the inability to identify who 
did the crime.  
  
2.4.2 Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
SIEM system is another category of a security tool that is utilised to protect organisations from 
insider threats. It emerged on the market in early 2000 due to lack of existing technologies in 
their abilities to deal with increasing amount and accuracy of security data and inability to 
centralised visibility. The abbreviation SIEM is derived from a combination of Security 
Information Management (SIMs) and Security Event Management (SEM). SIM tools are able 
to aggregate and store log data for different systems, applications, server and router to analyse 
the traffic in order to detect any threat. While SEM tools apply some sort of analysis to this log 
data in order to assist in identifying potential threats by concentrating on different activities of 
perimeter devices within a network, such as intrusion detection system and intrusion prevention 
system, in order to improve the incident response abilities of those devices. The combination 
of these two linked capabilities produced the modern SIEM (Schultz, 2009). Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) is a system that collects logs from different 
devices and applications of a network to provide centralised log handling. If the system detects 
an attack, it can react through its incident management channels that include alerting personnel 
and even initiating counter measures. A SIEM may also help an organisation to meet the terms 
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of regulations pertaining to data retention, and it can be helpful in cases of e-discovery and 
forensics (Karlzen, 2009). 
 
Gartner (2012) defines SIEM as “Security information and event management (SIEM) 
technology supports threat detection and security incident response through the real-time 
collection and historical analysis of security events from a wide variety of event and contextual 
data sources. It also supports compliance reporting and incident investigation through analysis 
of historical data from these sources. The core capabilities of SIEM technology are a broad 
scope of event collection and the ability to correlate and analyse events across disparate 
sources”  
 
There are trends to utilising security management in an organisation's system. According to the 
SANS survey in 2012, 37% of 600 respondents had used SIEM tools in their organisations. 
The motivations behind the use of SIEM vary; compliance, insider threats and a large number 
of devices being the most important reasons for using SIEM (Karlzen, 2009).The different 
SIEMs tools, sold by, for example, Cisco and Symantec, have some general features in 
common. In order to understand the capabilities of SIEM tools, it is quite important to know 
about their general features (Callahan, 2013). These are described below: 
 
• Collection (Node logging): different devices in the network can provide information 
through the log to the SIEM collection. Then the logs provide records of activities that 
can potentially be collected and analysed using a SIEM tool (Schultz, 2009). The most 
common logs are windows servers, security devices, network devices (switch, router) 
and network system (IDS/IPS/antivirus) (SANS, 2012). 
• Event Normalisation makes utilising the event easier in the report step. 
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• Correlation: predefines the relationship between the event and SIEM provides this 
service. 
• Filters: among a different number of logs, it is quite important to filter out some log 
events and focus on the important logs. 
• Rules: predefined rules are used to evaluate events received from the normalisation 
(Callahan, 2013). 
• Dashboards: SIEMs have utilised dashboards to make it possible for the security 
officers to monitor an organisation`s network activities and keep an eye on the level of 
the security on all devices. 
• Alert: the alert will be raised automatically when the event threshold occurs. 
Log storage: in the initial set-up of the SIEM, an organization can label important 
records for log storage in terms of size limits and time limits in order to comply with 
relevant regulations (Schultz, 2009). 
	
Figure	2.4	:	SIEM	Architecture	(EventLog,2017)	
 
  As shown in Figure 2.4 above, the tool relies on information that is collected from different 
resources such as servers, routers, switches and so forth. This data provides vital information 
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by analysing these different logs in order to aid a security officer to concentrate upon security 
incidents that might happen to the system rather than just matching different signals from 
different devices (RSA security brief, 2012). Figure 2.4 shows how SIEMs tools work and from 
where the data comes to the tools. It is quite evident that there are many events connected to 
the SIEMs tool. Hence, analysing all these logs file from SIEM provide vital support for the 
security officer. Table 2.1 below discusses SIEM capabilities and limitation.  
SIEM Capabilities Limitation 
Performing various functions automatically 
such as collecting, archiving and reporting of 
log and event data from several devices such 
as firewalls, IPS, IDS and antivirus.  
The design of the SIEM was not built to deal 
with a huge number and the volume of 
information security required today, which 
causes a problem in term of data handling. 
Centralising the security data by collecting 
them in the same repository and giving the 
Security Operation Center (SOC) 
authorization to access to this repository. 
It is clear that a large amount of data is 
collected from different logs. However, these 
data represented a small amount of the 
available resources and this gives security 
analyst small amount of potentially relevant 
activities might belong to the certain threat.  
SIEM is offering a centralized repository by 
the combine of logs and data event from 
different sources in order to produce a 
complete security data warehouse. 
Although the amount of data that exist within 
SIEM system is huge, possibility to being 
utilized for handling incident investigation is 
poor. 
Providing a various control reports that 
reflect which level the regulations that 
release from the government and industry 
were applied. 
Although making a compliance report is 
important, does not mean the security 
situation of the organisation will be 
improving or potential risk will reduce. 
Using a correlation rules and signature of 
known attack in order to produce alert 
mechanism. 
This mechanism is not accurate because it 
limited to the signatures attacks, while the 
advanced attacks do not have a predict 
signatures which means the tool is not able to 
detect advanced attacks 
Table	2.1:	Capabilities	and	limitation	of	SIEM	system	(Siemplify.com,2016)	
Although SIEM may produce a sufficient information to the security officer (analyst) which 
would aid towards insider threat measurement, it presents three challenges to the user and 
organisation. The first of these is the regulatory requirements; internal policies should be 
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considered at the time of applying the tools. The second is an organisation has to be able to 
deal with a number of devices in addition to inside and outside threats, and determine which 
threats warrant investigation in order to save staff time and the organisation money. Lastly, 
gathering logs from the applications and devices is not an easy job and managing a large 
amount of real time data and store the data is a hard and complex task. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
There is an increasingly wide range of technologies developed to help detect and manage this 
process but when it comes to response part, there is still a gap (Sperotto et al., 201.; Crawford 
and Peterson, 2013; Young et al.,2013; Senator et al,2013). This gap is what comes after the 
detection step which is attributed to the misuse incident by finding out the individual who 
perpetrated the crime. As discussed above, insider misuse detection tools such as SIEM have 
done an excellent task in terms of monitoring users and detect a misuse. However, their work 
to fulfil this part is by depending solely upon IPs address; however, IP is not a reliable measure. 
With mobile computing and DHCP, the IP address is constantly changing making it 
challenging for an analyst to appreciate and understand the traffic associated with the attack 
versus the wider network traffic. Subsequently, there is an urgent need to go further into the 
investigation phase to find out a new approach that is able to link the traffic to the right person 
without dependency on IP address.  
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3 Biometrics and Behavioral Profiling 
3.1 Introduction 
Biometrics is a technique that can identify verify a person based upon some unique information 
about them. Well known biometric techniques include fingerprint and face recognition. 
Behavioural profiling is a biometric technique that is based upon utilising information gathered 
about what a person is doing (e.g. in a mobile context, who they call, when they call and for 
how long). It, therefore, has the potential to capitalise upon patterns in user behaviour as a 
means of identifying who they are. This chapter provides a background into an understanding 
of what biometrics are, their characteristics and performance in order to better understand 
whether this technology is suitable for this research. The chapter concludes with a critical 
evaluation of the prior work completed within behavioural profiling. 
 
3.2 Biometric System 
Biometrics as a characteristic can be defined based on ISO/IEC 27001 as “A measurable 
biological (anatomic and physiological) and behavioural characteristic that can be used for 
automated recognition”. There are two types of biometrics; physiological and behavioural. The 
former one means the physical characteristics of a person such as fingerprints and hand 
geometry. The second one is biometric characteristics that are learnt or an outcome of the 
environment in which the person has lived, such as keystroke and behavioural profiling 
(Shrivastava, 2013). These different types of biometrics mainly utilized in verification and 
identification mode (Lewies, 2002; Clarke, 2011). As a result, biometric applications can be 
useful in many different environments. Alphonse Bertillon, chief of the criminal identification 
division of the police department in Paris, established and used a kind of measurement of 
criminals in the middle of the 19th century (Jain, 2004). Later in the 19th century, the 
distinctiveness of the human fingerprint was discovered and law enforcement departments 
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started storing criminal’s fingerprints. This view is further supported by Jain et al. (2000), who 
suggested that biometrics can be utilised in a variety of areas, as illustrated in Table 3.1. 
Forensic Civilian Commercial 
Criminal investigation National ID ATM 
Corpse identification Driver`s license Credit card 
Parenthood determination Welfare disbursement Smart Phone 
 Border crossing Access control 
Table	3.1	:	Biometrics	applications	
 
In verification mode, the system validates a persons’ identified by making a comparison 
between the recently captured sample and his/her previously stored template(s) resulting in a 
one-to-one comparison. To enable this comparison, the individual will claim an identity (e.g. 
in an IT context through the use of a username). In identification mode, the system uses a one-
to-many method, which means the system recognises an individual’s biometric and searches 
through the database to find out who matches the individual from all users (Shrivastava, 2013). 
For instance, when it comes to a scenario such as when the police have a picture of a suspicious 
person and want to know who is this person, identification is required to search for this a person 
by using face recognition in the citizen database.  
 
A biometric system consists of a number of components, which rely on an individual set of 
biometric characteristics. Jain (2004) lists four main modules that make up the biometric 
system. The first is a module which undertakes the first step of the process by capturing the 
biometric data of an individual, such as a fingerprint sensor, which records the user’s 
fingerprint. Secondly, the feature extraction module extracts or selects the discriminating 
features from the sample resulting in a feature vector. Thirdly, the matcher module makes a 
comparison between the recently acquired feature vector and the stored reference templates. 
Finally, the decision module makes a final determination of the user through the application of 
a threshold to the matching subsystems output. However, Clarke (2011) has added a new 
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component named by storage; utilised to store the features for next step; before match 
component.   Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present an overview of the four main modules of the 
verification and identification biometric system, considering the differentiation between the 
verification and identification mode, in which, the first mode the user claimed identity and the 
system deals with one matcher of the sample and returns true or false whilst the other one there 
is no identity claimed and deals with number (N) of matcher in which it would result with user's 
identity or user not being identified. 
 
Figure	3.1	:	A	biometric	verification	process	
 
 
Figure	3.2:	A	biometric	identification	process	
The key aspect of the process involves enrolment and authentication. The enrolment process 
creates a reference template of the user for use in any subsequent authentication. At this stage, 
the sample is based on the enrolment template in the initiation step, and it is pertinent to ensure 
that it is of good enough quality to be used. The authentication process covers the remaining 
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two processes in the biometric system by comparing an input sample of biometric against one 
reference sample in the verification system, and with all reference samples with identification 
system. This process starts with capturing a biometric sample and extracting the features using 
appropriate sensors. The sample must then be compared with the reference template. Finally, 
the threshold will define whether the sample is valid if there is a match between the sample and 
the reference. If it does not, the decision will be to reject it. 
 
3.3 Biometric System Characteristics 
Biometrics have number of characteristics that describe various aspects of the system. Thus, 
setting certain criteria for the biometric characteristic or trait is very important as it can often 
play a significant factor in whether the biometric will work in a particular application. The 
characteristics are Jain et al. (2004): 
 
• Universality: refers to the degree in which an individual has the necessary biometric 
sample. For instance, whilst fingerprints are a popular biometric, there is a subset of the 
population without the use of their hands and for whom such an approach would not be 
suitable. 
• Uniqueness refers to the degree in which the technique is unique. There are differences 
between biometrics characteristics, for example, physiological techniques tend to be more 
unique than their behavioural counterparts. 
• Permanence indicates how long the biometric characteristic is constant (without any 
change) over time. For example, fingerprints of a person are very resistant to change over 
time; however, the way a person walks varies based on age, fitness level and even the 
weather (Bohannon, 1997). 
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• Collectability refers to the ability to collect the biometric sample from the user. For 
example, an iris image needs a special camera with infrared, and it takes a little bit longer 
compared with a facial recognition, which only needs a couple of seconds using a normal 
camera. 
• Performance is a measure of the recognition performance that can be achieved. The 
performance is based upon a range of factors such as uniqueness and permanence but is 
also directly related to the underlying matching sub-system. 
• Acceptability refers to how acceptable a certain biometric is to the population of users. 
• Circumvention is the means or the ability of the system to be circumvented or tricked. For 
instance, fingerprints biometric can be fooled by using a fake finger.  
Whilst all biometrics contain these characteristics no biometric technique exists that meets all 
of them perfectly. As such, the selection of a biometric technique is often dependent upon what 
the developer wants to achieve – with higher and more secure biometrics typically being more 
inconvenient and thus less acceptable. The nature of where the biometric is to be deployed also 
tends to self-select or reduce the available techniques. 
 
3.4 Biometric Performance 
A function of the matching system, which effectively provides a measure of similarity, is to 
introduce error rates, which subsequently are used to determine performance characteristics. 
According to Kindt (2013), a variety of metrics are used to rate the performance of a biometric 
system. However, the most common performance metrics in verification system are False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR). 
 
• FAR is the possibility that the system incorrectly gives permission to non-authorized 
persons due to incorrectly matching the biometric input with a template. 
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• FRR represents the possibility when the system does not grant access to an authorised 
user and considers it as an unauthorised user. 
(Jain et al,2011) 
As shown in Figure 3.2 below, the relationship between the two rates is mutually exclusive, 
which means when one rate decreases, the other one increases. Clarke (2011) indicates that the 
relationship between the two rates is quite special. He emphasises that there is a strong 
correlation between them and that this will be clear in the trade-off for the system designer 
between low user convenience and high security (tight-threshold setting) or high user 
convenience and low security (slack- threshold setting). 
 
 
Figure	3.3	:	Biometric	Performance	Characteristics (Jain	et	al.,2011) 
 
In order to find an appropriate way to compare the performance of different biometric 
techniques, the Equal Error Rate (EER) can be utilised as a measurement parameter 
(Kindt,2013). The EER is a value which portrays the point where the FAR and FRR are equal. 
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Li (2012) states that the recorded performance of a biometric system is seriously dependent on 
the number of participants, the uniqueness of each participant and the sophistication of the 
employed classification approach. Thu, biometric technique with a smaller EER tends to be 
more accurate. 
 
In contrast, other performance parameters may be used when designing a biometric 
authentication system, such as Failure To Acquire (FTA) and Failure To Enrol (FTE). 
 
• FTA means the rate of biometric samples not being successfully extracted at the capture 
stage to initiate a valid template. 
• FTE gives the rate of the user who is not able to complete enrolment onto the system. 
  
In identification mode, the performance characteristics are calculated differently. Indeed, with 
a number of (N) identities enrolled, output will be a set of identities corresponding to the top t 
matches (1≤ t << N) ,where, the identification rank is defined as the rank of user’s that has the 
correct identity in the top t match return by the biometric system.  
 
Figure	3.4	:	CMC	curve	example	(Jain	et	al.,2011)	
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The identification system error rates can be measured by calculating two common performance 
metrics as outlined below (Jain et al, 2011) 
• True Positive Identification Rate (TPIR): occurs when the input to the biometrics 
system truly matches one or more templates in the database. 
• False Positive Identification Rate (FPIR): occurs when the input to the biometrics 
system falsely matches one or more templates in the database. 
To summarise, different values of t, the Cumulative Match Characteristic (CMC) curve is used 
to produce rank-t identification as demonstrated in Figure 3.3 below. As Figure 3.3 illustrated, 
the overall performance of Identification rate increases when the value of t increases.  
 
3.5 Literature of Behavioral Profiling  
The research in this area started in the 1990s and since then, there have been a variety of studies 
that have examined the behavioural profiling from different perspectives, such as fraud 
detection, intrusion detection and authentication. Behaviour profiling is utilised to verify a user 
based on the previous history, it then creates a user template which can be used to decide 
whether this kind of activity belongs to a legitimate user or not. The sections below discuss the 
different systems that utilised behavioural profiling.  
 
3.5.1 Fraud Detection 
Fraud detection is an issue that many organisations in many countries suffer from. The 
measurement of the efficiency of each technique mainly used detection rate (DR) where the 
system correctly finds out the suspicious activities. One of the earliest studies on fraud 
detection was part of the European commission-funded ACTS ASPeCT (Advanced security 
for Personal Communications Technologies) project (Burge and Taylor, 1997). This study was 
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conducted on the Vodafone network in the UK. The approach used behavioural profiling to 
detect any abnormal activity on the number. Toll ticket tools used to extract all the necessary 
information about calls activities. In addition, two methods for utilised behavioural profiling 
in this study Current Behaviour Profile (CBP), which means the short sequence of activity and 
Behaviour Profile History (BPH) to save the long sequence of activity and both of them are 
managed based on the queue system. Over a two-month period, they used a neural network 
technique with an unsupervised approach where no fraudulent examples are required for 
training to classify the call activity, based on three parameters: national calls, intentional calls 
and use for supplementary reasons. Ultimately, the approach detected 75% of fraudsters and 
only 4% of misclassifications of valid subscriptions were included within the fraudsters list. 
 
In 1997, Moreau et al. published a paper in which they presented the first prototype of a tool 
based on a supervised neural network, an unsupervised neural network and knowledge-based 
systems. This research provided a framework for the detection of fraud in mobile 
communication as a part of the European commission-funded ACTS ASPeCT project. They 
gathered the information for the study from toll ticket because it includes all the necessary 
information that could help in the detection process. The features were International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI), the start date of calls, the start time of calls, duration of calls, dialled 
telephone numbers and national/international calls. It is quite unacceptable to detect just 64% 
of fraudsters by using the unsupervised approach, which has a 5% false alarm rate, due to the 
fact that a huge number of fraudsters will not be detected, while the main reason for this kind 
of technique is to determine what the problem with the communication is and to identify the 
potential solution to mitigate it. The other approaches are significantly better, but they still have 
a high number of false alarms that may disrupt communications for the valid subscribers 
(Moreau et al.,1997).  
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Samfat and Molva (1997) investigated the ability to perform intrusion detection in the visited 
location and within the duration of a typical call. The experiment was carried out in the 
simulation environment and the dataset has a similarity of GSM network, then applying a 
statistical classifier in order to have a user behavioural based on location and telephony 
features, such as the start and end of call and duration. The results of this experiment were 82% 
detection rate and about 40% FAR, which means a huge number of the illegitimate user is 
considered as an authorised user. Although the detection rate is quite satisfying, FAR is quite 
high which may need further research to fix it. 
  
In 2002, Boukerche and Notare provided a fraud detection model on mobile phones by utilising 
a Radial Basis Function (RBF) neural network model. In order to detect call service fraud, the 
model uses user-calling features such as time and duration of the call. The model sends an alert 
message to the user and network administrator immediately when a suspicious call is identified. 
The dataset was collected by an unknown telecommunication service provider and contains 
4,255,973 telephone calls. The result achieved by applying the RBF neural network and using 
110 neurons in the hidden layer of the network, was 97% detection rate and 4.2% system error 
rate. 
 
Hilas and Sahalos (2005) published a paper titled “User profiling for fraud detection in 
telecommunication networks”. The authors mention that the amount of telecommunication 
fraud has dramatically increased. Hence, searching for effective detection is important to avoid 
further fraudulent activities. The paper suggests obtaining user profiling to detect fraud 
activities by using a statistical machine learning method, which constructs user profiles of each 
user and compares them with the future activities of the users to detect any abnormal activities. 
The methodology of this paper is to create a profile for each user from their previous history, 
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which were stored on the organisation's database. Consequently, the authors mention the 
similarity measure, which consists of different parameters, such as calls made to local 
destinations, the duration of local calls, the number of calls to mobile destinations, the duration 
of mobile calls, the number of calls to national and international destinations and their 
corresponding duration.  There are two levels of similarity, the first being to examine the 
equality of the number of calls in the same category, and the second is to compare the total 
calls durations across categories. The dataset contained more than 5,000 users, and it was 
collected over a one-year period at a university (Hilas and Sahalos, 2005). The technique used 
was the statistical machine learning to present that constructs user profiles for the detection of 
fraudulent activities in telecommunications networks. The experiment relied upon a different 
number of parameters and extracted these parameters from the call inquiries in the large dataset. 
In addition, the greatest similarity achieved was 80%, which is a promising result. Furthermore, 
this paper does not mention anything about malicious activities from a particular user. It merely 
compares known parameters for known durations for known users, and that might not be 
enough to detect fraudulent activities in the telecommunication sphere. The same authors in 
2007, tried to perform another classifier to improve the detection rate, however, the result 
almost remains about 80%  
 
Ogwueleka, (2009) published a paper titled “Fraud Detection in Mobile Communications 
Networks Using User Profiling and Classification Techniques”. This study utilised call data 
for describing behavioural patterns of users by using unsupervised Self Organisation Map 
neural network (clustering). The evaluation of this experiment was done using a dataset that 
includes 180 participants during a period of 75 days, in which, the results of this research 
concludes that FAR is about 3% which means the fraudulent transactions that accepted as 
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legitimate and the mobile communication detection system detect most of the fraudulent 
transactions.   
 
Similarly, Oayyum and Mansoor in 2010 have stated that in order to improve the detection rate 
of the fraud issue, two techniques could be utilised; let the user think what is the most feature 
that may represent the fraud and create a weight that is association priorities based on user 
input.  The values that were given from the users to the most features that might represent the 
fraud by giving the highest features high value to presenting the level of dangerous that has. 
The study used a neural network as a classifier and evaluate the technique using a dataset that 
includes 300 participants. The final result from this approach was an ability to detect up 70% 
of the fraudulent calls.    
 
In 2015, Subudi and Panigrahi have published a paper titled "Quarter-Sphere Support Vector 
Machine for Fraud Detection in Mobile Telecommunication Networks". This paper has utilised 
a set of features such as call duration, call type, and call frequency along with location and 
time. The experiment was carried out by using the Reality Mining dataset which includes 94 
users' information. The authors utilised support vector machine classifier in order to distinguish 
the malicious behaviour from the normal behaviour. The result of this approach was promising 
compared to the previous studies in this fields where the detection rate attained is 97%. The 
aforesaid studies found that using behavioural profiling in fraud detection technique provide 
promising results once the behavioural profiling template creates with sufficient information. 
With respect to performance, many studies have achieved positive DR and FAR and over the 
time where more information became available and being able to include when the user profile 
created such as user location. 
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3.5.2 Intrusion Detection System  
This section explains using behavioural profiling in IDS which is analogous to anomaly 
detection. Buschkes et al.,1998 has introduced a new approach that using anomaly detection; 
they produced their procedure to test their hypothesis by using Bayes decision rule; In 
probability theory and statistics, Bayes' theorem (alternatively Bayes' law or Bayes' rule) 
describes the probability of an event, based on prior knowledge of conditions that might be 
related to the event to detect any abnormal usage (Zou,2006). The study mainly focused on 
different features, such as call activities and location of users. The result shows that the system 
was able to score 87.5% detection rate. 
 
Similarly, Sun et al. (2004) have published a paper in titled "Mobility-Based Anomaly 
Detection in Cellular Mobile Networks". This paper examined cell IDs transferred by a user as 
the features value. In addition, various services were included in this study for a user as an 
option in order to create an accurate user profile. Consequently, a higher order of Markov 
model for the detection part was used. The paper has applied the concept to a simulation 
environment for evaluation purposes and the final finding form this research was 87.5% 
Detection Rate (DR) and 15% False Alarm Rate (FAR). The second experiment that was 
conducted by Sun et al in 2006 has achieved a better DR (89%) and low FAR (13%). This is 
due to more care which was being considered in relation to the location of the user. 
Nevertheless, location information is quite sensitive for users, in which this approach gives the 
user an ability to turn it on/off as required.  
 
Yazji et al.(2011) published a paper in the title "Protecting private data on mobile systems 
based on spatiotemporal analysis". The research sought to produce a model used to detect theft 
in smart phone mobile by creating an anomaly spatiotemporal patterns. They used network 
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access patterns and file system activities to build a behavioural model that permitted attack 
detection with a latency of 5 minutes and an accuracy of 90%. The study evaluated on Reality 
Mining dataset consisted of 100 participants. The authors used two techniques spatiotemporal 
and Trajectory. The former used when the users do not have many locations in their dataset 
whereas the later utilised with sufficient locations, in order to improve the performance. The 
result shows that the system was capable of detecting an attack within 15 minutes with 81% 
accuracy. 
 
Finally, Yazji et al. (2014) produced an approach that addressed mobile device issues by 
making an effective correlation between the user’s location and time data.  They developed 
two statistical profiling approaches for modelling the normal captured behaviour of the user: 
the former based on an experimental collective probability measure and the other one is based 
on Markov which provides a way to find dependencies between the current information and 
compare it with the previous one that owned (Clemson University,2017). Reality Mining and 
Geolife dataset were utilised to evaluate this approach. The result shows that the system is 
capable of detecting a potential intrusion with 94% accuracy. This high proportion of accuracy 
achieved due to the set of features utilised in this research and the duration that was taken into 
account in order to create a user behaviour profile template, which was 9 months.   
   
3.5.3 Authentication  
The majority of authentication-based systems rely on a behavioural-based mobile security 
system. These systems use different techniques to assess user’s identity based on one or more 
behavioural characteristics, such as keystroke and gait. The following section provides a short 
description of these studies. 
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Aupy and Clarke (2005) conducted a preliminary study to determine at which level people 
present a unique behavioural profile while utilising their computer desktop. The paper aimed 
to provide a transparent and continuous authentication of users relying on their interaction with 
computers, what applications are used and when, and recently visited websites. The authors 
used the ‘logger’ application to capture user interactions. The experiment sample was 21 
participants, and the data was collected over 60 days. The study utilised different features 
extracted by the logger application, as shown in Table 3.2 below. 
 
Code Continuously action update 
KEY  When the word has been typed in, the title of the window where it has been 
entered and the word is recorded. 
OPN This records the name and class of the opened window. 
CLO This records the name and class of the closed window. 
Table	3.2:	Logger	Features	Extraction	
 
The study used a neural network classification known as the Feed Forward Multi-Layered 
Perceptron (FF-MLP). FF-MLP has been commonly used in implementing the K-classification 
module for the character recognition (Oh and Suen, 2000). The result of the study was 
promising, with an overall EER average of 7%. Finally, the study faced some problems, such 
as the number of participant’s actions being very small. Therefore, the authors decided to repeat 
a number of actions from the dataset many times to raise the input features. 
 
Yazji et al. (2009) proposed an implicit user re-authentication system for the portable computer 
that has limited in application change and hardware replacement. The main aim of this research 
is to reduce the probability of unauthorised access or theft by creating a user behaviour based 
on a combination of filesystem activities and network access that is able to distinguish between 
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normal user and anomalous. There are a set of features that can be obtained from file access 
system where the log file has a lot of useful information such as timestamps, names of the 
process responsible for access, locations of accessed files, and operations on the file. Different 
parameters of network activities were included in this study, such as the timestamp of each 
access, source IP address, destination IP address, protocol identifier. The study utilised K-
means clustering, and in order to evaluate the approach, a period of two weeks was allocated 
to gather a dataset of 8 participants.  The result was promising where the system was capable 
to score detection rate of 90% with FAR 14% (it means 14% of nonauthorized access 
considered as authorised) and FRR 11% (it means 11% of authorised access considered as 
unauthorised access or imposter). 
 
Li et al. (2010) published a paper titled "Behaviour Profiling on Mobile Devices". The study 
proposed a novel behaviour-based profiling technique that is capable of building up on the 
weaknesses of current mobile device authentication systems by developing a comprehensive 
multilevel approach to profiling. One of their main features collected form device usage 
includes the day, time, duration and weekday. The approach was evaluated using 30 users from 
MIT Reality dataset and Neural network with different neuron size was applied. The findings 
of this are; 35.1% average EER, where top user achieved 1%EER. With this high number of 
EER, the authors proposed another approach that is concentrating on mobile user's application 
usage. They used a behavioural-based host mobile security mechanism, using some of the 
user’s behaviour characteristics to assess the legitimacy of current users. The experiment was 
conducted using a dataset that is available from the MIT Reality Mining project. The dataset 
was collected over 10 months as the duration of time starting from September 2004 to Jun 2005 
for 106 participants. There were different types of features collected from the mobile including 
application level (default application, such as a phonebook), application specific (additional 
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discriminating information, such as Internet browser) and multi-instance application (a mixture 
of application level and application specific). The user behaviour was created based on two 
types of profile techniques: static and dynamic.  After applying the data on the mathematical 
equation, the results were 13.5%, 5.4%, 2.2% and 10% for the general application, telephone, 
text messaging, and multi-instance application usage respectively. This result seems to be 
encouraging and points to the use of this method in order to identify misuse within the mobile 
phone sphere. However, some limitations may affect that decision, such as the dataset was from 
2004/2005 when smart phones first emerged, hence the data is not up to date. The entity data 
is not sufficient for various reasons, because, for instance, applications have changed since 
2004 (Li et al, 2011). Therefore, an additional experiment has conducted on a dataset consisted 
of 76 users in order to build a novel behavioural profiling framework that is able to collect user 
behaviour based on applications usage. So, the system would reject the user’s access based on 
a number of consecutive abnormal applications usages rather than single application usage. By 
applying this technique, the system has achieved better performance achieved 9.8%EER, FAR 
4.1% and FRR 4.4%. 
 
Similarly, Shi et al. (2011) published a paper titled “Implicit Authentication through Learning 
User Behaviour”. The aim of this paper is to create a new model for performing implicit 
authentication. The model utilised different features, such as SMS and telephony along with 
Browser History: they examined browser history and recorded the obfuscated domain name of 
each URL along with the number of visits to this URL done previously. The technique was 
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evaluated based on two weeks of collected data from 50 users and the result was quite 
promising where the system achieved 95% detection rate. 
 
Salem and Stolfo in 2011 produced modelling user search behaviour for masquerade detection 
technique. Their hypothesis relied on the level of knowledge that a user has about his system, 
in which encourages him to do a search for information in limited, targeted and unique fashion. 
Subsequently, this kind of behaviour might aid to distinguish legitimate users form 
masquerade. There were 18 participants involved in this experiment and a support vector 
machine as a classifier to detect the masquerade. The result showed that by using this kind of 
user behaviour, the system was able to detect all masquerades with a very low false positive 
rate of 1.1%.  
 
In 2013, Abramson and Aha created a technique for continuous authentication purpose based 
on user web browsing behaviour. They claimed that using web browser has become a common 
activity in different places for different purposes, thus there is a chance to uniquely identify 
someone based on their Web browser behaviour. The main features of this technique come 
from the type of web browsing, number of sessions, length of session, and timestamp. The 
experiment was conducted using a dataset that included 10 users by using ensemble classifier. 
This classifier is often more accurate due to a set of classifiers whose individual decisions are 
joined in some way to classify a new example (Dietterich.T,2001). The results show that 24% 
best EER achieved. 
  
Similarly, Fridman et al. (2015) presented an active authentication model on mobile devices 
based on user behaviour that is collected form four biometrics modalities: Text enters via soft 
keyboard, Application usage, Web site visited and Physical location via GPS. The evaluation 
	
	
41	
of this system was conducted based on a dataset from 200 participants collected for at least 30 
days. Decision Fusion classifier has been utilised in order to improve the overall accuracy of 
the system. The result showed that high accuracy can be achieved with EER 3%. 
 
In 2016, Sbeyti (2016) suggested a novel authentication model be used complementary to the 
existing models. Indeed, the research sought to produce an implicit authentication through the 
capture of user's discriminative behavioural pattern. The system aims to reduce the number of 
explicit authentication. Its purpose is not to replace the common authentication approaches, but 
rather to accompaniment them. That is, the user can still use his chosen authentication method, 
but once the phone is unlocked, the implicit authentication takes responsibility to determine if 
the user is indeed the owner or an attacker. And to accomplish this, the author relied on two 
features applications usage and duration of each usage for each particular user. Then a 
mathematical algorithm has implemented and being work at the run time to determine if the 
user is an owner of the smart phone or an attacker. 
The experiment evaluated on Android dataset consisted of 30 users and the result shows that 
the system was able to achieve True positive attained 76%. 
 
3.5.4 Identification  
Much of the prior art has focused on the application of behavioural profiling in the simpler 
verification mode. In identification mode, there are a few papers discussed using behavioural 
profiling model.  Yang (2010) published a paper about web user behavioural profiling for user 
identification. The author tries to build a user profile based on web usage patterns. He creates 
a user profile for different known users based on their web activities and anonymous web 
sessions. 
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The framework using Lift-based profiling; performs best when the number of users is small; 
consists of different stages, starting from initiating a user behavioural pattern, including the 
number of web sessions, overall user behavioural patterns, retrieve patterns for all the users, 
and measure the distance between two profiles. The dataset consisted of 50,000 users over the 
one-year period, and it was provided from a commercial data vendor. It included the web 
browsing history of a panel of users who were included in this experiment. However, the author 
selected a few users (with id # 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 75, 100) and chose 10 different sliding window 
sizes,1, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 in order to investigate how sliding window 
size affects the predictive accuracy. The accuracy of the classification methods showed that the 
level of accuracy attained 90%.  Regardless of the fact that accuracy rate was promising, the 
study has few serious issues which may affect the reliability especially when the author has 
evaluated the approach on just 10 users from the large dataset that contained 50,000 users. 
 
Similarily, Herrmann et al. (2010) proposed a re-identification model based on behavioural 
profiling that is collected form web users' sessions in order to overcome the changing of IP 
addresses issue. They mentioned that the websites that are retrieved by an individual reflect – 
at least to some degree – his or her interests, habits and social network. The URL of some pages 
may even disclose the user's identity. So, they tried to ink the web sessions of a given user only 
based on a record of his past activities on the web. To overcome some privacy issue the features 
of the study were collected form HTTP requests, in which they used destination host name 
only. The evaluation of the approach was conducted in a real-world dataset from 28 users by 
using Naïve Bayes classifier and assuming a limited knowledge of an attacker who can only 
observe the host names visited. The result showed that the system was able to re-identify up to 
50 % of the users, about 80 % of the time.  
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This technique relied on the observed access frequencies of hosts based on the name of 
destination hosts in order to create user profiles. There is a scalability issue in this study where 
just 28 users utilised to gauge whether the provider can correctly identify their users or not 
based on web site visited history. In addition, perhaps using sophisticated attacks, it can be 
argued that this study is not going to be efficient. 
 
3.6 Discussion  
The table below summarises the different studies of behavioural profiling. Although fraud 
detection and IDS research have contributed in a view of understanding the technique, further 
research is needed with reference understanding the applicability of behavioural profiling 
within a networking-based application. A variety of studies have examined user behavioural 
profiling from different perspectives such as fraud detection, intrusion detection, authentication 
and identification. The techniques mainly utilised to verify a user by storing the pervious user 
activities that used it to create the user profile and comparing it with current user activities to 
be able to decide whether this user is legitimate or illegitimate. The nature of the behavioural 
profiling features has played a core key into creating an accurate user profile. In fraud detection 
where the majority of this research has been supported by communications and mobile 
companies, the main features that utilised to create a user profile extracted from telephony 
activities such as call number, time and duration and later country of the calling included. Thus, 
the accuracy does vary across studies with high FAR scores in some of them. This is because 
of the features that were used to create a user behavioural profiling were quite limited and the 
samples were quite huge. In contrast, there are various researches have been conducted to 
explore the possibility of applying user behavioural profiling to increase the level of security 
of the mobile device. Indeed, the early studies in this field have utilised anomaly- based 
detection to determent any abnormal activities with the mobile devices such as studies (10-15) 
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as illustrated in table 3.4. whilst recent research tends to create a user profile based on 
application usage within authentication and identification model and achieved a high accuracy. 
This is due to that nature of features that included which were contributing towards achieving 
a higher performance as can be seen in table 3.3 studies (16-28). 
No. Author(s) BP source Classifier  # User Performance% Category 
1 Burge	and	Taylor,	1997	 Telephony	 Neural	Network	 110	 DR=75,	FAR=4	 Fraud	detection	
2 Moreau et al.,1997 Telephony	 Neural	Network	 600	 DR=90,	FAR=10	 Fraud	detection	
3 Samfat	and	
Molva,1997	
Telephony	 Statistical	 non	 DR=82.5,	
FAR=40	
Fraud	detection	
4 Boukerche and 
Notare,2002 
Telephony	 radial	Basis	
function	
100	 DR=97,	FAR=4.2	 Fraud	detection	
5 Hailas	and	
Sahalos,2005	
Telephony	 statistical	
machine	learning	
5000	 DR=80	 Fraud	detection	
6 Hailas	and	
Sahalos,2007	
Telephony	 decision	tree	 5000	 DR=80	 Fraud	detection	
7 Qgwueleka,2009	 Telephony	 Neural	Network	
and	probabilistic	
180	 FAR=3	 Fraud	detection	
8 Qayyum	and	
Mansoor,2010	
Telephony	 Neural	network	 300	 DR=70	 Fraud	detection	
9 Subufhi	and	
Panigrahi,2015	
Telephony	 Support	Vector	
Machine	
94	 DR=97	 Fraud	detection	
10 Buschkes	et	al,1998	 Mobility	 Bayes	decision		 Non	 DR=87.5	 IDS	
11 sun	et	al,2004	 Mobility	 Markov	 Non	 DR=87.5,	
FAR=15	
IDS	
12 Hall	et	al,	2005	 Mobility	 Decision	rule	 50	 DR=50,	FAR=50	 IDS	
13 sun	et	al,2006	 Mobility	 Markov	 Non	 DR=89,	FAR=13	 IDS	
14 Yazji	et	al.,2011	 	
Mobility	
Spatio-temporal	
model	and	
trajectory-based	
	
100	
	
DR=81	
	
IDS	
15 Yazji	et	al,2014	 Mobility	 non	 100	 DR=97	 IDS	
16 Aupy	and	Clarke,2005	 PC	usage	 Neural	Networks	 21	 ERR=7	 Authentication	
17 Yazji	et	al.,	2009	 File	access	activity	
and	network	event	
K-Means	 8	 DR=90,	FAR=14,	
FRR=11	
Authentication	
18 Li	et	al,	2010	 Telephony,	device	
usage,	Bluetooth	
and	network	
scanning	
Neural	Networks	 30	 EER=13.5,35.1,	
35.7	
Authentication	
19 Shi	et	al,2011	 Telephony,	SMS,	
Browsing	and	
Mobility	
Gaussian	Mixture	
Model	
50	 DR=95	 Authentication	
20 Salem	and	Stolfo,2011	 file	access	activity	 SVM	 18	 FAR=1.1	 Authentication	
21 Li	et	al,	2011	 Applications	
Telephony,	SMS	
Neural	Networks	 76	 EER=13.5,2.2,	
5.4	
Authentication	
22 Dimitrios	et	al,2012	 Telephony,	SMS,	
Browsing	
machine	learning	
algorithms	
35	 DR=98.5,	
EER=1.6	
Authentication	
23 Abramson	and	Aha,	
2013	
web	browsing	 ensemble	 10	 EER=24	 Authentication	
24 Li	et	al	2014	 Application	usage	 Neural	Networks	 76	 EER=9.8	 Authentication	
25 Fridman	et	al,2015	 text,	application,	
web	and	location	
probabilities	 200	 EER=3	 Authentication	
26 Sbeyti,2016	 Application	usage	 Mathematic	
algorithm	
30	 TP=76%	 Authentication	
27 Yang,2010	 web	browsing	 decision	trees	 7	 DR=91	 Identification	
28 Hermann	et	al.,2010	 web	browsing	 Naïve	Bayes	 28	 DR=	50		 Identification	
Table	3.3:	Behavioural	profiling	overview	 	
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There are different classifiers utilised from the studies above such as SVM, Neural Network, 
decision tree and so forth. However, it is clearly obvious Neural Network machine learning is 
a classifier that is mainly utilised with behavioural profile most of the studies in different 
categories due to its ability to solve the non-linear problem (Chtious et al.,1997). 
According to the numbers of studies in Table 3.3, there were various sources to create a user 
behavioural profiling such as applications usage, text and web history, thus the performance 
does vary based on the features that extracted to create a user profile. The performance of the 
studies that relied upon one user behavioural profiling may not quite accurate compared with 
other researches that building their user profile from different behavioural profiling sources as 
demonstrated in Table 3.3. However, there is a chance to improve the performance by using 
different multi-biometrics system categories such as multi-sensor and multi-algorithms. 
Indeed, Combining the information from these differing sources is called fusion (Jain et al., 
2008).   
Based on the discussion of the aforementioned studies, it can be argued that using behavioural 
profiling could help in distinguishing users for various purposes in different performance based 
on the number of activities that can be provided in order to aid the system to create an accurate 
user profile. Subsequently, using behavioural profiling is an appropriate solution that may 
contribute in associating the insider misuse to the right person. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
Although behavioural profiling has been used in different studies particularly in a verifications 
mode and scoring a positive performance, there are a few studies that have discussed and 
examined the identification mode by using behavioural profiling and shown that it is viable, 
even if performance could be improved to overcome some of the scalability issues. However, 
it has been shown that using behavioural profiling can contribute towards creating an accurate 
template of the user profile.   
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4 User Interactions: A Novel Feature Extraction 
Process using Network Traffic Metadata 
4.1 Introduction  
As highlighted in the previous chapter feature identification is a key element of the biometrics 
design process. Identifying discriminative features will enable better classification and better 
performance. Therefore, it is important when looking to use network-based traffic that more 
investigation needs to be undertaken to better understand what features might be more 
discriminative than others in order to create the most optimal user profile. This chapter begins 
with a discussion of the traditional network analysis techniques, packet based and flow based 
detection technologies, in order to understand how network data is typically modelled and why 
this would not be appropriate in this context. This leads to a novel proposition in terms of the 
creation of application level interactions for network traffic followed by a detailed examination 
and set of investigations in order to be able to identify and understand whether user level 
interactions can be derived from low-level network data. 
4.2 Network Analysis Approaches 
There are two different kinds of network traffic analysis approach that utilised in the existing 
tools for preventing /detecting insider threats which are packet and flow based. 
 
4.2.1 Packet based Network Analysis Method  
A network packet contains various data fields, including headers, trailers and payload; and it 
can be obtained directly from network traffic. The packet based network analysis method (also 
known as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)) inspects not only the header information of a packet 
but also (more importantly) its payload data in a bit by bit manner to detect misuse. From a 
network observation point, the raw information of the packet is constantly analysed and 
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compared with various signatures of known threats; any matching could indicate the presence 
of an attack. With the aim of enhancing the performance and effectiveness of the packet based 
network analysis, a wide range of research has been conducted, including (Verizon,2014; 
Cisco,2014; Merkle.L,2008; Baehr et al.,1995). Also, a number of tools (both open source and 
proprietary) have been developed, including Cain and Abel, TCP dump, Wireshark, Xplico and 
Microsoft network monitor, assisting network security analysts with an easy capture of packet 
information and a better understanding of how the attack was formed. 
  
Mahoney and Chan (2001) emphasize that the main aim of their approach is Packet Header 
Anomaly Detection (PHAD) for identifying hostile network traffic. Their algorithm relied on 
learning the normal values for each packet field at the different protocols, IP, TCP, UDP, and 
ICMP. They determined the normal and unusual behaviour during the training stage and 
conducted all experiments on the 1999 DARPA dataset. The outcomes from these experiments 
were different, however examining packets and fields in isolation, and by using simple non-
stationary models that estimate probabilities based on the time since the last event rather than 
the average rate of events gave the best value with a detection rate of 65%. 
 
 Wang and Stolfo (2004) presented anomaly network intrusion system based on packet payload 
which called PAYL. PAYL was designed along with some objectives such as no human 
intervention "hands-free", high accuracy, and ability to operate within high bandwidth 
situation. The model segregates to the different protocol relying on port number and length for 
instance FTP has port 20 and 21, HTTP utilises port 80 and so forth.  Then, they utilised n gram 
analysis, Mahalanobis and Z-string in order to analyse, compare and process the data. The 
evaluation of this model was conducted using 1999 DARPA dataset, in which the result was 
nearly 100%, accuracy was achieved with 0.1% false positive rate on TCP port 80. 
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To faster the process of packet analysis, Bolzoni et.al proposed new anomaly network intrusion 
detection system that consists of two parts; The first part is using self-organisation map (SOM) 
for classifying payload data, and the other part is a slight modification of the well-known PAYL 
system which was discussed above. The modification upon PAYL is by using SOM after the 
PAYL uses the class value given by SOM instead of the payload length. This approach made 
a combination between SOM with a modified PALY algorithm. The experiment was carried 
out based on the 1999 DARPA dataset. There were 97 attack instances (payload-based attacks) 
in the dataset. The duration of the experiment was 4 weeks randomly (weeks 1 and 3 for training 
with 244,591 attacks free packets and weeks 4 and 5 for testing). The overall detection rate 
result was 73.2%. Different studies have utilized classification approach to detect any abnormal 
traffic. In 2012, Al-Bataineh and White produced a study that used entropy and byte frequency 
distribution of HTTP POST request content as features to identify data stealing. The study 
relied on studying the behaviour of a data stealing bot, then provides insights into how it could 
be distinguished from another typical web usage of benign applications. After applying a 
classifier, the outcomes were 99.97% detecting rate on HTTP traffic. 
 
He et.al (2014) proposed a novel network-based solution that relied on entropy technology and 
user’s network behaviour to detect data exfiltration in the cloud environment. Because of the 
DPI cannot detect encrypted data leakage efficiently, this study tried to build a network 
behaviour profile based on features, such as network and application protocol type, destination 
IP, port and time of occurrence, and then applying Naïve Bayes algorithm to classify expected 
and unexpected results successfully. The final result showed that the rate of detection was 90% 
and the false positive rate was 1%.  
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Table 4.1 lists a number of studies that have been done by using packet based to detect several 
types of threats where the insider threats tools have been executed based on the same concept. 
Since information is encapsulated within the payload of the packet, the packet based network 
analysis can be effective against malware attacks and information leakage; also the method is 
utilised to detect other network related attacks, such as buffer overflow attacks, DoS attacks 
and network intrusions. Nonetheless, the packet inspection approach is a time-consuming 
process due to the nature of the bit by bit comparison.   
 
Table	4.1:	Packet-based	detection	studies	
 
4.2.2 Flow based Network Analysis Method 
Flow-based approaches seek group IP packets passing through an observation point in the 
computer network within a certain time interval based on a (typically TCP/UDP) connection 
profile. All packets that belong to a specific flow have a set of shared properties. These 
properties may exist in the header or in other different parts in the packet itself or both (Wang 
No. Studies Applications Methods Performance 
1 Mahoney and Chan 
(2001) 
Anomaly based 
network IDS 
Learns the normal ranges of values for 
each packet header field  
65% DR 
2 Wang and Stolfo 
(2004) 
Anomaly based 
network IDS 
Mahalanobis distance for the 
detection phase.  
100% DR with 
0.1% FP for port 80 
traffic 
3 Zanero (2005) Anomaly based 
network IDS 
Uses Self-Organising Map to analyse 
the payload of TCP packets 
66.7% DR with 
0.03% FP  
4 Wang et al 2005 Zero-day worm 
detection 
Correlates ingress/egress payload 
alerts to identify the worm’s initial 
propagation and also automatically 
generates signatures.   
Over 95% of DR 
with less than 0.5% 
of FP 
5 Bolzoni et al (2006) Anomaly based 
network IDS 
Exams the packet payload via the 
combination of Self-Organising Map 
and a modified PAYL system 
73.2% DR with less 
than 1% of FP 
6 Wang et al (2006) Buffer overflow 
attack blocker 
Extracts instruction sequences from 
HTTP request and determines if the 
instruction contains malicious code 
100% DR on HTTP 
traffic 
7 Ahmed and Lhee 
(2011) 
Malware 
detection  
Classifies the packet payload based 
upon three categories: multimedia 
(e.g. jpg), text (e.g. asp) or 
executables.  
FN (4.69%)   and FP 
(2.53%) 
8 Al-Bataineh and 
White (2012) 
Detection of 
data exfiltration  
Uses entropy and byte frequency 
distribution of HTTP POST request 
contents to detect the presence of data 
stealing botnets 
99.97% DR on 
HTTP traffic 
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et.al, 2010). The advantage of using flows is the vast reduction in data that needs to be analysed 
in comparison with packet-based approaches. The flow record normally consists of various 
fields, such as the time and date stamps, the IP addresses of the communication source and 
destination, their port numbers, the length of the total payload, and the type of protocols. The 
flow is normally generated from the raw traffic by using third party applications, such as 
NetFlow, SFlow, JFlow and IPFIX (Wang et al.,2010; Ahmed and Kyung,2011; Al-Bataineh, 
2012; Gaofeng,2014). These applications perform different tasks based on flow based analysis, 
such as traffic monitoring, identifying unauthorised network activity and tracing the source of 
DoS attacks. Typically, this is performed by analysing the current traffic flow and identifying 
any abnormality based upon the historical traffic profile. Subsequently, this concept of how the 
network traffic being analysed, many methods and tools have been proposed and devised 
within the flow based network analysis domain (Dharmapurikar et al.,2003). With increasing 
network bandwidth and encryption, the flow-based approach has become the main approach in 
the market in terms of investigating network traffic issues. In addition, the analysis in large 
capacity networks consumes more time considerably. Subsequently, this approach is more 
efficient in detecting network scans and intrusions, the widespread of malware attacks, and 
monitoring general network usage. However, although the approach solves issues of data 
volume and encryption, the approach is based on including all communication traffic. 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, there have been number of studies conducted about using IP flow to 
detecting threats. Pao and Wang (2004) published a paper titled "NetFlow based Intrusion 
Detection System". They emphasised that the security approach needs to be improved to be 
able to detect insider and outsider attacks. Therefore, they produced a system that can detect 
several types of network attacks from inside and outside organisations. They created an access 
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control list using IP addresses and port numbers. The result of this system was being able to 
detect the Ping sweep, DoS and port scan attacks. 
 
In 2006, Crotti et al presented a classification technique based on the statistical analysis of 
network traffic implemented at IP-level in order to find out a protocol fingerprinting. The study 
included three protocols HTTP, SMTP and POP3 for network traffic on both directions 
between client and server. The finding of the experiments shows that  HTTP protocol was 
scoring the promising result where the detection rate attained  99.41% from the server and 
97.46% from the client side.    
 
Similarly, Song et.al (2006) produced a novel Flow-based Statistical Aggregation schemes 
(FSAS) for network anomaly detection. The technique relied upon an aggregation of traffic 
within a certain time to reduce the amount of data and improve the ability to handle a high 
amount of statistical and packet data. Five parameters were mainly focused on as listed below, 
source and destination IP addresses, source and destination port numbers and Layer 3 protocol 
type. Neural network Classifier (Back-Propagation Networks) was utilised, in which, the 
approach was evaluated using two datasets DARPA 98 dataset and CONEX testbed dataset 
and the result was quite positive with 94% detection rate and 0.2% false positive rate. 
Muraleedharan et. al (2010) applied chi-square detection mechanism to detect anomaly 
activates based on IP flow characteristics. They provided a solution to identify some of the 
anomalies attack like scan a flood attack by studying the behaviour of the network traffic, in 
which, the system concentrated on three protocols, TCP, UDP and ICMP that they selected. 
 
They used different parameters in traffic analysis, such as the number of packets, average 
packet size in bytes, average flow duration in second, average packet per flow, number of single 
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packet flows.  The total number of attacks was 15 and they belonged to two categories, which 
are Scan and Flood. The output of this system was compared with SNORT detection system to 
gauge the detection rate. The result was quite excellent where the detection rate was 100%, but 
there was a long delay compared to Snort. Another limitation that can be discussed is that this 
system was not able to detect other attacks, such as the worm. Moreover, various studies have 
been conducted to improve the detection rate of IDS verifies the IPs flow. For instance, Braga 
et.al utilized Self-Organization Map (SOM) to detect DoS attack. However, other researchers 
have used different classifiers to analysis IP flow in order to detect anomaly or malware attacks.  
 
 
In conclusion, the aforementioned studies discussed a set of behavioural characteristics of the 
packet or flow based. Hence, by using anomaly approach, in depth knowledge of their features 
No. Studies Applications Methods Performance 
1 Pao and Wang, 2004 
Signature based 
network IDS 
Creates an access control list by using 
IP addresses and port numbers 
The method was able 
to detect the Ping 
sweep, DoS and port 
scan attacks. 
2 Crotti et al, 2006 Traffic classification 
Uses a statistical method to analyze 
network traffic at the IP flow level; 
traffic from both directions between 
the client and the server were 
considered. 
99.4% and 97.5% DR 
for server’s and 
client’s HTTP traffic 
respectively 
3 Song et al 2006 Anomaly based network IDS 
Employs the back-propagation neural 
network to exam the statistically 
aggregated flow data  
94% DR with 0.2% FP 
4 Muraleedharan et al, 2010 
Anomaly based 
network IDS  
Utilises a chi-square detection 
mechanism to analyse IP flow 
characteristics   
100% DR on 15 
attacks 
5 Braga et al, 2010 Anomaly based network IDS 
Verifies IP flows by using Self-
Organising Map to detect distributed 
DoS 
99.11% DR and 
0.46% FP 
6 Winter et al, 2011 
Anomaly based 
network IDS 
Uses One-Class Support Vector 
Machines for the analysis of IP flow 
data 
98%DR 
7 Tegeler et al, 2012 
Malware 
detection system 
Utilises a statistical method to create 
training and identifying models for 
detecting botnet traffics   
90% DR with 0.1% FP 
8 Jadidi et al, 2013 Anomaly based network IDS 
Utilises the Multi-Layer Perceptron 
neural network with a Gravitational 
Search Algorithm to analyse the flow 
data 
99.43% DR 
9 Hofstede et al, 2013 
Anomaly based 
network IDS  
Mainly employs Exponentially 
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
for mean calculation algorithm  
 
95% DR with 1% FP 
Table	4.2:	Flow-based	studies	
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has been acquired. However, looking to investigate to what extent using this technique can 
contribute towards identifying individuals activates is required. Subsequently, this work on 
networks is based upon anomaly detection and is NOT what we are looking to achieve. Indeed, 
this research is focused on the identification of people which is a more challenging 
classification problem than anomaly detection has. 
 
4.3 Application-Level User Interaction Features  
The aforementioned studies have relied on monitoring all network traffic; however, this method 
is arguably not effective due to noise that is introduced (e.g. any traffic that is not directly 
related to the user activity/problem at hand) . Whilst the packet-based inspection approach 
offers the opportunity to use the payload (which itself is likely to contain a very rich source of 
discriminative information) the increasingly and widespread use of encryption makes this more 
challenging. Proxies or gateways are a mechanism for allowing organisations to decrypt and 
encrypt such traffic but the increase in the computational overhead and increasing concerns 
related to privacy make this undesirable. Conversely, the nature of the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) protocol, in that the session remains open for a period of time (in comparison to the 
stateless HTTP protocol) results in the flow-based approach not having the appropriate level 
of resolution or granularity required to understand user interactions. For example, several user 
interactions could exist within a single encrypted session). 
 
Subsequently, it is necessary to devise an appropriate feature extraction approach that is a better 
measure of the user activity. Therefore, the focus of this research was on the derivation of user 
interactions from network traffic metadata. This approach is quite complex because in order to 
capture user interaction signature, both traffic directions (from user to application server and 
reverse) need to be investigated. Whilst intuitively the user action at the application level is 
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encapsulated in one form or another in the network layer when it comes identifying and 
extracting this behaviour it is not a simple task. In fact, packets responsible for the user action 
get transmitted with other packets which have different tasks such as, establishing connection, 
connection control, downloading web-page JavaScript and so forth. On top of that the traffic 
may encompass packets associated with other application layer and machine to machine related 
protocols which makes capturing a certain packet in both directions is a challenging task. The 
figure below (Figure 4.1) simulates a reality by capturing user interactions among different 
network traffic. Even the most simply web-applications would result in multiple data flows 
from a single mouse click. 
Figure	4.1	:	Various	protocols	traffic	in	low	network	level		
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, identifying user action, such as BBC.com at the network level is 
challenging due to the very large number of packets that may pass at the same time. Although 
the previous studies relied on capturing and analyzing the whole traffic between the two nodes, 
the user interaction approach has reduced the size of packets that were captured and analyzed 
by focusing and extracting just the packets that represent user actions from network level while 
omitting the rest.  
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Since using TLS has become popular; TLS is the standard security technology for establishing 
an encrypted link between a web server and a client’s browser; efficiency of flow based 
approach of anomaly detection significantly decreased. This is due to a conceptual work of the 
SSL technique that establishes a secure channel between a user and an application server, in 
which, such a channel stays open until the connection has finished. Thus, the previous studies 
have suffered from a level of noise at their network traffic, because they had considered the 
connection between a user and an application server as a one interaction. However, 
scientifically this is might not be right because each user action on the application level has a 
specific IP flow that carries out the request and the respond in both directions, yield there might 
be more than one IP flow within the TLS connection. Thus, this research focuses on the IP flow 
of the user actions in both directions and omits other non-relevant flow. However, this 
technique increases the level of complexity in this approach. This is because a user may 
establish different TLS connections, thus, the number of packets from user to other applications 
and reverse that belongs to these TLS connections that will increase the level of noise and make 
capturing the associated user action IP flow more difficult. However, these features that can be 
obtained from the application level, will reflect the reality of user activities within those 
applications, which may contribute towards identifying individuals.  
 
Accordingly, to determine whether user interactions could be derived from network traffic 
different web-applications across a range of categories needed to be investigated. For example, 
a search engine, online shopping, social network and so forth (web developer, 2015). Based on 
this concept, it was decided to choose certain services in different categories in order to make 
sure a variety of Internet services were included for analysis. For instance, webmail, social 
networking, news, online storage, file transfer, search engines, VoIP application, video/TV 
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streaming, online documents, and e-shopping, as shown in Table 4.3 below, have been selected 
to be part of this investigation. 
 
 
No 	 Service	 Example Applications	
1	 Information search	 Google	
3	 Blogging/microblogging	 Twitter	
4	 Video sharing/streaming	 YouTube	
5	 Online documents	 Google Docs	
6	 Online shopping (E-Commerce)	 E-bay	
7	 Online encyclopedia	 Wikipedia	
8	 Email web mail	 Outlook 	
9	 Social/Professional Networking	 Facebook	
10	 News	 BBC	
11	 Online storage	 Dropbox	
12	 VoIP	 Skype	
Table	4.3	:	Commonly	used	Internet	services	and	example	applications	
The table below (Table 4.4) illustrates a sample of the user actions that are embedded within 
Skype application. 
  
Service	 Application	 User	Actions	
		
	VoIP	
		
		
		
	Skype	
		
		
Text	message	
Voice	call	
Video	call	
File	attach	
Idle	
Table	4.4	:	Skype	user	actions	
 
The section below discusses the viability of user interactions whether it is even possible to 
identify it or not. 
 
4.4 Methodology  
The approach is based on the theory that states how users interact with Internet-based 
applications on their computer produces a (relatively) unique network packet signature which 
can subsequently be used to identify the activity.  
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In order to test this hypothesis, an investigation was undertaken to determine to what extent 
these signatures could be developed. In the first instance, ten of the most popular Internet-based 
applications were selected for analysis in order to obtain comprehensive user actions date in 
various applications (eBizMBA, 2016). These applications are Google, YouTube, Skype, 
Facebook, Dropbox, Outlook, Twitter, Wikipedia, eBay and BBC. To ensure the resulting 
analysis is reliable, three researchers were tasked with the collection and analysis of network 
traces against a predefined set of network captures against user activities by following patterns 
validation model as illustrated in Figure 4.2, which themselves were repeated 20 times in order 
to allow for any variance in the resulting network traffic.  
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
	
	
Figure	4.2	:	Pattern	validation	
 
Consequently, each researcher swapped his list with another researcher to verify the same user 
actions and then comparing the final result that were obtained by the three researchers. Finally, 
the most constant and stable signature of user actions are going to be utilized in this research. 
The main advantage of this process is to make sure the three researchers identified the same 
user actions signatures. This is because some user signatures are not stable in their form or/and 
value. For instance, the text message user action signature in the Skype application achieved a 
different packet length and this is because when the user increase message length the packet 
Analysis	
Traffic 
Identify	a	
signature 
Validate	a	
signature 
Start	
connection 
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value of signature changes as well. Whilst the typing action on the Facebook application has a 
constant value but different number of packets that represents this signature. On top of that 
there are some unrelated packets that come alone between the signature packet as can be seen 
in Figure 4.3, which makes the feature identification process of user actions more difficult. 
	
Figure	4.3	:	Identifying	user	interaction	from	network	traffic	
 
Figure 4.3 demonstrates the level of complexity that exists in one of the investigated 
applications (which is actually the simpler BBC application). The monitoring process of the 
signature starts when the user presses on one of BBC sections at application layer. This request 
is then directed to the BBC server. However, the response from BBC server about this request 
is not limited to this action, it usually returns with a very large number of packets associated 
with it as can be seen in Figure 4.3.  These packets that were generated from BBC server may 
represent different things, such as video, images, JavaScript and so forth. Hence, the challenge 
is to extract the related signature of the page navigation from this larger set of packets 
	
	
59	
associated with it. This noisy and variable output was a key consideration in the decision to 
assign three researchers for validating each of the patterns. 
The table below (see Table 4.5) illustrates the whole user interactions across the different 
applications that are included in this study. The researcher assured that the main user actions 
in different applications is a part of this investigation, for instance YouTube application has 
two main tasks, upload and download,  
Application Name User Actions Application Name User Actions 
 
Skype 
Text messages 
 
Outlook 
File attachments 
Audio calls Compose an email 
Video calls Reply/forward an email 
File transfer Insert a recipient 
Click on contacts 
 
 
 
Facebook  
Post 
Idle Comment 
 
Online documents 
(Google Docs) 
Creation Share 
Editing Find friends 
Share with other s Page loading 
Delete file Attach files 
Wikipedia 
Search  Chat 
Download  Typing 
YouTube 
Watch videos 
 
BBC 
Page navigation 
Video upload Watching video clips 
Search engines 
(Google) 
 
Keyword search Listening to audio  
 Page navigation 
 
Dropbox 
Download files 
 
eBay 
Browsing products Upload files 
money transaction Share files/folders 
Comment 
Folder navigations 
  
  
 
 
Twitter 
Idle/Reading  
Tweet  
Download  
Upload 
Click Contact 
Table	4.5	:	Applications	user	actions	
 
Despite the fact that network traffic has got a numbers of features, the methodology that are 
used to obtained the user interaction has focused upon features that have a vital influence of 
representing user action at the application level. Therefore, a list of network metadata 
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parameters was utilized for the analysis, there are as follows: the date and time stamp, the IP 
addresses of source and destination, their port numbers, protocol ID (either TCP or UDP), the 
length of a datagram, and several TCP flags (e.g. SYN, FIN, ACK and PUSH). Based on these 
parameters, a number of features were collected for better representation of user interaction as 
illustrated in Table 4.6 below.  
No. Feature Name Example 
1 Start Time of interaction. 2014.11.11.10:48:19.769086 
2 End Time of interaction. 2014.11.11.10:48:19.817979 
3 Source port number. 58823 
4 Service IP. 216.58.208. % 
5 Service port number. 443 
6 #  packets send from (client to server) 2 
7 Total size of packets sends (client to 
server) 
2000 
8 #  packets send from (server to client) 6 
9 Total size of packets sends (server to 
client) 
2868 
Table	4.6	:	User	Interaction	Features	
 
4.5 Experimental Result  
There are 9 applications included in this investigation in order to find out a unique signature of 
user actions after excluding two application File transfer and eBay due to lack of usage of the 
former and noise signature for the later. The following sections will explain each application’s 
user action signature and provide a summarized table of the signatures followed by discussion 
on how the researcher captured user actions from network traffic.  
There are some abbreviation words mentioned in the following sections that need to be clarified 
before starting the analysis process, such as stream (10 packets or more transmitted from one 
side to another), multiply (between 3 and 8 packet convey and may not in sequence order) and 
MTU (maximum transmission unite).  
4.5.1 News (BBC) 
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The BBC application has been chosen because of its popularity in the news category. However, 
its user interactions are quite limited to the three main tasks which are listed in Table 4.7 below, 
associated with their signatures.  
 
 
 
	
	
Table	4.7	:	BBC	user	action	signature	
Extracting a pattern from BBC website was a challenging step. This is due to the number of 
IPs address that appeared during the experiment and the ability to utilize all the data traffic 
during certain time was quite difficult as demonstrated in Figure 4.4. Hence, there were several 
attempts to validate the user action signature by repeating the capturing and analyzing 
processes of user action, and this step was done across all investigated applications. 
 
BBC application has three different types of user actions identified as being highlighted, page 
navigation, watching video and listening to audio. The former signature is identified through a 
stream number of packets that have various lengths that are transferred from BBC server to the 
client side as can be seen in Figure 4.4.    
 
Figure	4.4	:	Starting	navigation	on	BBC	
 
Regarding the other user actions (watching video and listening to audio), the length of packet 
is different as demonstrated in Table 4.7. This kind of differences can help to overcome of the 
User interactions # packets Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
Page navigation Stream Various Server > Client 
Watching video Stream MTU (Almost) Server > Client 
Listening to audio Stream 120-280 Server > Client 
Searching  × × × 
Comment × × × 
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similarities that exist between the user actions signatures, such as the number of packets stream 
from BBC server to client with total length almost MTU and from the client to the BBC server 
mainly a stream of TCP ACK packets are observed as can been seen in Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure	4.5	:	Audio	and	video	user	action	signature	
 
4.5.2 Outlook 
The process of Outlook services is quite complex. This is due to number of IPs addresses that 
appeared in the experiments were subject to change, which has increased the disruption of 
pattern extraction. The Outlook login website has number of IPs within the same range, such 
as 131.253.61.66 or 131.253.61.84 and after a user accesses its account, another IPs have raised 
up based on the interaction selected. However, there is a time of stability where the IP address 
of the Outlook application can be detected.  	
 
Identifying a signature that belongs to the Emails interactions is one of the main targets to this 
particular service. Therefore, this research has tried to cover all interactions within the Outlook 
application account. And, some of email interactions can be possibly determined as 
demonstrated in Table 4.8 below, in association with their signatures. 
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Table	4.8	:	Outlook	application	signatures	
 
1. File attachment 
 File attachment user action signature is relatively easy to identify. This is due to the form of 
its traffic at the network level as a stream number of packets transmit from client to Outlook 
server with total length almost MTU as illustrated in Figure 4.6 below. 
 
Figure	4.6	:	Attach	file	
 
2. Compose email and Add recipient 
In these user actions, four packets are transmitted from client to Outlook server. These packets 
have total size around 4450 bytes (this number calculated based on similarity of time stamp 
and identical source and destination). It is transmitted by PSH and ACK form. When the 
packets are safely delivered to the server, the server sends one packet with the size of 971 bytes 
in compose user action; as shown in Figure 4.7.  While in add recipient the same length of 
packet send from client to application server.  
User interactions # of packets Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
File attachments Stream MTU (Almost) Client > Server 
Compose an email One 971 Server > Client 
Insert a recipient One 971 Client > Server 
Main page content × × × 
Send × × × 
Reply × × × 
Delete × × × 
Forward × × × 
Search for email × × × 
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Figure	4.7	:	Pres	compose	icons	and	add	recipient	
 
4.5.3 Skype  
Skype application is one of the accurate applications in terms of type of signature. Indeed, it is 
considered as one of the applications that have many user actions from different categorizes 
and it is rich in signature side where the majority of its interactions are determined with a high 
level of accuracy as shown in Table 4.9. However, text message was the only action that was 
often altered, hence further investigation was carried out to explore this issue, in which, the 
researcher found that the length of the message was different, thus, the size of the packet was 
changed. 
 
 
 
 
 
	
Table	4.9	:	Skype	application	signatures	
1. Online Text Message 
The researcher was able to identify the length of the message by testing this user action many 
times over as demonstrated in Figure 4.8 below. The baseline of testing a message could be 
identified by sending a different length of text message form the client to the Skype server 
where the result of this process was determined in which 794 bytes is the baseline of text 
message user action.  
User interactions # packets Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
Text messages One 794+ Client > Server 
Audio calls Stream 117-147 Both Clients 
Video calls Stream 1165-1365 Both Clients 
File transfer Stream MTU (Almost) Sending Client> 
receiving client 
Click on contacts One 747 Client> Server 
Idle One 587 Client > Server 
Add contact × × × 
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Figure	4.8	:	Skype	message	
 
2. Audio user action 
In audio user action, the connection is established between two nodes directly after the Skype 
server sets up the communication channel as can be seen in Figure 4.9. The connection is 
established by using UDP protocol and the data was flown from node 1 to node 2 with a range 
of sizes between 117 to 147 bytes. Once the audio call has finished the UDP connection also 
stops but the connection with Skype server remains valid.   
	
Figure	4.9	:	Audio	action	
 
3. Video interaction  
This user action signature has the same signature of audio user action in terms of connection 
between the two clients without passing through skype server but the difference is in the size 
of packet, where it is between 1165 to 1380 bytes as demonstrated in Figure 4.10.  
 
Figure	4.10	:	Video	conference	
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4. Sending File  
It can be considered as similar to the previous two user actions in terms of number and direction 
of the signature of user action packets.  However, this user action has something different that 
can be used to distinguish it from others which is the total length of packets.  Figure 4.11 shows 
that packet size is the main sign to differ sending file from others; the size of packet here is 
MTU. 
 
Figure	4.11	:	Sending	file	
 
5. Click on Contact and Idle 
These two user actions have a similarity in terms of number of packets exist in this signature. 
In both of them, the user actions signatures were identified as one packet pattern. However, the 
size of the packet is the main pattern for both of them that can be used to distinguish each user 
action from another. As can be seen in Figure 4.12, click on contact is represented by packets 
sent from client to the Skype server with size of 747 bytes by using TCP protocol and this 
amount is 587 bytes in idle action as shown in Figure 4.13. 
 
Figure	4.12	:	press	on	contact	
 
Figure	4.13	:	Idle	status	
 
4.5.4 Facebook  
Facebook application is one of the applications that has a number of user actions investigated. 
The majority of its user actions signature were less accurate comparing to other applications 
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user signatures, such as Skype signatures and it is quite complex to determine. For instance, 
typing user action is represented by two packets sent from client to the Facebook server, 
however, these packets could be transmitted with the same overall length and number of 
packets but the length in each packet changes every time. The table below explains the user 
actions and their identified signatures from network traffic followed by explanation of each 
one. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	4.10	:	Facebook	application	signature	
 
1. Typing  
When the user starts typing on Facebook, a number of packets are sent from the client to a 
Facebook server. The total size of two of these packets is 1,502 bytes (i.e. 1434+68 or 
1169+333). These packets are sent in less than one millisecond timeframe (as demonstrated in 
Figure 4.14).  
 
Figure	4.14	:	User	Typing	on	FB	
User interactions # packets Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
Page loading Stream Various Server > Client 
Attach files Stream MTU (Almost) Client > Server 
Typing Multiply 1,502 Client > Server 
Post × × × 
Like × × × 
Comment × × × 
Add or remove × × × 
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2. Attach file 
The files are transmitted from client to server in group of packet (MTU size over TCP protocol) 
as shown in Figure 4.15 followed by group of Acknowledgments back from server.  
 
Figure	4.15	:	File	Attach				
 
3.  Page loading 
Figure 4.16 demonstrates the main page load action, when a user presses main icon, stream of 
data transfers from Facebook server to the client and the size was MTU.  
 
Figure	4.16	:	Page	loading	
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4.5.5 Online Document (Google) 
Google Doc application has been chosen to be the example of online document category in this 
study in order to have a different number of user actions. However, one user action was 
identified at network level as shown in Table 4.11. This is due to the complexity of identifying 
user action signatures when the signature continues to change during the experiment and this 
has become clear in the validation process of identifying user actions methodology. In fact, the 
three researchers found that user actions in Google application achieved different signatures in 
each researcher’s list and the only user action that remains stable is edit document as show 
below.  
 
 
	
	
Table	4.11	:	Google	Doc.	application	signature	
 
1. Edit 
There were two packets sent from client to server as illustrated in Figure 4.17. One of them in 
the beginning of interaction with size ranging between 530 up to 650 bytes and this is the 
signature of this user action on Google application that can be determined.  
 
Figure	4.17	:	Edit	document	
 
4.5.6 Video (YouTube) 
User 
interactions 
# packets Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
Edit Multiple 530+ Client > Server 
Create × × × 
Share × × × 
Delete × × × 
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There are two main user actions in this application which are watching video and uploading 
video. Thus, the investigation process has focused upon these two user actions. Table 4.12 
shows that watching and uploading user actions have got a signature. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table	4.12	:	YouTube	signatures	
  
1. Watching Video (download)  
When a user start chooses to watch a video, stream of packets is transferred t from YouTube 
server to the client as shown in Figure 4.18 with MTU size. These packets are intervened by 
Acknowledgement reply from the client side from time to time.  
 
Figure	4.18	:	Watching	Video	
 
2. Uploading Video 
This option requires an account to be created on YouTube website in order to upload videos. 
After that, when the upload process starts a stream of packets are transferred from client side 
to the YouTube server by MTU size of each packet as demonstrated in Figure 4.19. 
User interactions #  packets Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
Watching Video Stream MTU (Almost) Server > Client 
Upload Stream MTU (Almost) Client > Server 
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Figure	4.19	:	Uploading	Video	
 
4.5.7 Online Storage (Dropbox) 
The researcher has chosen Dropbox application to investigate cloud storage. This is because 
Dropbox services are becoming more popular. There are two main interactions investigated 
and their signatures explained below. 
 
 
	
Table	4.13	:	Dropbox	application	signature	
1. Upload  
When a user uploads a document or file, the signature represents a group of packets with MTU 
size transferred from client to Dropbox server as shown in Figure 4.20. After each group that 
sent from client, there is a group of ACK packet sent from server to client. This process 
continues up to the document or file sent to server. The transmission is over TCP protocol and 
the data is sent and received through port 443 on the server side. 	
User 
interactions 
No. of 
packets 
Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
Download  Stream MTU (Almost) Server > Client 
Upload  Stream MTU (Almost) Client > Server 
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Figure	4.20	:	Uploading	document	
 
2. Download  
As can be seen in Figure 4.21, two to three packets are sent from server to client with MTU 
size followed by one ACK packet sent from client. This process continues up until all 
documents or files are completely delivered to the server. The transmission is over TCP 
protocol and the data is sent and received through port 443 on the server side.  
 
Figure	4.21	:	Downloading	document	
 
4.5.8 Wikipedia 
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This application is the one that has been frequently visited as it is an open source for different 
subjects. So it is important to explore whether some of user actions can be captured here or not. 
The table below (see Table 4.15) shows that two user actions signature have been identified 
form this application; page viewing and download, in which they are going to be explained in 
the following paragraph. 
 
 
 
 
1. Page viewing  
The data is moving from client to server through port 80. It is possible to identify each 
navigation action within websites by determining SYN and FIN, ACK using Wireshark as 
sown in Figure 4.22. 
 
 
Figure	4.22	:	Page	viewing	
2. Downloading  
In the downloading user action, the data is moving from server to client in group of two to four 
packets with MTU size until the download is complete as can be seen in Figure 4.23. 
User interactions No. Packets Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
Page viewing  One  Various  Client > Server  
Download   Stream MTU (Almost) Server> Client  
Table	4.14	:	Wikipedia	application	signature	
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Figure	4.23	:	Downloading	file	
 
4.5.9 Twitter  
Twitter application has got a number of user actions that are commonly utilized by users due 
to the low level of complexity that has, which may encourage everyone to experience their 
action. However, table below (see Table 4.15) shows that three different user actions signature 
were successfully identified with different levels of accuracy as explained below.  
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
Table	4.15	:	Twitter	application	signature	
 
1. Tweet  
Doing tweet interaction several times gave a visible baseline. This baseline is valid with text 
tweet only. 182 bytes is an initial number. The experiment started with a tweet that is 10 char. 
long and found out that the packet size is 192 bytes as can be seen in Figure 4.27. Subsequently, 
number of characters was increased to 20 char. thus the packet size has increased to 202 bytes 
as illustrated in Figure 4.24. Therefore, 182 bytes considered as a bassline of tweeting user 
action. 
 
User interactions # packets Total length 
(bytes) 
Directions 
Text message One 192+ Client>Server 
Upload Stream MTU Client>Server 
Click contact × × × 
Follow × × × 
Plying Video × × × 
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Figure	4.24	:	Sending	10	and	20	characters	
 
2. Uploading 
This signature becomes obvious when a user starts uploading an image through tweet 
interaction. Then, a group of packets are transmitted from client to twitter server over TCP 
protocol. The size of these packets is dependent on the size of image, but it generally ranges 
from 1434 bytes. After the packets are received by the server, the server sends a group of 
acknowledgment packets to the client. The process continues until the image is delivered to 
Twitter server. 
 
Figure	4.25	:	Uploading	image	
In the same context, the examination of the 9 services is done similar to what have been 
explained before. Forty-two user actions across twelve services have been investigated, and the 
majority of them have a signature that belongs to the one of the categories mentioned above.  
 
4.6 Discussion  
At first glance, and by looking to the very large number of packets that pass through the 
network layer, capturing user actions to be impossible; however, applying the methodology of 
feature extraction process for network traffic metadata resulted in a simple concept of how user 
actions can be identified. Table 4.16 presents user actions signatures of all investigated 
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applications. The experiment has proved that identifying user action at application level is 
possible and unique as described in Table 4.16.  
 
Table	4.16	:	User	actions	signatures	
Accordingly, 30 user actions across all applications out of 45 were successfully identified. 
Indeed, some user actions within the same application have a level of consistency in their 
signature, such as YouTube application where user action (upload/download) is represented by 
a stream of packets and MTU packet length but in different direction based on user action and 
others have not, for instance on twitter application each user action has different signature. In 
addition, user action signature uniqueness is measured by to what extent user actions signature 
is precise. With reference to Table 4.16, it is evident that user action signatures have fluctuated 
across the investigated applications. However, there are some applications that have achieved 
		Services	 User Action Signature Applications IP  
    No. of 
packet 
Size of          
packet 
 Direction 			Outlook		  File attach. Stream MTU Client>Server 131.253.61.% 204.79.197.% 
204.79.197.% 
 Compose email One 971 Server>Client 
 Insert   recipient One 971 Clientr>Server 		Facebook	  Share Multiple Various Server>Client    31.13.%.%  Page loading Stream MTU Server>Client  Attach files Stream MTU Client>Server 
 Chat Multiple 2,625+ Client>Server 
 Typing Multiple 1,502 Client>Server 			BBC	  Page Navigation Stream Various Server>Client  212.58.244.% 
212.58.246.% 
Watching   Video Stream MTU Server>Client 
 Listening  Audio Stream MTU Server>Client 			Dropbox	  Download  files Stream MTU Server>Client   
108.160.172. 
 Upload files Stream MTU Client>Server 
 Page navigate Multiple Various Server>Client 						Skype	
 Text messages One 794+ Client>Server  
 
 
157.56.193.% 
157.56.126.% 
 Audio calls Stream 129-147 Both Clients 
 Video calls Stream 1165-1365 Both Clients 
 File transfer Stream MTU Both Clients 
 Click contact One 747 Client>Server 
 Idle One 587 Client>Server 			Google		  Editing Multiple 530+ Client>Server 216.58.208.% 173.194.78.% 
216.58.209.% 
 File download Stream MTU Server>Client 	YouTube	  Watch videos Stream MTU Server>Client  216.58.198.%  Video upload Stream MTU Client>Server 	Twitter	  Tweet One 192+ Client>Server 185.45.5.%  199.96.57.% 
104.244.42.% 
 Upload Stream MTU Client>Server 		Wikipedia	  Download Stream MTU Server>Client  91.198.174.%  V   Viwing Stream MTU Server>Client 
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a sufficient level of accuracy in their signature, such as Outlook, YouTube and Drobox. In fact, 
Skype application is considered as the most accurate application among them due to the high 
level of accuracy in its user action signatures in terms of number and total length of packets.  
 
Although all applications that are included in this research have achieved an acceptable level 
of user action signature uniqueness such as Facebook, Twitter and Wikipedia, eBay application 
was an exceptional case where no single user action signature could be identified due to the 
noise of its traffic, in addition, the whole user actions in this application are encrypted since 
the website open. Ultimately, it is clear that there is a strong chance to determine the number 
of user actions signature in different applications, and this outcome may contribute towards an 
accurate user profile that would reveal what kind of actions being utilized within different 
applications. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 	
Although the existing network traffic analysis based on anomaly detection is widely used in 
preventing/detecting insider threats, it suffers from different issues that are reducing their 
capability which subsequently causes serious concerns for organizations. Therefore, 
applications level user interactions proposed as a new approach required to overcome of the 
previous approaches limitations.  
The user actions investigation shown showed that how complex identifying user actions 
signature at network level is. However, a set of experiments have been conducted on different 
applications that proved that a number of user interactions in different application can be 
identified.   
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5 User Behavioral Profiling from Network Traffic 
Metadata 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that it is possible to identify user interactions with Internet-
enabled applications from network traffic meta data. This chapter builds upon these to create 
feature vectors and develop and evaluate a network-based behavioural profile biometric. 
Behavioural profiling may have the potential to identify a user based on the user interactions 
signatures that predefined in the previous chapter. This leads to utilised a comprehensive 
methodology that is including some of the key functions such as classification and evaluation 
processes to measure the success of this approach. 
 
5.1 Methodology  
The experiment process consists of a number of steps which are demonstrated in Figure 5.1. that 
members the sequence for each function. The user's behavioural profiling flows from one 
function to another through the directional arrows. The methodology aims to measure to what 
extent it is feasible to use behavioural profiling based on user interactions.  Data collection is 
the first step in focusing on the targeted applications highlighted before. Then selecting the 
features after applying the user action signatures to create a new dataset that includes user 
actions from different applications. However, this data needs to be normalized to be more 
beneficial to the classifier as demonstrates in the following sections.  
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Figure	5.1:	User	behavioural	profiling	processes	
 
5.1.1 Dataset 
The effectiveness and robustness of an experiment such as this are largely dependent upon the 
quality and quantity of data. After a search for open-access data sets failed to identify any 
suitable sources, a significant data collection activity was undertaken.  Network-based traffic 
data was collected centrally from the local research Centre (ethical approval appendix B). This 
enabled the researchers to set static IPs within the network in order to provide the ground truth 
and avoid changing IPs. Twenty-seven participants took part in the study that lasted for 2 
months; from 7th November 2014 to 7th January 2015. This process focused purely on the 
collection of network metadata.  The size of the complete data set attained at the end was 62.4 
GB with over 140 million packets. The source IP address was anonymized in order to maintain 
privacy. Ethical approval was sought and granted (please refer to Appendix B for more 
information).  
 
The raw data describes the natural manner of connection between users and all others services. 
This traffic includes a number of packets for establishing the connection with the server and 
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all applications that users have used. Furthermore, the database has been built to reveal the key 
information about each connection and this includes, time of the request, source and destination 
port, service IP addresses, size of packet and type of packet (as illustrated in Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure	5.2:	Raw	packet	header	information	
 
There are some parameters that exist in the dataset as shown in the last column in Figure 5.2 
and is explained in details in Table 5.1 so that they can be understood. These abbreviations 
represent the status of the packet in TCP protocol (TCP flags) and number 1 refers to the UDP 
traffic. As discussed in the previous chapter, every IP flow may contain separate interactions; 
hence it is important to realize when the connection is started. Synchronize abbreviation (S) 
represents the start of user action when the request is sent from the client to the server and the 
following packets represent a response from the server (Syn/Ack), end of action is described 
in the database as (F) and it is a required confirmation packet from the other side to show that 
the action is finished and this is represented as abbreviation (F.) that means ‘Finish 
Acknowledgment'.   
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Column  Description  
Time Time when packet sending 
S_IP Source IP address 
S_port Source Port 
D_IP Destination IP address 
D_port Destination port 
Length Size of packet  
 
 
 
Tags 
 
 
1 UDP traffic 
S Synchronize  
S. Synchronize Acknowledge 
. Acknowledgment 
F Finish  
F. Finish Acknowledgment 
PUH Push  
Table	5.1:	Dataset	description	
 
The dataset has included all traffic that was captured between the participants’ machines and 
any Internet services. Hence, some of preprocessing actions need to be done in order to orient 
the research to the main point that was discussed by focusing on the 10 Internet services that 
were chosen in the previous chapter.  
 
5.1.1.1 Targeted Services Selection  
The raw data included the metadata of the whole traffic that passed through the network 
gateway. This means that it is not limited to the nine Internet services that were predefined and 
investigated in the previous chapter. Subsequently, it had to be categorized based on the 
application, by doing a segregation process to enable every user to have a separate part that 
contains his traffic on each application and this process needs to be applied to 140 million 
packets that are representing the entire data set. Amongst this traffic, the experiment sought to 
focus upon 9 services that were previously analysed for user interaction signature in the 
previous chapter; after excluding eBay application due to the high level of noise during the 
signature identifying phase. Table 5.2 below shows that the selected applications, their network 
traffic and the number of participants in each application. It is clear that YouTube, Facebook 
and Google applications have the largest number of network traffic compared to other 
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applications and this is predictable due to their type of signatures as well as a large number of 
monthly visits across the world as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The traffic reveals that the majority of participants have utilised all applications. In fact, there 
are 4 Internet-based services across 9 services that have been utilized by all 27 participants, in 
which; two of them are into in domain social networks which are Facebook and Twitter while 
the other two are Google and YouTube services. Throughout the experiment, more than half 
of participants went through the whole 9 services. Skype has got the lowest usage in this 
experiment by 12 participants. In contrast, BBC and Dropbox applications have been utilized 
by more than 17 participants.  The table above (see Table 5.2) demonstrates a number of 
participants in each application and it shows that Google, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, 
Outlook and Wikipedia seem to be the core applications in this experiment and have enough 
popularity to have been used by the majority of participants. Unfortunately, as the purpose of 
the data collection methodology was to collect real users behaviour over a significant period of 
time, it was always likely that some applications would be not be used or would not be used 
enough to be able to be incorporated with the study. The overall figures, however, suggest there 
is sufficient volumes of interactions and users across a good number of applications to proceed. 
 
Table 5.3 demonstrates the number of packets in each application at a user level. The amount 
of user traffic in each application relies on two factors. The first one is how frequently the user 
No. Application No. of packets No. of Participants 
1 YouTube 21,131,316 27 
2 Facebook 5,727,953 27 
3 Google 1,857,420 27 
4 Twitter 747,584 27 
5 Wikipedia 1,250,302 24 
6 Outlook  703,711 24 
7 Dropbox 17,480,739 18 
8 BBC 201,263 17 
9 Skype 575,030 12 
Table	5.2:	Total	number	of	packets	and	participants	per	application	
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has utilized an application; some applications have been used quite often during the day; such 
as Facebook and Twitter. The second factor is the nature of application traffic, for instance, 
Dropbox application traffic is quite massive and this is due to download and upload capabilities 
that it offers. 
 
ID BBC Dropbox FB Google Outlook  Skype Twitter Wiki. YouTube Total   
1 545 0 2559 14479 65 0 1593 1658 66846 87745 
2 9173 16029 123930 30390 834 91 90385 6084 496536 773452 
3 937 0 69853 3301 1088 94 13913 7895 162538 259619 
4 0 68303 540992 54971 36912 0 9643 481 6977320 7688622 
5 0 0 5238 82272 276 0 3814 474 363268 455342 
6 259 29895 6250 31108 2033 53026 1723 0 242199 366493 
7 1176 62 24144 115720 236 0 20844 3253 535746 701181 
8 0 0 669241 39609 90 0 1542 2241 175470 888193 
9 2081 78294 591562 70626 101335 60283 95826 9544 2860391 3869942 
10 0 0 45233 32867 13351 40742 12280 1277 165192 310942 
11 505 0 37665 27085 19715 40694 5229 678 212851 344422 
12 18734 1347 44985 295503 9935 36676 58610 5703 2572454 3043947 
13 3045 45295 346115 113603 24 0 8679 1078 112193 630032 
14 2440 251812 7751 439 2088 45430 14123 969 127571 452623 
15 170 49672 652252 21130 339 0 46797 27236 504684 1302280 
16 0 16474 2846 12706 1264 0 720 3034 10130 47174 
17 51 0 803 12247 0 0 270 5444 11828 30643 
18 7394 10859 21555 117756 204 0 6582 2128 13262 179740 
19 18457 19219 13943 48101 65957 41497 4913 7567 195874 415528 
20 0 887 255886 51059 283 0 13906 21992 1048721 1392734 
21 756 20929 1538 19806 1593 41442 1823 421 95363 183671 
22 0 0 2398 2839 0 0 232 0 13871 19340 
23 0 0 314270 5724 115 0 1563 4753 80459 406884 
24 2577 5727 7167 24045 118360 42839 3044 12661 93149 309569 
25 0 1059 8976 15942 0 0 1329 1056 92418 120780 
26 0 18 228082 11673 8 0 1499 1066 81918 324264 
27 1157 15830 27477 332077 115908 42282 50081 3044 370566 958422 
Table	5.3:	Number	of	packet	in	each	application	per	participant	
 
There are some users who have acquired a small amount of network traffic across the services 
that have been utilized, such as Users 1 and 22 as illustrated in Table 5.3. These kinds of users 
reveal the daily usage of Internet services and type of applications that are preferred. For 
instance, both of them (user 1 and 22) did not utilize Dropbox and Skype applications, in 
contrast, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube applications were usually used based on the number 
of interactions they have. 
 
Another example that is shown in Table 5.3, some participants have utilized all applications 
and the number of their network traffic is quite high. User 2, 9, 12 and 27 have a good number 
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of network traffic which roughly ranges between 700 thousand and 3.5 million in all 
applications. However, there are some differences among them, e.g. a number of packets in 
Outlook application for user2 are quite low while user 27 has got a high number of packets 
with over than 100 thousand. In contrast, this amount is not the same on BBC application where 
user 2 has a high number of packets compared to user 27. However, Twitter and YouTube 
applications have acquired the highest number of packets for all of them. 
 
In terms of the applications usage, there are some participants who did not use some of the 
applications. With reference to the Table 5.3 above, user 22 has achieved the lowest point, in 
which it has utilized four applications out of nine; which are Facebook, Google, Twitter and 
YouTube. Nevertheless, there are also a good number of participants who did use the nine 
applications, such as users 9 and 27. The percentage of the number of users who used at least 
eight applications is quite promising, which is 60%. Hence, the applications usage boundary is 
between four; which represents 3%; and more than five applications; which represent 96%; for 
each individual and this is in accordance with what the previous chapter proposed about 
choosing the top applications' usage to be investigated in this experiment. 
 
5.1.1.2 User Interaction Creation 
The previous section shows the volume of network traffic for each participant on each 
application. However, this traffic represents the raw data the users have, regardless of whether 
it represents user actions or not. Subsequently, it is important to apply the user interactions 
signatures that were identified in Chapter 4 to investigate whether this data has a meaning or 
not. Hence, after applying the user interactions, the outcomes reveal that there is valuable data 
on the majority of applications. Table 5.4 illustrates the total number of interactions that exist 
after applying user interactions signatures upon each application. 
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No. Application No. Interactions No. Participants  Data Reduction % 
1 YouTube 1,322,848 27 93.8 
2 Facebook 386,741 27 93.3 
3 Google 194,404 27 89.6 
4 Twitter 71,403 27 90.5 
5 Wikipedia 5,719 20 99.5 
6 Outlook  122,989 19 82.6 
7 Dropbox 98,555 16 99.4 
8 Skype 178,686 12 69 
9 BBC 4,180 12 98 
Table	5.4:		Number	of	Interactions	per	application	with	rate	of	data	reduction	
 
With reference to Table 5.4 above, it is evident that there was a large reduction in data occurred 
after applying the user interaction signatures. Wikipedia and Dropbox have acquired the 
maximum amount of this by omitting about 99% of their network traffic. However, skype and 
Outlook are the two applications that have achieved a low data reduction with 69% and 82.6% 
and this is due to (as mentioned above) the nature of their interactions. Nevertheless, this scale 
of reduction will have a huge impact on the data processing requirements for the recognition 
system and over packet-based analysis systems. 
 
According to the table above, there is sufficient interactions across a number of applications 
such as YouTube, Facebook, Google and Twitter that have data from the entire population of 
participants. In the same context, other applications have acquired a sufficient number of 
interactions in their traffic with at least 60% of participants, such as Wikipedia, Outlook and 
Dropbox. 
Figure 5.3 demonstrates that the proportion of each application interaction from the total 
number of interactions during the experiment period. YouTube application cumulatively 
represented 55% of the total users’ interactions due to the nature of user action signature in 
which it has been utilized by all participants.  
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Figure	5.3:	Overview	of	user	interactions	per	application		
 
In the same vein, Facebook and Google applications achieved the 2nd and 3rd applications in 
terms of user interactions since they have been utilized by all users. Although there are some 
applications that suffer from a lack of participants such as Outlook and Skype, they have 
acquired a good number of user interactions as can be seen in the Figure above (see Figure 
5.3). This is because of their user actions represent the main function of them and they were 
quite accurate.    
 
Table 5.5 illustrates the number of user interactions in each application for each individual. 
Users 17 and 22 achieved the minimum numbers of interactions in total with 2586 and 5314 
interactions respectively across their usage of applications. While the maximum total numbers 
of user interactions that have been achieved by user 4 and 15 with 484,332 and 148,538 
interactions respectively. 
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ID BBC Dropbox FB Google Outlook  skype Twitter Wiki. YouTube Total 
1 0 0 528 1898 0 0 266 40 7620 10352 
2 654 6156 11068 3136 174 44 11494 232 50262 83220 
3 28 0 3894 426 276 30 1504 164 22162 28484 
4 0 21850 41252 15740 4404 0 1086 0 4.00E+05 484332 
5 0 0 1110 17500 46 0 596 0 85356 104608 
6 0 9196 386 2752 430 67528 218 0 28318 108828 
7 108 0 4344 12590 36 0 3366 114 52550 73108 
8 0 0 63104 3628 0 0 214 44 17404 84394 
9 124 3164 68764 7248 10902 2922 9950 1384 2.00E+05 304458 
10 0 0 2240 3904 3084 7698 1296 54 20050 38326 
11 0 0 5350 4594 3162 1208 616 0 26284 41214 
12 1630 540 7570 31616 2524 41010 7034 232 105336 197492 
13 86 4976 16700 13454 0 0 1192 30 15050 51488 
14 146 8900 1440 122 574 9058 1736 30 13346 35352 
15 0 12416 43894 2200 46 0 9270 798 79914 148538 
16 0 6134 662 860 62 0 106 228 1206 9258 
17 0 0 150 992 0 0 38 168 1238 2586 
18 278 4156 1672 16908 0 0 784 100 1622 25520 
19 316 3978 3310 4892 25412 19282 636 214 23902 81942 
20 0 170 22852 6626 32 0 1716 814 88798 121008 
21 94 7654 242 3442 342 114 398 0 17390 29676 
22 0 0 444 850 0 0 144 0 3876 5314 
23 0 0 51642 1294 56 0 406 204 14712 68314 
24 320 2204 1922 5006 58032 19986 768 674 16020 104932 
25 0 358 1852 3962 0 0 322 0 11892 18386 
26 0 0 24872 1320 0 0 322 42 12594 39150 
27 28 6658 5460 27430 13330 9800 15910 68 40730 119414 
Table	5.5:	number	of	interactions	per	user	
In terms of applications, there are 9 out of 27 users that have acquired interactions across the 
nine applications. This percentage has significantly increased to 50% of users who utilised at 
least 6 applications. This provides a strong proof that half of selected Internet services have 
been experienced by all users during the experiment. The volume of the interactions in each 
application is varied from one user to another due to the frequent use the applications and nature 
of the user action signature. 
 
5.1.2 Feature Selection 
Every record from the interaction table represents a feature such as a start and finish time, 
duration, source port number, destination port number, destination IP address, number and size 
of packets from the client to server and so forth. Selecting a subset of them should be done 
carefully in order to not miss some of them that have a value. According to Koller and Sahami 
(1996), “The goal of feature selection is to select a small subset such that the resulting class 
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distribution, given only the values for the selected features, is as close as possible to the original 
class distribution given all feature values” 
 
Consequently, reducing the number of unrelated features and selecting the ones that are 
consistent with the general concept will drastically reduce the running time of learning algorithm 
(Kohavi et.al, 1995). Dash and Liu (1997) emphasized that there are two major steps in feature 
selection generation procedure and evaluation function. The generation step has three kinds, 
complete which means select all features, heuristic which means incremental (either decreasing 
or increasing) up to find the optimal feature and finally, random manner which means optimality 
the selection of a subset of features based on the resource availability and trying many times up 
to get the good result.   
 
In this research, all three approaches have been examined and the result was subsequently 
different based on the utilized approach. Firstly, all 29 (start and finish time dividing to second 
on the top of the 9 features below) features were applied for all users to explore the outcomes 
of this approach, the result was quite poor and it consumed a lot of resources and time. The 
second attempt was carried out by selecting a random number of features, 4 features were 
selected (start time, duration, source port and service IP address) and again the result was not 
satisfying where equal error rate was quite high. Finally, the experimental approach was applied 
by selecting a number of features then adding and removing until the optimized result was 
reached. These features are the most appropriate because it represents the direction and value of 
the interaction. These features are as follows: 
1. Start time.  
2.  Finish time.  
	
	
89	
3. Source port. 
4. Service IP. 
5. Destination port. 
6. A number of the packet from the client to the server. 
7. Size of the packet from the client to the server. 
8. A number of a packet from the server to the client. 
9. Size of the packet from the server to the client. 
 
5.1.3 Normalization  
 Normalization is a manner used to standardize the range of independent variables or features 
of data. It is commonly performed throughout the data pre-processing step. Normalization can 
be executed at the level of the input features or at the level of the kernel (Priti &Vishakha, 
2013). In many applications, the available features are continuous values, where each feature 
is measured in a different scale and has a different range of possible values. In such cases, it is 
often beneficial to scale all features to a common range by standardizing the data.  Sola and 
Sevilla (1997) recommended prior to train the data, all input data must be normalized in order 
to obtain good results and accelerate significantly calculation. There are different techniques 
for normalization step and everyone has owned a particular manner to be applied (Patki and 
Kelkar, 2013). So, the technique is going to be used in this research is a linear normalization 
which means dividing every feature by the maximum value of the vector that belongs to.  
5.1.4 Data Split  
The split sample manner is a commonly used study in classification setting. There is a different 
approach for splitting data. The best splitting proportions strategies that are widely used ½ or ⅔ 
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training (Dobbin.K and Simon.R, 2011). Accordingly, in this research ½ training and ½ testing 
data split strategy has been applied and before that, the data was randomly selected. 
5.1.5 Classification 
Using a machine learning technique to predict a group of membership for the data exemplar is 
the main theme of classification phase and a supervised learning approach was utilised. The 
classifier took the normalised data as inputs and applied its algorithm upon it (Sola and Sevilla, 
1997). A neural network classifier was chosen as it has previously been proven to be an effective 
approach that deals with complicated patterns (Chtioui et al., 1997). One of these classifiers is 
feed-forward multi-layered perceptron (FF-MLP) and it considered as a large scale optimisation 
problem because it can be used for difficult to complex problems and it is the most popular 
neural networks that are working effectively and aiding solving a complex issue (Ilonen et al., 
2003; Sharma et al.,2013; Metha et al.,2015). One layered neural network was built with nine 
inputs and one output by using Matlab tools version 2015b. MLP networks with a single-hidden 
layer and a nonlinear activation function are fundamentally able to distinguish classes with 
decision boundaries of arbitrary complexity, (Hartman, Keeler, Kowalski, 1990; Haykin, 2003). 
Within the FF-MLP network, a supervised learning technique called Backpropagation 
Marquardt was used for training the network and to solve the nonlinear problem. Neuron sizes 
were varied in order to seek to optimise (10,15, 20, 25 and 30 neurons). Table 5.6 defines the 
different neural network parameters with varying numbers of neurons utilised to allow for 
optimisation of the problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
Classifier 
Name. 
No. 
Neuron 
No. 
Layer 
Activation 
Function 
Training 
Function 
Epochs 
FF-MLP 10-30 1 tansig trainlm 1000 Iterations 
Table	5.6	:	Neural	network	setting	
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5.1.6 Evaluation   
The evaluation process has been conducted in order to validate the level of correct 
classification. In the identification approach, the evaluation can be done by comparing the 
existing user templet user many temples to compare to what extent this template may match 
with one of the previous templates that already exist. However, in order to assist scalability 
issues involved with identification mode, a verification model has implemented with a single 
class classifier. Thus, the evaluation stage is undertaken using the standard approach for 
biometric testing which gives the system an ability to reject imposters and match the authorised 
users, which is initiated for all the participants (Clarke et al., 2004). Indeed, in each endeavour 
of identifying a particular user, the system has labelled the interactions that belong to this user 
by number 1 as a meaning of authorised and labelling the reset users interaction by value 0 as 
an indication of imposters.  The experiment is repeated for each participant, in which every 
participant has to play the role of the authorised user and the remaining acts as the impostors. 
Thus, dividing each user interactions in each application into two halves; one for training the 
classifier and the other for testing; is vital because training and testing samples should be 
separated to ensure that there is no single sample that has been utilised in both parts. Also, in 
order to ensure there is sufficient data for both training and testing, a minimum of 28 user 
interactions is set as a threshold: users will be excluded from an application test if they had less 
than 28 interactions for that application. Ultimately, the evaluation phase of the classifier 
performance utilises the True Positive Identification Rate (TPIR) - if the biometric system 
outputs the identities of the top t matches for each user sample, where t represents the rank of 
accuracy. The following sections will show the result of the evaluation step in details.  
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5.2 Experimental Results 
The results show that concentrating upon the user actions can produce a promising result in 
terms of user profiling. Table 5.8 illustrates the user’s identification rate in the three different 
ranks and the average users’ performance in the three ranks were gradually increased from 
50.5% in rank 1 to 71% in rank 5.  In rank 1, more than half of the participants have acquired 
discriminative information which aided the system to create an accurate users profiling, thus, 
they achieved performance above average. In fact, among these users, there are some users who 
achieved high level of accuracy in rank 1 such as users 9, 24, 27 where their performance are 
68.8%, 79.5% and 88.5% respectively.   
	
	
93	
User ID Total No. 
interactions 
Ident. Rate rank 1 
% 
Ident. Rate rank 3 
% 
Ident. Rate rank 5 
% 
1 10352 49 55.3 63.9 
2 83220 48.2 70.1 74.4 
3 28484 46.3 64.8 74.4 
4 484332 65.8 78.3 82.1 
5 104608 32.3 38 51.7 
6 108828 55.1 71.8 79.8 
7 73108 36.9 69.1 80.2 
8 84394 60.8 67.6 68.7 
9 304458 68.6 75.4 82.6 
10 38326 39.4 56.9 63.9 
11 41214 51.2 55.1 57.9 
12 197492 65.3 75 78.8 
13 51488 54.1 63.3 69.5 
14 35352 34.9 62.5 72.7 
15 148538 59.8 80.1 84.9 
16 9258 31.1 53.2 60.1 
17 2586 28.4 39.1 43.6 
18 25520 64.1 73.6 75.7 
19 81942 45.5 60.1 71.2 
20 121008 44.7 51.5 64.2 
21 29676 50.6 71.8 87 
22 5314 19.1 66.4 68.6 
23 68314 41 54.4 61.7 
24 104932 79.5 84.2 85.8 
25 18386 53.7 61.2 68.3 
26 39150 50.2 52.9 54.8 
27 119414 88.5 91.6 92.8 
Average  50.5 64.5 71 
Table	5.7	:	User	identification	rate	
 
The overall average of user identification in rank 3 and 5 have gradually increased by about 
15% in rank 3 and then from rank 3 to rank 5 at about 8%. Subsequently, there are some users 
that achieved identification more than 85% in rank 3, such as users 15, 24 and 27 in which their 
TPIR are 84.9%, 85.5% and 92.8% respectively. This suggests there are some very reliable 
feature sets amongst the users and applications. 
 
With reference to the applications, there are a number of key results that can be derived from 
the experiment. Table 5.9 illustrates the TPIR for all users in each application. Applications that 
have achieved a high performance in rank 1 considered as a high accurate application in terms 
of user profile because this reflects the level of discriminative information of users which 
indicate that choosing the classifier was a valid choice. Skype and Outlook applications have 
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achieved high TPIR from rankv1 with 98.1% and 96.2% respectively which means the system 
has correctly classified almost all their samples by assigning them to the correct user. Although, 
BBC application has got achieved a good level of accuracy 81.8% in rank 1, this value has 
gradually increased to 88.7%, in rank 2 and improved to 95.4% in rank 5. There are some 
applications that achieved a low TPIR, such as Google and Wikipedia where the system has 
correctly identified more than 66% of their samples from the first top value (rank 1) but this 
proportion could be considered as a promising value if we knew that they will have been utilized 
by the majority of the participants as show in Table 5.3 and the level of improvement that was 
achieved in their accuracy in ranks 2 and 3. Although, YouTube application have acquired the 
lowest level of accuracy where its TPIR is 62.8% in rank1, this proportion is still positive where 
YouTube interactions were quite large in number and represents more than 55% of whole users’ 
applications usage as illustrated in Table 5.4 above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
 
Although, some applications results have acquired enough discriminative information to be 
correctly identified in ranks 1 and 2 such as Skype and Outlook , the other applications have 
almost achieved significant improvement in their performance from rank 1 to rank 5 between 
2% to 25%, for instance BBC, Wikipedia, Twitter, YouTube and Drobox. In addition, 
applications that have a small number of participants often achieved a high performance, and 
this is due the number of samples that needs to be compared with it such as Skype, BBC and 
Outlook. 
  App. Name No. Users Rank1 % Rank2 % Rank3 % Rank4 % Rank5 % 
Skype 12 98.1 98.2 98.2 98.2 98.2 
Outlook  19 96.2 96.8 96.9 96.9 97 
BBC 12 81.8 88.7 92.5 93.7 95.4 
Google 27 71.7 77 79.4 80.7 82.2 
Wikipedia 20 66.9 78.2 83.6 86.6 89.2 
Facebook 27 66.7 69.6 70.8 71.3 71.9 
Twitter 27 65.3 75.3 79.5 81.9 83.4 
YouTube 27 62.8 71.4 74.8 77 78.9 
Dropbox 16 57.1 67.5 73.9 78.8 82.8 
Table	5.8	:	Application	Identification	Rate	
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For individual services, there are promising results that have achieved across all applications.  
The tables below show the level of TPIR in each application in different ranks. As Table 5.10, 
Skype application is considered as the top application that has a rich discriminative information 
based on TPIR result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is 75% of users that have successfully been profiled with almost 100% TPIR from rank 
1 such as users 3, 5, 24 and 27. Subsequently, their interactions size varies but the performance 
remains high which means the level of uniqueness of information that is located on their traffic 
are precise enough to distinguish the individual, such as users 15 and 21 who have a smaller 
size of interactions compared to the other users. However, users 2, 10 and 11 have achieved the 
lowest TPIRs with 90.9%, 63.7% and 80.3% respectively, even though this outcome is not 
satisfying, their performance has slightly improved by almost 10% in rank 5. Skype application 
has achieved the best user profile result among the 9 application with almost over 90% TPIR 
and this is due to the nature and precise of its signature also the port connection is often constant 
with particular number above of 1024 (Skype, 2016). Ultimately, this feature helps the 
application to register the lowest application that had data reduction with 69% of original 
dataset. 
In the same view, Outlook  application achieved high level of accuracy from rank 1 with over 
96% TPIR and this is due to the level of uniqueness of information that exists in the traffic. 
User ID No. Interactions Rank1 
% 
Rank2 
% 
Rank3 
% 
Rank4 
% 
Rank5 
% 
2 22 90.9 90.9 100 100 100 
3 15 100 100 100 100 100 
6 33764 100 100 100 100 100 
9 1461 100 100 100 100 100 
10 3849 63.7 63.7 63.7 63.7 63.7 
11 604 80.3 83.9 85.2 91.3 94.8 
12 20505 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7 
14 4529 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
19 9641 99.4 99.5 99.5 99.6 99.6 
21 57 100 100 100 100 100 
24 9993 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
27 4900 100 100 100 100 100 
Table	5.9	:	Skype	Identification	Rate	
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Regardless, Outlook traffic represents more than 5% of the entire users traffic, it been utilized 
from almost 3/4 of participants. In addition, it has been registered as the second lower 
application in terms of data reduction of 82.5% by applying the proposed user interaction 
approach on their traffic as illustrated in Table 5.4 and this is due to the nature of user action 
signature that exists on the traffic, such as attach file and send email as explained in the previous 
chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With reference to the table above, the system can successfully be profiling more than ½ of 
participants from rank 1 with a level of TPIR above 80%. In the meantime, 50% users in this 
group can be correctly identified by almost their whole traffic from rank 1, for instance, users 
24 and 27. Moreover, in the majority of them, their performance has been improved by 5% from 
rank 1 to rank 5. Although, some of users have achieved low performance such as 7 and 16 
who achieved 0% and 35.4% TPIR in rank 1, this proportion is improved in different ranks such 
as in rank 3 where more than 50% of user 7 traffic can be identified and in rank 5 as well where 
the system can correctly assign all user 7 traffic. It seems to be the number of interactions are 
altered from one user to another and it applies the main pillar in this approach but the type of 
User ID No. Interactions Rank1 % Rank2 % Rank3 % Rank4 % Rank5 % 
2 87 5.7 597 72.4 72.4 75.8 
3 138 60.8 60.8 60.8 60.8 60.8 
4 2202 91.8 97.9 97.9 97.9 98.3 
5 23 13 13 13 13 13 
6 215 85.5 92 92 92 92 
7 18 0 33.3 55.5 100 100 
9 5451 94.9 95.4 95.4 95.4 95.4 
10 1542 83 85.4 86 86 86 
11 1581 80.5 80.5 80.6 80.7 80.7 
12 1262 80.2 82 82 82.1 82.4 
14 287 62.3 64.8 66.2 66.2 67.6 
15 23 0 26 73.9 100 100 
16 31 35.4 54.8 58 61.2 61.2 
19 12706 95 95.5 95.6 95.7 96 
20 16 0 0 0 25 56.2 
21 171 85.3 85.3 85.3 85.3 85.3 
23 28 71.4 71.4 71.4 71.4 71.4 
24 29016 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
27 6665 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.9 99.9 
Table	5.10	:	Outlook	True	Identification	rate	
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signature also has a vital influence, for instance some of participants have acquired a small 
number of interactions but they achieved a high TPIR, such as users 21 and 23. Thus, there is a 
strong relation between number of interactions, type of interaction signature and the TPIR. So, 
the performance of the system relied on variety parameters such as number of user interactions 
signature, and their precisely signature from each application that can be determined before.  
 
Despite the fact that BBC application has the smallest amount of user’s interactions size, it 
achieved as a third application in terms of performance with average TPIR above 80% (by 
calculating the results in rank 1 and divided by total number of participants) in rank 1 as shown 
in Table 5.11. Therefore, from rank 1 the system is able to identify 25% of the participants’ 
traffic with TPIR more than 80%, such as user 12 and 24 where the TPIR above 90% for both 
as demonstrates in Table 5.11. They have a satisfying amount of interactions size and 
uniqueness information that contribute to the system in order to distinguish a particular user 
from another user from rank 1. 
User	ID	 	No.	Interactions	 		Rank1	%	 		Rank2	%	 Rank3	%	 Rank4	%	 Rank5	%	
2	 327 74.6 83.1 87.1 91.4 92.9 
3	 14 0 42.8 78.5 100 100 
7	 54 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 
9	 62 59.6 61.2 61.2 62.9 75.8 
12	 815 95 95.4 96.4 97 97.5 
13	 43 60.4 72 74.4 76.7 76.7 
14	 73 34.2 58.9 76.7 80.8 84.9 
18	 139 82 94.2 98.5 100 100 
19	 316 61.7 88.2 98.1 98.4 99.3 
21	 47 74.4 74.4 76.6 93.6 100 
24	 160 91.8 91.8 92.5 94.3 94.3 
27	 14 71.4 78.5 92.8 100 100 
Table	5.11	:	BBC	True	Identification	rate	
 
In comparison, there are some users who achieved low TPIR in rank 1 and do not have that 
much amount of interactions size but their performance has dramatically increased up to 
correctly assign all entire traffic to the right user, such as users 3 and 27. With reference to Table 
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5.11 True identification in rank 2 has achieved a good performance rate where more than ½ of 
users’ traffic can be successfully identified with more than 75%.  
 
Google is one of the four applications that have been utilized by all participants as demonstrated 
in Table 5.8. It has two main signatures as explained in the previous chapter; search and modify 
document. These two user actions gave it this kind of popularity to be used by the users. In 
addition, by concentrating upon these users action, data reduction reaches up 89.6% of the whole 
application traffic. 
 
The results in Table 5.12 show that there are a number of promising results from rank 1. 
Amongst 27 users, there are 11 users who have acquired a uniqueness of information in their 
traffic which contributes to the system towards right classification with level of accuracy 
reached to 70% and more in rank 1. In addition, this percentage is slightly improved ranging 
between 2% to 8% in each rank such as users1 and 27 with 95.2% and 99.9% respectively.   
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The remaining users who represent about ½ of participants have acquired a fluctuated TPIR as 
illustrate in Table 5.12 in rank 1. However, this proportion has increased dramatically among 
each rank up to 20% or more, for instance user 21 has got TPIR 18.9% in rank 1 and 
subsequently when the performance increased from rank 1 to rank 2 with more than 30% to 
score 52.6 % and accordingly from rank 2 to rank 3 with 20%. Ultimately, this application has 
achieved a satisfying level of discriminative information that aids the system to assign each 
interaction to the associated user and if it is not from rank 1 it would be possibly be in ranks 2 
or 3 as the result described above. 
 
In spite of the fact that the data reduction process reduced a vast amount of the data with 
Wikipedia being the highest application that was exposed (99.5% of the original traffic was 
User ID No. Interactions  Rank1 % Rank2 %  Rank3 % Rank4 %  Rank5 % 
1 949 95.2 96.1 96.2 96.2 96.2 
2 1568 32.4 52.8 80.1 84.3 87.1 
3 213 59.1 69 95.7 100 100 
4 7870 91.6 91.8 91.9 92.1 92.2 
5 8750 73.6 78.9 79.3 79.6 79.8 
6 1376 89.1 90 90.1 90.4 90.6 
7 6295 79.2 86 87.4 87.8 88.1 
8 1814 42.7 54.5 56.1 58.2 59.1 
9 3624 0 0 0 0 13.6 
10 1952 56.1 67.4 69.6 72.4 74.2 
11 2297 72.7 75.3 76.5 76.9 77.1 
12 15808 73 78.2 79.6 80.6 82 
13 6727 75.3 84.8 86.2 87.9 88.4 
14 61 26.2 70.4 90.1 90.1 100 
15 1100 68.4 78.1 82 83.4 83.7 
16 430 16.2 43.7 70.2 76.5 81.6 
17 496 59 73.5 80.4 88.7 93.5 
18 8454 68.3 75.2 77.4 79.8 82.2 
19 2446 42.3 51.8 69.8 73.9 75.8 
20 3313 63.2 63.9 64 64.1 64.4 
21 1721 18.9 52.6 74.1 85.5 93.6 
22 425 29.4 48 48.2 48.2 48.9 
23 647 0 0 0 0.9 0.9 
24 2503 76.5 79.9 81.8 83.7 86.1 
25 1981 80.8 81.7 83.3 88.4 91.1 
26 660 64.8 65 65 65 65 
27 13715 99.9 99.9 99.9 100 100 
Table	5.12	:	Google	True	Identification	rate	
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reduced) the remaining data has enough discriminative information which leads to a high level 
of TPIR of some users as shown in Table 5.13.  
User ID   No. Interactions   Rank1%  Rank2%   Rank3%   Rank4%  Rank5% 
1 20 100 100 100 100 100 
2 116 74.1 78.4 78.4 78.4 78.4 
3 82 6 6 31.7 56.1 79.2 
7 57 49.1 61.4 61.4 61.4 61.4 
8 22 100 100 100 100 100 
9 692 93 94.2 94.8 94.9 95.2 
10 27 0 3.7 11.1 29.6 29.6 
12 116 56.8 65.5 67.2 71.5 75.8 
13 15 0 0 20 46.6 53.3 
14 15 0 0 0 0 0 
15 399 64.6 91.9 99.2 99.5 100 
16 114 95.6 95.6 95.6 95.6 95.6 
17 84 52.3 67.8 70.2 72.6 73.8 
18 50 98 98 98 98 98 
19 107 0 0.9 21.5 48.6 72.9 
20 407 57.7 85.5 88.9 93.1 94.6 
23 102 20.5 38.2 68.6 82.3 91.1 
24 337 81.6 91.9 93.7 93.7 93.7 
26 21 76.1 76.1 80.9 80.9 85.7 
27 34 73.5 73.5 73.5 73.5 73.5 
Table	5.13	:	Wikipedia	Identification	Rate	
Therefore, 40% of the participants have successfully classified their traffic with more than 73% 
of accuracy. In fact, the level of uniqueness in their traffic reaches to the extent where the whole 
user interactions assigned correctly to the associated user from rank 1, such as users 1 and 8.   
However, there are some users that have achieved low TPIR in rank 1 and 2 , however, they 
achieved a good improvement up to correctly classified almost 70% of their traffic in rank 5, 
for instance user 3 has achieved 6% TPIR in rank 1 and this proportion continues to increase in 
each rank to attain almost 80% of the traffic has accurately classified. 
 
Social media Internet services are becoming common applications across the world, such as 
Facebook, Twitter and so forth Wilson et.al (2012). With reference to the findings in the 
previous chapter, different user actions have been discovered on Facebook application with 
their signature. This application has achieved 66% TPIR in rank 1 as an average value of all 
entire users’ result as demonstrated in Table 5.8 above. However, 1/3 of participants has 
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acquired a satisfying level of uniqueness of information on their traffic and achieved TPIR of 
63% and above as illustrate in Table 5.14.  
User ID   No. Interactions   Rank1%   Rank2%   Rank3%   Rank4%   Rank5% 
1 264 0 0 25 39.3 46.2 
2 5534 30.9 38 39.6 40.3 41.8 
3 1947 45 45.5 45.5 46.4 46.4 
4 20626 17.3 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.5 
5 555 0.5 5 5 8 24.1 
6 193 0.5 2.5 25.9 42.4 55.9 
7 2172 19.7 47.7 78.5 84 89.5 
8 31552 79.5 81.4 81.5 81.6 81.6 
9 34382 92.5 97.1 97.3 97.5 97.7 
10 1120 11.8 35 73.2 79.8 91.3 
11 2675 48.6 48.8 48.8 48.8 48.8 
12 3785 57 57.6 59.7 63.6 67 
13 8350 72.7 74.8 74.8 74.8 74.8 
14 720 4 30 56.9 73.7 90.9 
15 21947 74.5 77.3 77.3 77.3 77.4 
16 331 22.3 38 54.9 56.4 57.1 
17 75 0 0 0 0 1.3 
18 836 30.3 34.8 34.8 34.8 34.8 
19 1655 20.6 27.9 39.8 57.5 67.3 
20 11426 73.9 75.5 76 76.1 76.2 
21 121 3.3 31.4 32.2 32.2 38 
22 222 0 63.9 78.3 78.3 78.3 
23 25821 75.5 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 
24 961 73.3 77.2 80.5 82.7 83.9 
25 926 45.8 57.6 60.5 64.7 65.5 
26 12436 62.4 65.4 66.2 66.4 66.6 
27 2730 72.6 72.7 72.7 72.7 72.7 
Table	5.14	:	Facebook	Identification	rate	
In addition, this proportion has gradually increased in each rank between 6-10% and in rank 
5; the number of users who achieved TPIR above 65% represents almost 2/3 of existing 
participants. 
With regards to individuals, there are some participants who achieved a good TPIR in rank 1, 
such as users 9 and 8 where the system was able to correctly identify 92.5% and 79.5% of them 
as can be seen in Table 5.14.  
 
With reference to the Table above, it seems that users who have acquired a good number of 
interactions achieved a good TPIR and this is because of this amount of interaction gives the 
system an ability to find a user pattern that differentiate one user from another. For instance, 
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users 8 and 9 have achieved a maximum number of interactions in which they achieved the 
highest TPIR. 
 
In the same vein, and as mentioned above Twitter application has been utilized by all 
participants throughout the experimental and almost 90% of its original traffic has been reduced 
after applying the user interaction approach on the traffic as illustrated in Table 5.5. Even 
though, the overall result gives an indication that the application owns a discriminative 
information that contributes to the system in order to be able to correctly classify 66.4% from 
all entire traffic in rank 1 and this proportion has gradually increased to reach up to 83.4% in 
rank 5. 
  
User ID No. Interactions Rank1% Rank2% Rank3% Rank4% Rank5% 
1 133 0 0 1.5 7.5 21 
2 5747 60.4 79.9 85.5 88 89.5 
3 752 55 56.1 56.2 56.2 56.2 
4 543 20.4 49.7 69.6 80.8 87.6 
5 298 0.3 10.4 17.1 48.9 66.1 
6 109 33 47.7 50.4 51.3 52.2 
7 1683 17.1 40.2 53.9 58.1 63.3 
8 107 25.2 33.6 40.1 42 42 
9 4975 79.5 89.9 94 95.8 96.2 
10 648 16 43.3 45.9 47.9 52 
11 308 25.3 37.9 39.6 46.1 46.1 
12 3517 67 69.3 70 71.2 71.8 
13 596 49.1 59.7 62 64.4 65.7 
14 868 6.4 32.4 59.6 75.1 83.5 
15 4635 70.2 78.8 82.1 84.4 85.3 
16 53 0 0 0 1.8 3.7 
17 19 0 0 0 0 0 
18 392 46.4 66.5 71.1 73.2 74.4 
19 318 25.1 29.5 30.8 31.7 34.2 
20 858 42.6 53.3 56 58.3 58.3 
21 199 79.3 83.9 85.9 87.9 89.4 
22 72 43 68 68 68 68 
23 203 58.6 66 66.5 66.5 66.5 
24 384 44.7 49.7 52.6 53.1 54.1 
25 161 14.9 24.8 29.8 37.2 46.5 
26 161 0 0 0 0 0 
27 7955 97.3 98.1 98.9 99.4 99.7 
Table	5.15	:	Twitter	Identification	Rate	
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In terms of individuals, there is a number of participants who achieved a good TPIR, such as 
users 27, 9, and 15 where their results are 97.3%, 79.3% and 70.2% respectively as demonstrate 
in Table 5.15. In fact, these results show that Twitter application has owned enough user action 
that reveals some uniqueness on their traffic.  
 
It is clear that 1/3 of users has achieved TPIR of 50% and above in rank 1, but this proportion 
has dramatically risen up to 3/4 of participant has achieved 50% TPIR. To this extent, the 
majority of them can be correctly identified in rank 5 by more than 70% as can be seen in Table 
5.15. However, there are two users; user17 and 26; out of 27 users where the system could not 
find any discriminative information on their traffic and achieved 0% TPIR across all ranks, 
although there are some users achieved low correct classification in rank 1 or 2, they could 
achieve a level of accuracy in the remaining ranks, such as users 1 and 5.  
 
In contrast, YouTube application has been exposed to the massive data reduction that omits 
more than 93% of its traffic after user interaction was applied on the traffic as demonstrated in 
Table 5.4, it represents more than 50% of the whole users traffic in the new dataset that includes 
just the valuable information about the users (user interactions).  Based on the predefined 
signature of YouTube application, there are two main functions that are frequently used; upload 
and download. Hence, it consumes a stream of packets in both tasks, and this is described in the 
number of interactions column in Table 5.16.    
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User ID No. Interactions Rank1% Rank2% Rank3% Rank4% Rank5% 
1 3810 50 53.5 54.4 55.6 56.7 
2 25131 31.2 36.2 37.5 38.6 40.6 
3 11081 44.5 48.8 49.9 51.2 52.9 
4 2E+05 90.9 97.2 98.3 98.7 99.1 
5 42678 74.1 74.8 75 75.3 75.7 
6 14159 34.8 56 71.8 78.5 82.4 
7 26275 28.8 63.7 81.9 91.2 94.7 
8 8702 56.5 59.3 60.1 60.4 60.9 
9 1E+05 83.6 90.2 91.6 92.8 93.7 
10 10025 45 47.9 48.8 49.8 50.8 
11 13142 0 0 0 0 0.1 
12 52668 46.3 77 90.2 93.7 95.3 
13 7525 40.1 42.6 44.4 45.4 46.3 
14 6673 33.1 38.4 42.4 43.4 44 
15 39957 71.1 74.7 75.4 76 76.8 
16 603 28 28 28.3 29.5 29.8 
17 619 30.6 42.4 45 48.3 49.5 
18 811 67.2 67.8 68.4 68.6 68.9 
19 11951 21.9 31.7 37.1 40.4 44 
20 44399 0 0 0.6 4.4 13.9 
21 8695 17 32.4 52.6 82.7 96.8 
22 1938 4.2 65.6 71.2 76.2 79.2 
23 7356 20.2 32.1 44.7 54.7 64.6 
24 8010 86 91 93.5 95.3 96.2 
25 5946 51.1 53.8 56.3 58.3 62.5 
26 6297 47.5 51.3 52.4 54.8 56.9 
27 20365 99.9 100 100 100 100 
Table	5.16	:	YouTube	Identification	Rate	
 
However, the TPIR is varied from one user to another, and this is due to the level of valuable 
information that distinguishes a particular user are different. There are more than 37% of 
participants who achieved TPIR more than 53% and when it was  compared with the number of 
packets that were investigated it represents a big number, for example user 12 has acquired more 
than 52,000 interactions and the system was able to identify almost ½ of them. In fact, some of 
them have acquired a large number of interactions and almost 100% have been correctly 
classified in rank 1, such as users 4 and 27 where the TPIR achieved 90.9% and 99.9%. 
 
In similarity with YouTube application, user interaction of Dropbox application signifies less 
than 1% of the original application traffic, but it has been utilized by around half of participants 
as shown in Table 5.17. In addition, the majority of user interaction size is more than a thousand 
and this is due to the nature of user action signature and how often user used a particular 
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application. It is clear that there is a level of discriminative information for all participants with 
different levels of accuracy in rank1 but this amount improved has gradually to score around 
40% TPIR as a minimum value in rank 5.  
  User ID   No. Interactions   Rank1% Rank2%  Rank3%  Rank4% Rank5 % 
2 3078 34.1 44 50 56.8 63.8 
4 10925 82.5 90.7 94.5 96.1 97.6 
6 4598 43.1 65.2 72.7 78.8 85.4 
9 1582 14.6 30.9 44.6 59.6 75.9 
12 270 12.9 24 30.3 35.1 38.1 
13 2488 80.9 81 81.3 81.3 81.3 
14 4450 48.2 63.5 71.1 77.8 83.8 
15 6208 70 71.1 71.2 71.2 71.3 
16 3067 20.6 41 65.7 81.1 92 
18 2078 56.4 64.3 66.8 69.6 71.5 
19 1989 43.7 49.2 49.4 49.7 51.3 
20 85 75.2 75.2 75.2 85.8 85.8 
21 3827 26.9 48.1 68.1 84.2 92.7 
24 1102 61.8 63 63.7 63.8 64.2 
25 179 75.9 75.9 75.9 75.9 75.9 
27 3329 82.3 85.7 87.2 88.1 89.2 
Table	5.17	:	Dropbox	Identification	Rate	
 
In terms of individual, there are a promising results that were achieved from some users, such 
as users 4, 13 and 27 where the number of interaction exceeded 2000 and the system could 
classify more than 80% of their traffic to the right user as can be seen in Table 5.17. 
5.3 Discussion  
Although the system has achieved promising results, some users in different applications did 
not have sufficient uniqueness of information on their traffic to contribute to the system to find 
out a pattern in terms of user behavioral in particular applications in order to profile them, hence 
the TPIR was quite low. However, all participants have experienced the use of at least three 
applications as shown in Table 5.18. These three applications represent the top three applications 
that achieved a high level of accuracy from rank 1 for each user.   
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User ID First App. Second App. Third App. 
Name TPIR% Name TPIR% Name TPIR% 
1 Wikipedia 100 Google 95.2 YouTube 50 
2 Skype 94.1 BBC 74.6 Wikipedia 74.1 
3 Skype 100 Outlook  60.8 Google 59.1 
4 Outlook  91.8 Google 91.6 YouTube 90.9 
5 YouTube 74.1 Google 73.6 Outlook  13 
6 Skype 100 Google 89.1 Outlook  85.5 
7 Google 79.2 BBC 64.8 Wikipedia 50 
8 Wikipedia 100 Facebook 79.5 YouTube 56.5 
9 skype 100 Outlook  95 Wikipedia 93 
10 Outlook  83 Skype 63.7 Google 56.1 
11 Outlook  80.5 Skype 80.3 Google 72.7 
12 Skype 99.7 BBC 95 Outlook  80.2 
13 Dropbox 80.9 Google 75.3 Facebook 72.7 
14 Skype 100 Outlook  62.3 Dropbox 48.2 
15 Facebook 74.5 YouTube 71.1 Dropbox 70.9 
16 Wikipedia 95.6 Outlook  35.4 YouTube 28 
17 Google 59 Wikipedia 52 YouTube 30.6 
18 Wikipedia 98 BBC 82 YouTube 67.2 
19 Skype 99.4 Outlook  95 BBC 61.7 
20 Dropbox 75.2 Facebook 73.9 Google 63.7 
21 Skype 100 Outlook  85.3 Twitter 79.3 
22 Twitter 43 Google 29.4 YouTube 4.2 
23 Facebook 75.5 Outlook  71.4 Twitter 58.6 
24 Outlook  100 Skype 100 BBC 91.8 
25 Google 80.8 Dropbox 75.9 YouTube 51.1 
26 Wikipedia 76.1 Google 64.8 Facebook 62.4 
27 Skype 100 Google 100 YouTube 100 
Average  87.4  68.9  61.9 
Table	5.18	:	Users	TPIR	in	Rank1	Top	Three	Applications	
 
The results reveal that 1/3 of participants have been correctly identified via their interactions 
with a level of accuracy of more than 80% in all top three applications. It is also shown that 
more than 75% of the users have acquired at least one application with 80% TPIR, where the 
system has an ability to profile 92% of the users from their interactions with TPIR of more than 
74%, there is a small proportion where the system could only assign less than 60% of the 
interactions to the associated participant. 
 
On the level of individual user, the average TPIR in first application for all users on average has 
achieved 87.4%, this result has proved that it is possible to use user interaction for creating user 
profiles which is the main aim of this work. Therefore, there are some participants who achieved 
high level of TPIR across the three applications from rank 1 as shown in Table 5.18, such as 
users 4, 9, 24 and 27, but user 27 has acquired the best user profile because of the highest level 
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of accuracy it has acquired in all top three applications where the system was able to completely 
identified all its interactions with 100% accuracy. Although the majority of participants have 
achieved a promising result in the first application, Skype application has achieved the best user 
profile result among the 9 applications with almost over 90% TPIR and this is due to the nature 
and precision of it signature.  
 
The experiment reveals that the nature of the user interaction derived from application level is 
unique; thereby using it to build a user behavioral profile is a promising solution to identify a 
user. Moreover, the experiment evidently shows that by using user interactions the system was 
able to identify some participants in different applications with 100% level of accuracy (as 
shown in Table 5.18). Since this high level of accuracy achieved form rank 1, it is a clear 
indication that there is a discriminative information presence in the user interaction which 
contributes towards right classification. The explanation of TPIR being high is attributed to the 
level of information uniqueness of a particular user in a particular application. Therefore, 
obtaining a precise user actions pattern leads to the creation of an accurate user profile. 
 
There are many attributes that play a vital role in order to have a high TPIR; first one is the 
precision of user interactions signature of the application, size of user interactions and the 
number of user actions that can be identified within the application. These attributes have a vital 
influence on NN algorithm result, because NN is trying to identify a specific user based on 
learning the behavioral of such a user from the data and if the data does is not accurate enough 
to reveal what a user is doing, the classifier will find it difficult to assign this kind of traffic to 
the associated user. 
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The experimental results proved that applications that have an accurate user actions signatures 
and good number of user interactions achieved a high level of TPIR such as Skype, Outlook  
and BBC applications. Skype application is the evidently example of this type because it has a 
specific signature for the majority of its interactions and most of its user actions were identified. 
In fact, all of its signatures have a unique pattern, for instance, texting message has a baseline 
value and it is just one packet that is sent from the client to the Skype application server. In 
addition, calling by either video or audio has also a precise signature from the values perspective 
and by using a constant port. Subsequently, the system was able to determine the participants 
that have used Skype application with 100% level of accuracy.   
 
In terms of users, there are many participants who achieved a positive performance and as 
mention above the number of applications usage, total number of interactions, and its amount 
in the accurate applications have an influence to the overall user performance. For example, 
users 9, 24 and 27 have achieved the highest average performance among the 27 users in rank 
1 with 68.6%, 79.5% and 88.5% respectively as shown in Table 5.8. By analyzing the 
applications usage in the nine applications as illustrates in the table below, all of them have 
acquired a high total number of user interactions in the nine applications.  
ID	 BBC	 Drop.	 FB	 Google	 Outlook		 Skype	 Twitter	 Wiki	 YouTube	
9	 124	 3164	 68764	 7248	 10902	 2922	 9950	 1384	 2.00E+05	
24	 320	 2204	 1922	 5006	 58032	 19986	 768	 674	 16020	
27	 28	 6658	 5460	 27430	 13330	 9800	 15910	 68	 40730	
Table	5.19	:	users	with	different	rate	of	interactions	
 
 With reference to Figure 5.4 below, User 27 has achieved an excellent performance in the 
majority of application with TPIR almost 100% in 5 applications out of 9, thus, the overall 
performance has achieved a good result. This is due to the majority of their interactions in each 
application was quite sufficient for the system to be capable to create a user profile that 
distinguishes this particular user from others.    
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Figure	5.4	:	Sample	of	users	with	high	TPIR	
 
In spite of the fact that user 9 has acquired a number of interactions in Google application as 
can be seen in Table 5.19, these interactions do not have a uniqueness of information that help 
the system to be able to build a user profile and the performance has achieved 0% for this 
application as can be seen in Figure 5.4 above. So, it is evident that user interaction should 
includ some uniqueness of information; otherwise the system will not able to create a unique 
profile that differentiate the user. 
   
Nevertheless, BBC application has acquired the smallest number of user interaction but it has a 
uniqueness of information that is derived from application user actions such as watching video 
clips and listening to audio which help the system to be able to find a pattern in the user 
behavioral in order to properly create a user profile as illustrated in Table 5.10.  
 
There are some applications that have acquired an altered user actions signatures which means 
the accuracy of the signature is slightly low. In this case the overall performance and induvial 
performance in these applications will be affected accordingly. One of the popular applications 
that are included in the experiment is Facebook, it has been used by all participants. Its 
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performance is slightly low and this is due to the nature of user actions were not quite accurate, 
even though, all of them could be identified, thereby the level of discriminative information is 
not sufficient to distinct the users.    
 
Concerning the result analysis in terms of the accuracy of user actions signature impact, based 
on the available data, it can be concluded that a low accuracy of user actions leads to unsatisfying 
classification performance, although the classifications performance may be considered in a 
good level compared to large number of interactions that have been classified. For instance, 
YouTube, Google and Dropbox applications have acquired an altered user actions signature as 
discussed in the previous chapter and massive numbers of interactions, even though, they 
achieved a very positive performance with TPIR reached to more than 70% in rank 1. 
 
The result of this experiment proved that using user behavioral profiling based on user 
interactions that are derived at application level helped to make an accurate user identification 
system. The technique applied in this study is the identifications model, however, this does not 
mean it is going to be applied to one, 1000 or more. This is because about 99% of UK 
organizations as an example are considered as SMEs where the number of employee ranges 
between (1 to 249 employee) and a few are considered as enterprise organizations with 
thousands of employees (National Statistic, 2015). In addition, there is a technical solution that 
may help to in implementing this approach into enterprise organizations. For instance, an 
appropriate network architecture design to restrict IP pools based on physical location or logical 
business unit where it is possible to control and monitor sub sets rather than deal with a large 
number of peoples simultaneously. 
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5.4 Conclusion  
The chapter proved that it is possible to successfully identify users based on their user actions 
that are derived at the application level. It is envisaged from the results that system performance 
is largely dependent on accuracy of user interactions, number of user interactions identified in 
each application and the amount of user interactions. The date gathered from the nine 
applications showed that there is a level of uniqueness of information within the user 
interactions. This kind of discriminative information does vary between users as can be seen in 
Table 5.8.  In addition, the chapter presented the top three applications of each user that achieved 
the best TPIR and it showed that there is a number of participants that achieved a promising 
result where the system was able to identify their related traffic with accuracy attained 100% as 
presented in Table 5.19. Subsequently, using user interactions derived from application level 
for identifying users is a novel solution for user identification which aids towards identifying 
insider misuse efficiently.  
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6 Behavioral Fusion and Timeline Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Whilst the previous chapter has shown that it is possible to successfully identify users, the 
performance does vary between users. Looking to improve the performance and take into 
account the practical application of this technique, the chapter proposes two approaches. The 
first is to apply a fusion-based approach to the classification scheme and the second is to focus 
on the timestamps of interactions to see if decisions being made with stronger performing 
services can be utilised to identify interactions from poorer performing services (or services 
where too little data exists to create a classifier). 
 
6.2 Fusion  
Fusion is combining the information from different sources and it is a common approach that 
can be used in different domains. It firstly emerged in the literature in the 1960s, in data 
manipulation as a mathematical prototypical (Esteban et.al, 2004). Subsequently, it was applied 
in the US military field and utilized in different aspects for a long time. In the recent years, data 
fusion has received a significant attention due to the ability to improve the accuracy by 
observing features that are otherwise difficult to perceive in the first classification. Data fusion 
is based on user behavioral profiling that aims to solve the problem of some user interactions 
features in order to improve the performance of the system.  
 
A multi-algorithmic approach would enable utilizing a range of biometrics classification 
algorithms (each model to focus on differing aspects of the problem) and combine the results 
through fusion. 
 
	
	
113	
Commonly, according to various studies, fusion can occur at different phases of the 
authentication process; sensor, feature, matching score, and/or decision level (Clarke, 2011; 
Ross, 2007; Sim et al., 2007) as outlined below. 
 
• Sensor level fusion: The raw biometrics data is consolidated prior to feature extraction 
these data were captured by multiple sensors or by a single sensor acquiring multiple 
samples (for example fusing different face images from one or different cameras). 
• Feature level fusion: After obtaining multiple samples from one or more biometrics 
traits, the feature vector is extracted from each sample using a variety of algorithms. 
These feature vectors are then merged together to be utilized in the following matching 
phase (e.g. fusing the feature vectors of the face and voice). 
• Matching score level fusion: The produced results of multiple biometrics classifiers are 
joined at this level to produce a new accumulated match score to be utilized for the 
subsequent decision process.  
• 		Decision fusion: This fusion happens when each incorporated biometrics system has 
provided its own decision to enable a final authentication decision.	
	
Various studies have utilized fusion model to improve the performance of the biometrics 
technique in authentication mode. Table 6.1 illustrates a literature review of different studies 
that reflect the level of improvement occurred when fusion technique is utilized.   
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Studies	 Biometric	Modalities	 Level	of	
Fusion	
Fusion	
Approach	 #Users	
	Performance	
FRR	%	 		FAR	%	
Kumar	et	al.,2003	 Palm	print	 	  
100	
4.5	 2	
Hand	geometry	 	  8.3	 5.3	
Multi-mode	 Feature	 Concatenation	 5.1	 2.3	
Match	Score	 Max	rule	 1.4	 0	
Snelick	et	al	,2003	 Face	 	  
1000	
24.1	 0.1	
Fingerprint	 	  17	 0.1	
Multi-model	 Match	score	 Min-
Max+Simple	
Sum	
5.1	 0.1	
Rose	&	
Govindarajan,2005	
Hand	geometry	 	  
100	
15	 0.1	
Face	 	  35	 0.1	
Multi-mode	 Match	Score	 Min-
Max+Simple	
Sum	
2	 0.1	
Jain	et	al,2005	 Face	 	  
100	
32.3	 0.1	
Fingerprint	 	  16.4	 0.1	
Hand	 	  53.2	 0.1	
Multi-Mode	 Match	Score	 Min-
Max+Simple	
Sum	
5.1	 0.1	
Koreman	et	al,	2006	 Voice	 	  
30	
3.2	EER	
face	 	  27.6	EER	
Signature	 	  8	EER	
Multi-mode	 Match	Score	 Min-
MaxGMM	
0.8	EER	
Kounoudes	et	
al,2008	
Voice	 	  
30	
4.1	 4.2	
Fingerprint	 	  11.4	 9.9	
Hand	geometry	 	  9.1	 9.4	
multi-modal	 Decision	 majority	
Voting	
0.9	 1.2	
Soltane	et	al,	2010	 Face	 	  
30	
0.4	EER	
Speech	 	  0	EER	
Multi-modal	 Match	Score	 Adoptive	
Bayesian	
0.1	EER	
Saevanee	et	al,2014	 linguistic	 	  	 22	EER	
Keystroke	 	  20	EER	
behavioral	profiling	 	 	 20	EER	
Multi-modal	 match	Score	 weighted	
average	
8	EER	
Burriro	et	al.,2015	 Voice	 	  
26	
12.6	 63.9	
arm	movement	 	  6.1	 26.6	
multi-modal	 Decision	 weighted	
average	
4.1	 11	
Table	6.1	:	Summary	of	multi-modal	biometric	
 
With reference to the table above, it is evident that making integration between more than one 
biometrics models has improved the technique performance rather than just using individual 
biometrics. Match score level is a common Fusion manner that has been utilized in the 
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aforementioned studies. This is due to the technique feature where the existing and proprietary 
biometric systems are not affected. In addition, it is widely believed to be the most accurate 
approach of fusion type and thus it is the most utilized fusion type (Ross et al., 2006). 
Consequently, the fusion model that is based on match score level is going to be used to 
improve user identification performance based on user behavioral profiling model in this 
research as demonstrates in Figure 6.1. 
Figure	6.1	:	Behavioural	profiling	fusion	mode	
 
6.3 Timeline Analysis 
Timeline analysis refers to the process that scheduling information is used to develop a timeline 
of events that lead to the incident (Araste et al 2007). It is mainly used by forensic investigators 
because it includes information for instance when the files uploaded, accessed and changed 
and this information with their sequences are very critical from the forensics point of view 
perspective (Rocha,2014). Hosmer (1998) stated that the sequence timeline of computer events 
might be very useful to the forensic investigator. This is because it may provide a critical part 
of the information that leads to the prosecution of involved persons. Accordingly, using this 
concept in this study may offer another technique that helps to improve the user profiling, thus, 
the algorithm that is implemented in this study is working based on this aim in order to link the 
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interactions to the associated person without solely focusing on the IP address based on the 
realistic time window. 
  
6.4 Methodology  
6.4.1 Fusion Approach  
Data fusion approach can take advantage of the concepts of variety and redundancy to improve 
system performance. Diversity can be utilized to improve system performance via the 
incorporation of different information. In the same view, redundancy can attain the same target 
through the re-use of data (Boujelbene et.al,2011). Therefore, the output of the MLP classifier 
has been re-used as an input to the fusion method here in order to improve the performance. 
The data divided in ½ for training and same part for testing with using the same FF-MLP 
classifier setting. 
 
6.4.2 Timeline Analysis Approach 
The timeline approach is different from the previous models because it sorts the event as it 
happens from the user without any change. It is useful in digital forensics for the purpose of 
identifying when a specific activity occurs on a computer and is fundamentally utilized for data 
reduction or identifying specific objects that happened (Basis Technology, 2013). As 
mentioned above, the timestamp is used to schedule the interactions, which means all 
interactions are sorted descending by using the timestamp. Although IP address is not reliable 
for a long period of time due to the use of mobile technologies and DHCP mechanism, there is 
a window of time that the IP address remains constant whilst the connection between the user 
and the application server does not terminate.  Subsequently, this window is trusted enough to 
be associated with a particular user. Moreover, the technique has made a link between the 
fusion result and timeline analysis through the selected three applications that have high TPIR 
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for each user from fusion phase. This result represents the level of confidence that belongs to 
the associated user. Based on that, the system will seek for a value that can be matched with 
the predefined output in a particular application. Once the system has found this value, all 
interactions within a time window (the time windowing can be one of these values 30 Seconds, 
60 Second, 120 Second and 240 seconds) are turned to be to the same user regardless of the 
classifier results as shown in the figure below. This technique is implemented on all participants 
for the main three applications. 
 
Figure	6.2	:	Timeline	analysis	approach	
 
6.5 Experimental Result 
6.5.1 Fusion Result 
Generally, the level of performance across all participants has improved by using fusion 
technique. This improvement does vary between users as can be seen in Table 6.2. The results 
in Table 6.2 illustrate that the average user identification rate by using fusion in rank 1 has 
improved by 10% and achieved roughly 60% of accuracy compared to the standard approach 
where its TPIR achieved 50%, and this is due to giving a machine learning a chance to train and 
test the output of the first classification step in order to explore any pattern that has not been 
considered in the first attempt. With reference to the table below, 80% of the entire participants 
have acquired sufficient discriminative information in fusion mode which aids the system to 
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correctly classify ½ of their traffic in rank 1 comparing with 70% in standard model for the 
same performance level. Also, this increase in the performance has been also recorded in ranks 
3 and 5. In fact, this 10% difference in fusion performance means that there are correctly 
classified user interactions by assigned them to the associated person.  
User	ID	 Fusion	%	 Standard	%	 Fusion	%	 Standard	%	 Fusion	%	 Standard	%	
	 TPIR	Rank	1	 TPIR	Rank	1	 TPIR	Rank	3	 TPIR	Rank	3	 TPIR	Rank	5	 TPIR	Rank	5	
1	 50.5	 49	 59	 55.3	 66.9	 63.9	
2	 64.4	 48.2	 73.9	 70.1	 79.8	 74.4	
3	 55.4	 46.3	 68.3	 64.8	 81.2	 74.4	
4	 80.5	 65.8	 89	 78.3	 90.7	 82.1	
5	 45.9	 32.3	 64.3	 38	 69	 51.7	
6	 61	 55.1	 71.9	 71.8	 77.9	 79.8	
7	 47.6	 36.9	 60.3	 69.1	 70.2	 80.2	
8	 70.5	 60.8	 75.9	 67.6	 78.9	 68.7	
9	 82	 68.6	 89.4	 75.4	 92.8	 82.6	
10	 51.7	 39.4	 69	 56.9	 74.6	 63.9	
11	 65.4	 51.2	 78.1	 55.1	 84.2	 57.9	
12	 72.3	 65.3	 82.4	 75	 85.4	 78.8	
13	 60.1	 54.1	 71.2	 63.3	 82	 69.5	
14	 50.7	 34.9	 64.6	 62.5	 69	 72.7	
15	 67.8	 59.8	 85.3	 80.1	 88.2	 84.9	
16	 40.5	 31.1	 65.5	 53.2	 71.4	 60.1	
17	 31.4	 28.4	 43.9	 39.1	 46.3	 43.6	
18	 66.9	 64.1	 80.3	 73.6	 89.7	 75.7	
19	 55.7	 45.5	 71.5	 60.1	 77	 71.2	
20	 64.1	 44.7	 74.5	 51.5	 86.4	 64.2	
21	 50	 50.6	 69.1	 71.8	 79.3	 87	
22	 36.3	 19.1	 72.3	 66.4	 80.9	 68.6	
23	 55.7	 41	 70.5	 54.4	 73.3	 61.7	
24	 79.2	 79.5	 87.3	 84.2	 94.1	 85.8	
25	 47.2	 53.7	 55.1	 61.2	 60.2	 68.3	
26	 63.2	 50.2	 68.6	 52.9	 72.4	 54.8	
27	 90	 88.5	 95.6	 91.6	 98.6	 92.8	
Average	 59.4	 50.2 72.4	 64.5 78.5	 71 
Table	6.2	:	User	identification	rate	by	using	fusion	behavioural	Model	
There are some users that achieved a significant increase in their performance in fusion 
technique compared to the standard mode. For example, users 4, 9 and 22 have achieved TPIR 
65.8%, 68.6 and 19.1% in rank 1 respectively; however, this proportion of the same users has 
improved by about 15% for each to attained 80.5% in user4, 82% in users 9 and 36.3% in user 
22. Although some participants have acquired a satisfying TPIR in the standard approach, their 
performance has also risen up after applying fusion mode; for instance, user 27 has achieved 
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88.5% accuracy in standard mode and the performance was improved to 90% in rank 1 by 
applying the fusion method.  
 
In terms of applications, the results show that there is a key outcome out of this experiment 
after applying fusion approach. Generally, applications that have achieved a high performance 
in rank 1 are considered as a high accurate application in terms of user profile and after applying 
fusion technique the level of applications accuracy has increased and this reflects the level of 
discriminative information of user which contributes the classifier towards correct choice. Based 
on the results in Table 6.3, it is evident that all applications in fusion technique have achieved 
a better performance than the standard approach in all identification ranks. In fact, the fusion 
technique provided a good opportunity for the system to be able to successfully identify more 
than 80% of user interactions in five out of nine applications in rank 1. In contrast, in standard 
model, this kind of performance had been achieved just in three applications as illustrated in 
Table 6.3. Hence, by utilizing fusion model the level of discriminative information in practice 
has improved in two applications from less than 80% of their traffic to be up to 80%, thus their 
overall performance has increased as well, such as Facebook and Google applications. 
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In comparison with standard approach, Skype and Outlook applications have achieved slightly 
higher TPIR in rank1 with about 99% TPIR which means the fusion system has correctly 
classified almost all of their samples by assigning them to the associated user, as can be seen in 
Table 6.3. However, applying fusion technique has dramatically improved the overall 
performance of Facebook and Google applications with more than 10%, from 66.7% and 71.7% 
in standard mode, to being considered as part of the top four performance applications with 
TPIR attained 83.4% and 82.1% in rank 1. 
 
Skype application continues to score the most uniqueness of information in each experiment. 
It is obvious that more than 90% of its participants has successfully classified the whole of their 
interactions by the system in rank 1 except user 11 where the TPIR achieved 85.4% as 
demonstrated in Table 6.4 compared to 80% in standard approach and this is due to using fusion 
approach which has improved the performance by reconsidering some of invisible features that 
the user has. In fact, the highest increase in fusion performance has been achieved by user 10 
where standard approach correctly identified just 63.7% of the traffic, while in fusion the 
system has able to successfully identify user 10 traffic with accuracy attained 100% in rank 1. 
This due to some features were being considered after applying fusion mode. 
  
  App. Name No. Users Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1 % Rank1 % Rank3 % Rank3 % Rank5 % Rank5 % 
 Skype 12 99.8 98.1 100 98.2 100 98.2 
 Outlook  19 97.3 96.2 98.9 96.9 99.3 97 
Facebook 27 83.4 66.7 87.6 70.8 88.6 71.9 
 BBC 12 83.1 81.8 93.2 92.5 97 95.4 
 Google 27 82.1 71.7 88.8 79.4 90.4 82.2 
Wikipedia 20 72.7 66.9 85.8 83.6 90.3 89.2 
 Twitter 27 72.4 65.3 85 79.5 89.3 83.4 
 YouTube 27 71.4 62.8 84 74.8 87.9 78.9 
 Dropbox 16 66.6 57.1 79.3 73.9 84.5 82.8 
Table	6.3	:	Average	TPIR	in	different	ranks	per	application	
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User ID  # Inter. Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1 % Rank1 % Rank3 % Rank3 % Rank5 % Rank5 % 
2 22 90.9 90.9 90.9 100 100 100 
3 15 100 100 100 100 100 100 
6 33764 100 100 100 100 100 100 
9 1461 100 100 100 100 100 100 
10 3849 100 63.7 100 63.7 100 63.7 
11 604 85.4 80.3 100 85.2 100 94.8 
12 20505 100 99.7 100 99.7 100 99.7 
14 4529 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
19 9641 99.4 99.4 100 99.5 100 99.6 
21 57 100 100 100 100 100 100 
24 9993 99.9 99.9 100 99.9 100 99.9 
27 4900 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Average 0 97.9 94.4 99.2 95.6 99.9 96.4 
Total # Inter. 89340  
Table	6.4	:	Skype	TPIR	
Although the ranks 1 in fusion approach has achieved one user result that has TPIR less than 
90%, ranks 3 has overcome this issue and registered high level of accuracy by scoring 90% as 
a low value for all users. However, in standard approach this kind of issues remain across all 
ranks such as user 10 where the TPIR achieved 63.7% in rank 5 as can be seen in Table 6.4 
above. Ultimately, by implementing fusion technique the system has more ability to profile the 
user from rank 1 where the minimum value of TPIR was 85.4%, however by normal 
classification this process might not be an easy task where the system faces some difficulties 
to profile the user in the most accurate application in this study.  
 
In the same view, Outlook application has achieved average TPIR of more than 97% as shown 
in Table 6.3 above and this means that the majority of Outlook users traffic have been correctly 
classified. However, with reference to the Table 6.5 below, more than 2/3 of participants have 
utilized Outlook application during the experiment and almost 60% of users have achieved 
TPIR of more than 75% in rank 1; Even though, it seems that users who have achieved 
promising TPIR have a good number of user interactions.  
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User ID # inter.  Fusion  Standard  Fusion  Standard  Fusion  Standard 
 Rank1 %  Rank1 %  Rank3 %   Rank3 %  Rank5 %  Rank5 % 
2 87 80.4 50.7 82.7 72.4 88.5 75.8 
3 138 55 60.8 55 60.8 56.5 60.8 
4 2202 91.9 91.8 99.6 97.9 99.8 98.3 
5 23 18.5 13 60.8 13 73.9 13 
6 215 92 85.5 93.4 92 97.6 92 
7 18 0 0 5.5 55.5 33.3 100 
9 5451 96.4 94.9 98.9 95.4 99.8 95.4 
10 1542 86.4 83 94.4 86 96.9 86 
11 1581 95 80.5 97.1 80.6 97.2 80.7 
12 1262 78.2 80.2 93.1 82 96.2 82.4 
14 287 72.4 62.3 90.5 66.2 90.9 67.6 
15 23 4.3 0 73.9 73.9 82.6 100 
16 31 0 35.4 80.6 58 83.8 61.2 
19 12706 97.5 95 99.1 95.6 99.2 96 
20 16 0 0 12.5 0 75 56.2 
21 171 66.6 85.3 66.6 85.3 98.2 85.3 
23 28 75 71.4 96.4 71.4 96.4 71.4 
24 29016 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 
27 6665 99.7 99.8 99.7 99.8 99.7 99.9 
Average  65.3 62.6 78.9 72.9 87.6 80.1 
Total # Inter. 61462  
Table	6.5	:	Outlook		TPIR	
In fact, within this proportion there is more than ¾ of them who have achieved an excellent 
level of accuracy of over 90% such as users 19, 24 and 27. In addition, this group has had 
significant improvement in the performance reach to 25% from rank 1 to rank 5, for instance 
user 23 has got 75% TPIR in rank 1, but this value has gradually risen up to 96% in rank 5.  
 
Nevertheless, Outlook  application has acquired a discriminative information that contributes 
to the system to record a positive result in terms of profiling a user, few users have not acquired 
sufficient uniqueness of information in rank 1, however they could be identified in rank 2 or 
3 with a sufficient level of TPIR such as user 5 where the system fails to determine the traffic 
in rank 1 but rank 2 and 3 have achieved good level of TPIR where more than 60% of their 
traffic identified.  
 
Facebook application is one of the applications that have significantly improved in its 
performance with fusion classifier compared to its result from the first experiment that was 
discussed in the previous chapter. After using fusion technique, it has achieved the third 
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promising result with average TPIR greater than 83% in rank 1 as can be seen in Table 6.3 
above. This application is one of the four applications that have been utilized by all users. 
Hence, it has discriminative information that contributes to the system to be able to correctly 
identify more than 40% of users with accuracy level reached to 70% and more in rank 1 as 
demonstrate in Table 6.6. 
User ID No. inter. Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1 % Rank1 % Rank3 % Rank3 % Rank5 % Rank5 % 
1 264 0 0 12.1 25 31 46.2 
2 5534 46 30.9 60.6 39.6 64.1 41.8 
3 1947 66.6 45 70.4 45.5 70.8 46.4 
4 20626 82.7 17.3 88.9 17.4 89.8 17.5 
5 555 27.3 0.5 39.8 5 42.1 24.1 
6 193 21.2 0.5 26.4 25.9 31 55.9 
7 2172 28.7 19.7 45.8 78.5 47.3 89.5 
8 31552 90.6 79.5 92.7 81.5 92.9 81.6 
9 34382 92 92.5 95.5 97.3 95.9 97.7 
10 1120 16.9 11.8 61.9 73.2 80.8 91.3 
11 2675 71.1 48.6 75.9 48.8 76 48.8 
12 3785 65.9 57 76.6 59.7 79.9 67 
13 8350 88.1 72.7 89.9 74.8 89.9 74.8 
14 720 7 4 20.6 56.9 31.2 90.9 
15 21947 89.3 74.5 90.5 77.3 90.7 77.4 
16 331 31.4 22.3 64 54.9 84.5 57.1 
17 75 0 0 9.3 0 10.6 1.3 
18 836 30.9 30.3 59.2 34.8 92.2 34.8 
19 1655 27.7 20.6 51.7 39.8 72.8 67.3 
20 11426 83.5 73.9 85.2 76 85.3 76.2 
21 121 0 3.3 40.4 32.2 40.5 38 
22 222 0 0 56.7 78.3 76.1 78.3 
23 25821 92.5 75.5 93.2 75.6 93.3 75.6 
24 961 78.3 73.3 85.3 80.5 92.9 83.9 
25 926 0 45.8 0 60.5 0 65.5 
26 12436 85.6 62.4 86.4 66.2 86.5 66.6 
27 2730 76.8 72.6 97.3 72.7 99.5 72.7 
Average  48.1   38.3 62 54.7 68.4 61.7 
Total # Inter. 193362  
Table	6.6	:	Facebook	TPIR	
In spite of the fact that rank 1 has acquired some of the users who achieved low TPIR, this 
proportion has changed in the positive direction in ranks 2 and 3 to score higher TPIR. For 
instance, the system was able to determine around 16% of 1120 interactions of user 10, and 
this amount has increased up to 60% in rank 3. Subsequently, the result in Table 6.6 above; 
there is a significant increase in user level performance between fusion and standard 
approaches. This change might reach 50% in some cases, such as user 4 where the system was 
able to identify 17.3% of their traffic in standard approach; however, after applying fusion 
mode this proportion was sharply increased to achieve 82.7% in rank 1 and the same thing 
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occurred in different users, for instance for users 5,6 and 26 with vary accuracy between 10% 
to 25%. 
 
BBC application has not been used by all participants; around ½ of them have utilized BBC 
application. However, 75% of them has enough distinctive information from user interactions 
which provides a performance of more than 70% as illustrated in Table 6.7, in comparison with 
6 participants that have acquired the same performance using the standard technique.  
User ID No. inter. Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1% Rank1% Rank3% Rank3% Rank5% Rank5% 
2 327 75.5 74.6 87.7 87.1 99.3 92.9 
3 14 14.2 0 35.7 78.5 92.8 100 
7 54 81.4 64.8 81.4 64.8 87 64.8 
9 62 70.9 59.6 87.1 61.2 93.5 75.8 
12 815 97.4 95 98.1 96.4 99.3 97.5 
13 43 58.1 60.4 65.1 74.4 65.1 76.7 
14 73 49.3 34.2 83.5 76.7 87.6 84.9 
18 139 86.3 82 92 98.5 96.4 100 
19 316 70.8 61.7 99.6 98.1 100 99.3 
21 47 72.3 74.4 74.4 76.6 78.7 100 
24 160 84.3 91.8 97.5 92.5 98.7 94.3 
27 14 78.5 71.4 85.7 92.8 100 100 
Average  69.9 64.1 82.3 82 91.5 90.5 
Total # Inter. 2064  
Table	6.7	:	BBC	TPIR	
Although, the system has failed to identify any interaction of user 3 using the standard method, 
fusion approach has correctly found out that 14.2% of user 3 traffic in rank 1 and it represents 
the only value that has identified less than 58% TPIR. With reference to Table 6.7, all users 
that have utilized BBC application have achieved high TPIR in the remaining ranks and with 
clear and better performance in rank 1of fusion side (roughly 6%) and slightly better also in 
the fusion side in the remaining ranks. In fact, 10 out of the 12 users have achieved a satisfying 
TPIR in rank 3 with TPIR of more than 80% in fusion mode; however, this proportion has 
decreased to almost 50% of the users that have acquired the same performance using standard 
approach.  
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Google is one of applications that have improved in fusion phase by more than 10% in rank 1 
as can be seen in Table 6.3. This means that using fusion classifier is able to increase the 
performance through training the data of the user for a second round. Table 6.8 illustrates that 
there is a significant improve in the average performance level of users in fusion mode by 
scoring 69.6%, in comparison standard approach has acquired about 57% in rank 1. It also 
shows that the system was able to successfully classify almost 2/3 of participants’ traffic with 
level of accuracy up to 70% while the other technique 40% of participants could achieve this 
value.  
In spite of the fact that the overall users average of TPIR in Google application in rank 1 was 
69.6%, in fusion mode as illustrated in Table 6.8, there is a set of users who achieved TPIR 
above 85% in rank 1, such as user 1,4 and 27 especially they has large number of interactions  
User ID No. inter. Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1% Rank1% Rank3% Rank3% Rank5% Rank5% 
1 949 92.7 95.2 95.6 96.2 96.2 96.2 
2 1568 52 32.4 56.3 80.1 58.1 87.1 
3 213 75.1 59.1 85.9 95.7 86.8 100 
4 7870 93.5 91.6 98.1 91.9 98.5 92.2 
5 8750 80.1 73.6 87 79.3 88.7 79.8 
6 1376 88.3 89.1 92.8 90.1 94.4 90.6 
7 6295 86.7 79.2 89.2 87.4 89.6 88.1 
8 1814 54.8 42.7 66.5 56.1 71.1 59.1 
9 3624 90.9 0 95.4 0 95.5 13.6 
10 1952 65.7 56.1 79.5 69.6 80.9 74.2 
11 2297 70.1 72.7 86.8 76.5 92.9 77.1 
12 15808 85.8 73 91.7 79.6 92.6 82 
13 6727 81.2 75.3 89.8 86.2 91 88.4 
14 61 0 26.2 0 90.1 0 100 
15 1100 77.5 68.4 82.7 82 87 83.7 
16 430 71.1 16.2 79.5 70.2 79.7 81.6 
17 496 68.3 59 88.9 80.4 91.1 93.5 
18 8454 76.7 68.3 88.6 77.4 90.5 82.2 
19 2446 56 42.3 68.4 69.8 78 75.8 
20 3313 80.9 63.2 88.2 64 89.7 64.4 
21 1721 24.4 18.9 54.7 74.1 62.4 93.6 
22 425 41.1 29.4 77.8 48.2 89.1 48.9 
23 647 31 0 35.8 0 36.3 0.9 
24 2503 80 76.5 83.8 81.8 86.1 86.1 
25 1981 85.4 80.8 88.9 83.3 90.4 91.1 
26 660 72.4 64.8 80.4 65 84.8 65 
27 13715 99.7 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 100 
Average  69.6 57.5 78.9 73.1 81.5 77.6 
Total # Inter. 97195  
Table	6.8	:	Google	TPIR	 	
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Google application is considered as one of the top three applications in terms of usage with 
total number of interactions roughly 200 thousand, the fusion mode has learnt more the 
discriminative information which contributes to the system to infrequently score TPIR of less 
than 50% in rank 1; hence, there is high potential to improve the performance in the remaining 
ranks; for example user 21 where the TPIR in rank 1 was 24% but in rank 5 this proportion 
attained to 62%. 
 
With reference to the results in Table 6.8, the fusion performance has achieved better average 
of users in TPIR, in rank 1 there is an improvement in TPIR by more than 10% compared to 
the standard approach and the same increase happened in the rest ranks with about 5%. 
   
Although Wikipedia application is one of the applications that has a small amount of 
interactions compared to other applications, it has a sufficient discriminative information. 
Therefore, some of participants have achieved a promising performance in rank 1. Table 6.9 
below shows that more than ½ of users acquired at least 60% TPIR in the fusion mode in 
comparison with 40% of participants have acquired the same proportion using the standard 
approach. In fact, there are different users who achieved over 90% TPIR, for instance users 1, 
8, 9 and 18 where the system almost identifies all their traffic as can be seen in Table 6.8.  
	
	
127	
User ID No. inter. Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1% Rank1% Rank3% Rank3% Rank5% Rank5% 
1 20 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 116 74.1 74.1 77.5 78.4 78.4 78.4 
3 82 6 6 60.9 31.7 97.5 79.2 
7 57 50.8 49.1 61.4 61.4 77.1 61.4 
8 22 100 100 100 100 100 100 
9 692 93.2 93 94 94.8 95.6 95.2 
10 27 7.4 0 29.6 11.1 29.6 29.6 
12 116 67.2 56.8 72.4 67.2 76.7 75.8 
13 15 0 0 33.3 20 86.6 53.3 
14 15 60 0 73.3 0 86.6 0 
15 399 67.6 64.6 95.2 99.2 98.2 100 
16 114 95.6 95.6 95.6 95.6 95.6 95.6 
17 84 57.1 52.3 69 70.2 73.8 73.8 
18 50 98 98 98 98 98 98 
19 107 25.2 0 61.6 21.5 67.2 72.9 
20 407 76.4 57.7 89.4 88.9 91.1 94.6 
23 102 50 20.5 81.3 68.6 83.3 91.1 
24 337 78.9 81.6 91.1 93.7 99.4 93.7 
26 21 71.4 76.1 71.4 80.9 71.4 85.7 
27 34 73.5 73.5 85.2 73.5 91.1 73.5 
Average  62.6 54.9 77 67.7 84.8 77.5 
Total # Inter. 2817  
Table	6.9	:	Wikipedia	TPIR	
Despite the fact that using fusion approach has improved the performance, in one case the 
system has failed to identify the user traffic (user 13), this approach is still better than the 
standard technique where the system was not able to correctly classify traffic of 4 users. In 
addition, there has been a gradual increase of TPIR value in fusion mode across all ranks 
between 12% as in rank 1 and 5% in the rest.   
 
Social network applications are the most popular applications that have been utilized by all 
participants in this experiment, such as Twitter. Applying the fusion technique has improved 
the performance of Twitter application by about 8% compared to single classification mode in 
rank 1 as shown in Table 6.3. With reference to Table 6.10 below, average user identification 
rate in Twitter application has achieved a significant change between two approaches by more 
than 10% in rank 1 and between 10% to 20% in ranks 3 and 5.   
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User ID No. inter. Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1% Rank1% Rank3% Rank3% Rank5% Rank5% 
1 133 2.2 0 25.5 1.5 45.1 21 
2 5747 68.8 60.4 89 85.5 92.6 89.5 
3 752 74.6 55 78.3 56.2 78.9 56.2 
4 543 37.9 20.4 53.4 69.6 59.8 87.6 
5 298 40.2 0.3 49.3 17.1 55 66.1 
6 109 32.1 33 44.9 50.4 60.5 52.2 
7 1683 36.9 17.1 71.6 53.9 84.9 63.3 
8 107 45.7 25.2 53.2 40.1 57 42 
9 4975 82.4 79.5 89.9 94 91.9 96.2 
10 648 35.9 16 56 45.9 61.8 52 
11 308 23.7 25.3 53.2 39.6 82.4 46.1 
12 3517 68.7 67 88.9 70 95.7 71.8 
13 596 52 49.1 66.1 62 83.3 65.7 
14 868 63 6.4 68.3 59.6 69.8 83.5 
15 4635 76.5 70.2 87.5 82.1 90.1 85.3 
16 53 0 0 43.4 0 49 3.7 
17 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 392 52.2 46.4 71.9 71.1 82.4 74.4 
19 318 36.1 25.1 50.3 30.8 52.8 34.2 
20 858 46.7 42.6 69.7 56 80.1 58.3 
21 199 78.3 79.3 93.9 85.9 96.4 89.4 
22 72 65.2 43 69.4 68 69.4 68 
23 203 58.6 58.6 64.5 66.5 65.5 66.5 
24 384 44 44.7 58.5 52.6 81.5 54.1 
25 161 16.7 14.9 41.6 29.8 61.4 46.5 
26 161 37.2 0 44.7 0 45.3 0 
27 7955 97.7 97.3 99 98.9 99.5 99.7 
Average  47.1 36.7 62.2 51.3 70 58.2 
Total # Inter. 35694  
Table	6.10	:	Twitter	TPIR	
This kind of improvement by using fusion approach has aided the system to correctly identify 
½ of participants traffic with performance of up to 50%, however, by using the standard 
approach the system registered such a level of performance for ¼ of participants in rank 1 as 
can be seen in Table 6.10 above. With regards to the fusion part in table above, there is some 
users the system could not be able to create a user profile for them, such as user 16 and 17 and 
this is because the number of interactions were quite low (53 and 19 interactions) and also these 
interactions did not have any uniqueness of information. However, user 16 was slightly 
different because the system was able to recognize their interactions and achieved a 
performance attained 43.4% and 49% in rank 3 and 5. 
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In terms of number of participants and interactions, YouTube application has been utilized by 
all the participants and acquired a maximum number of user interactions. Table 6.11 below 
outlines the results of the two approaches; fusion and standard; of all 27 users’ that have utilized 
YouTube application during the selected period. In general, the number of interactions is 
sufficient enough to give the system an ability to distinguish individual users from others if 
these interactions have a unique pattern for each user. According to rank 1 result in Table 6.11, 
the overall average users TPIR shows that fusion system achieved better performance than the 
standard mode by almost 10%. This kind of positive improvement has a positive influence on 
user level identification; thus, the system was able to correctly recognize the traffic of 18 users 
out of 27 with level of performance of up to 50% compared to 10 users of the same value by 
using the standard approach. These outcomes indicate that although YouTube application 
suffers from lack of user action at the application level, it still could find out a unique pattern 
for the majority of participants and the level of uniqueness of information has improved by 
using the fusion technique as it has been proved. In fact, within this category, there are some 
users that achieved high improvements in their performance after applying the fusion model, 
for example users 5, 11, and 20 where their TPIR were 74% for user 5 and 0% for user 11 and 
20 from the standard approach and after fusion has been applied the performance has 
significantly increased for all of them to score 82%,47% and 61.1% respectively as illustrated 
in Table 6.11 below.    
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User ID No. inter. Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1% Rank1% Rank3% Rank3% Rank5% Rank5% 
1 3810 57.8 50 61.8 54.4 62.5 56.7 
2 25131 39 31.2 65.2 37.5 81.7 40.6 
3 11081 51.4 44.5 60.4 49.9 66.5 52.9 
4 2E+05 89.8 90.9 98.5 98.3 99.2 99.1 
5 42678 82.2 74.1 84.9 75 85.4 75.7 
6 14159 39.9 34.8 74.3 71.8 81 82.4 
7 26275 48.9 28.8 67 81.9 72.2 94.7 
8 8702 61.3 56.5 67.3 60.1 73.5 60.9 
9 1E+05 84.2 83.6 94.8 91.6 96.5 93.7 
10 10025 49.8 45 61.9 48.8 72.1 50.8 
11 13142 47 0 55.5 0 57 0.1 
12 52668 54.4 46.3 83.2 90.2 90.4 95.3 
13 7525 52 40.1 64.1 44.4 67.7 46.3 
14 6673 49.3 33.1 54.2 42.4 55.7 44 
15 39957 76.9 71.1 83.2 75.4 84.5 76.8 
16 603 43.6 28 44.2 28.3 48.7 29.8 
17 619 31.6 30.6 52.5 45 56.3 49.5 
18 811 66.7 67.2 73.3 68.4 75.5 68.9 
19 11951 35.3 21.9 48.1 37.1 54.8 44 
20 44399 61.1 0 77 0.6 83.9 13.9 
21 8695 16.4 17 57 52.6 84.1 96.8 
22 1938 38.9 4.2 85.2 71.2 89.2 79.2 
23 7356 27.3 20.2 51.7 44.7 65.4 64.6 
24 8010 84.2 86 91.4 93.5 94 96.2 
25 5946 58.3 51.1 61.3 56.3 62.1 62.5 
26 6297 49.6 47.5 60.1 52.4 73.9 56.9 
27 20365 99.3 99.9 100 100 100 100 
Average  55.4 44.5 69.5 58.2 75.3 64.1 
Total # Inter. 678816  
Table	6.11	:	YouTube	TPIR	
 
In comparison with other applications, YouTube has a steady performance that has increased 
in different ranks. Subsequently, rank 5 has registered a maximum rate of TPIR where the 
majority of users have acquired TPIR of more than 70%. It seems that it is quite rare to find an 
individual who can acquire performance of less than 50% using the fusion technique.  
 
Similarly, Dropbox application suffers from a lack of user actions at the application level and 
has been utilized by about 60% of users. However, eventually it’s the level of performance that 
is acquired in rank 1 is promising as can be seen in Table 6.12 below. With reference to the 
table below, there is about 80% of participants that the system can correctly identify based on 
their traffic with a level of accuracy attained 50% and more by using the fusion technique and 
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this number is better than the number that can be obtained by using the standard mode by 
almost 40%.  
User Id No. inter. Fusion Standard Fusion Standard Fusion Standard 
Rank1% Rank1% Rank3% Rank3% Rank5% Rank5% 
2 3078 52.8 34.1 55 50 55.8 63.8 
4 10925 86.9 82.5 95.8 94.5 97.4 97.6 
6 4598 53.6 43.1 71.2 72.7 80.5 85.4 
9 1582 28.2 14.6 49.1 44.6 67 75.9 
12 270 33.3 12.9 37.4 30.3 37.7 38.1 
13 2488 89.5 80.9 90.1 81.3 90.6 81.3 
14 4450 55.5 48.2 91.3 71.1 99.1 83.8 
15 6208 82.5 70 83.9 71.2 84.2 71.3 
16 3067 41.7 20.6 51.5 65.7 58.7 92 
18 2078 57.3 56.4 79.3 66.8 93.1 71.5 
19 1989 53.4 43.7 65 49.4 68.7 51.3 
20 85 100 75.2 100 75.2 100 85.8 
21 3827 42.1 26.9 65.7 68.1 74.3 92.7 
24 1102 63.3 61.8 78.5 63.7 94.4 64.2 
25 179 75.9 75.9 83.8 75.9 87.1 75.9 
27 3329 84.5 82.3 93.7 87.2 97.8 89.2 
Average  62.5 51.8 74.4 66.7 80.4 76.2 
Total # Inter. 49255  
Table	6.12	:	Dropbox	TPIR	
 
In contrast, the number of users’ interactions is a bit high; the system could be able to find out 
a pattern of each individual. Therefore, numbers of users have obtained high TPIR such as user 
4, 13 and 20 where their performance in rank 1 are 86.9%, 89.5% and 100% respectively.  
In addition, this level of discriminative information continues to increase across the ranks 
where the system has correctly classified 11 users out of 16 with TPIR of more than 75% by 
using the fusion technique. 
 
6.5.2 Top Three Applications  
The criteria that used to select the top three applications here is based upon the value of the 
TPIR, which means the high three applications in TPIR is going to be chosen in this part. It is 
evident that applying the fusion mode has improved the level of users’ average performance in 
the top three applications by roughly 7% in rank 1 in each of them from the previous standard 
results. The accuracy of user profiling in first application has improved to 93.3% as an overall 
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average compared to about 87% in the standard mode as can be seen in Table 6.13 below. In 
fact, with reference to the results in Table 6.13, there are about 70% of participants that 
achieved a result above than the average in first top application, in addition, there are 11 
participants in the fusion mode comparing with 8 in the standard acquired unique interactions 
that aided the system to create their profiling in a manner which can be 100% identified among 
other users. Skype, Outlook  and Wikipedia applications are the most popular applications that 
have discriminative information compared to other applications in fusion. This is due to their 
user interactions signatures were accurate, thus, their user profiling achieved the best 
performance. Though, some users acquired a performance below the average, just two users 
(user 17 and 22) went far from the average and achieved low performance while the rest 
acquired TPIR within 5-10% below the average.   
 
In contrast, using the standard technique the level of user profiling accuracy based on user 
interactions derived at application level was not quite sufficient to produce a unique user 
profiling, hence, there are just about 50% of the participants who achieved performance above 
the average which is 87.4% in first application and about half of them achieved 100% TPIR. 
In addition, there are some users that recorded a very low performance comparing with the 
average such as user 17 and 22 where their performance 59% and 43% but this proportions are 
better that the performance that achieved in the standard mode.   
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ID 
  
Fusion Standard Fusion 
        
Standard Fusion 
  
Standard 
 First App. First App.       Second App.  Second App. Third App.          Third App. 
Name  TPIR 
   % 
Name TPIR 
% 
Name TPIR 
% 
Name TPIR 
% 
Name TPIR 
% 
Name TPIR 
% 
1 Wiki. 100 Wiki. 100 Google 95.2 Google 95.2 YouTube 57.8 YouTube 50 
2 Skype 94.1 Skype 94.1 BBC 75.5 BBC 74.6 Wiki. 74.1 Wiki. 74.1 
3 Skype 100 Skype 100 Google 75.1 Outlook  60.8 Twitter 74.6 Google 59.1 
4 Google 93.5 Outlook  91.8 Outlook  91.9 Google 91.6 YouTube 89.9 YouTube 90.9 
5 YouTube 82.2 YouTube 74.1 Google 80.1 Google 73.6 Outlook  40.2 Outlook  13 
6 Skype 100 Skype 100 Outlook  92 Google 89.1 Google 88.3 Outlook  85.5 
7 Google 86.7 Google 79.2 BBC 81.4 BBC 64.8 Wiki. 50 Wiki. 50 
8 Wiki. 100 Wiki. 100 Facebook 90.6 Facebook 79.5 YouTube 61.3 YouTube 56.5 
9 skype 100 skype 100 Outlook  96.4 Outlook  95 Wiki. 93.2 Wiki. 93 
10 Skype 100 Outlook  83 Outlook  86.4 Skype 63.7 Google 65.7 Google 56.1 
11 Outlook  95 Outlook  80.5 Skype 85.4 Skype 80.3 Facebook 71.1 Google 72.7 
12 Skype 100 Skype 99.7 BBC 97.4 BBC 95 Google 85.8 Outlook  80.2 
13 Dropbox 89.5 Dropbox 80.9 Facebook 88.1 Google 75.3 Google 81.2 Facebook 72.7 
14 Skype 100 Skype 100 Outlook  72.4 Outlook  62.3 Twitter 63 Dropbox 48.2 
15 Facebook 89.3 Facebook 74.5 Dropbox 82.5 YouTube 71.1 YouTube 76.9 Dropbox 70.9 
16 Wiki. 95.6 Wiki. 95.6 Google 71.1 Outlook  35.4 YouTube 43.6 YouTube 28 
17 Google 68.3 Google 59 Wiki. 57.1 Wiki. 52 YouTube 31.6 YouTube 30.6 
18 Wiki. 98 Wiki. 98 BBC 86.3 BBC 82 Google 76.7 YouTube 67.2 
19 Skype 99.4 Skype 99.4 Outlook  97.5 Outlook  95 BBC 70.8 BBC 61.7 
20 Dropbox 100 Dropbox 75.2 Facebook 83.5 Facebook 73.9 Google 80.9 Google 63.7 
21 Skype 100 Skype 100 Twitter 78.3 Outlook  85.3 BBC 72.3 Twitter 79.3 
22 Twitter 65.2 Twitter 43 Google 41.1 Google 29.4 YouTube 38.9 YouTube 4.2 
23 Facebook 92.5 Facebook 75.5 Outlook  75 Outlook  71.4 Twitter 58.6 Twitter 58.6 
24 Outlook  100 Outlook  100 Skype 100 Skype 100 BBC 84.5 BBC 91.8 
25 Google 85.4 Google 80.8 Dropbox 75.9 Dropbox 75.9 YouTube 58.3 YouTube 51.1 
26 Facebook 85.6 Wiki. 76.1 Google 72.4 Google 64.8 Wiki. 71.4 Facebook 62.4 
27 Skype 100 Skype 100 Google 100 Google 100 YouTube 100 YouTube 100 
Avg.   93.3   87.4   82.5   75   68.9   61.9 
Table	6.13	:	Top	three	application	results	
At the user level, there are number of participants who have dramatically increased their 
performance between fusion and standard techniques and this might be associated with 
reorganizing the order numbers of applications in terms of performance.  For instance, by using 
standard approach user 10 achieved in the first and second top applications (Outlook  and 
Skype) 83% and 63.7% TPIR respectively; however, in fusion the order of top three 
applications has changed where skype application moved forward to be the first one with 
accuracy attained 100% and Outlook  application step back to be the second application with a 
level of increasing in the performance achieving 86.4%. Moreover, there are some participants 
that have the same number of applications sequences in both techniques but with some 
differences in their performance in fusion technique, such as user 9, 24 and 27. This is because 
these applications are considered as top applications that have unique user actions which aided 
the system to correctly create a user profiling and then achieved high performance in the 
standard technique. 
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Similarly, the second and third top applications achieved discriminative information of some 
participants. In spite of the fact that, the level of performance here is quite low, but fusion 
technique has a better performance in the individual level and then in the overall average 
compared to the standard technique. Despite the fact that first application mostly consisted of 
the accurate applications as listed in Table 6.3, such as Skype and Outlook , there are other 
applications that are considered as less accurate based on their average performance, such as 
Dropbox and YouTube but in terms of individual some users have achieved promising results 
attained 100% of accuracy. 
 
6.5.3 Timeline Analysis Result 
Timeline analysis approach is built based on fusion results for each user as mentioned in the 
methodology section, the event sorted based on the time stamp and the top three application in 
TPIR that have been utilized as a trust point of the user action. Hence, the system assigns all 
events within the time windows to the one user. It is evident that using a correlation between 
top three applications results of fusion technique and timeline analysis have provided more 
authenticity to assign the interactions to the associated individual, and this hypothesis is 
supported by the results obtained from this experiment as shown in Table 6.14. This approach 
also provides a more realistic scenario in practice, as the samples are time synchronized and 
thus presented in order. 
 
Table 6.14 clearly shows that applying timeline analysis on the user interactions based on the 
top three applications from fusion approach has significantly increased the overall performance 
with the first time window of 30 seconds achieved an average user performance of 70.2% and 
this performance is better than the results registered in rank 1 using the fusion technique with 
more than 10%. This outcome is ongoing to be improved in each time window until attained 
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72.8% in 4 minutes as demonstrated in Table 6.14. It is shown that there is a direct relationship 
between length of time windowing and level of performance 
Consequently, the number of user interactions that is labeled to the associated user by using 
this approach has been improved in the individual performance, thus, improved the overall 
performance.  
User ID Fusion % Timeline Analysis % 
TPIR Rank 1 TPIR Rank 3 TPIR Rank 5 30 Sec 60 Sec 240 Sec  
1 50.5 59 66.9 68.6 69.6 71 
2 64.4 73.9 79.8 46.6 47.2 50.5 
3 55.4 68.3 81.2 55.5 56.6 58.1 
4 80.5 89 90.7 93.1 94 96.7 
5 45.9 64.3 69 88 88.7 89.5 
6 61 71.9 77.9 79.8 79.8 79.8 
7 47.6 60.3 70.2 54.9 54.9 55.2 
8 70.5 75.9 78.9 91.3 92.1 93.6 
9 82 89.4 92.8 86.5 86.9 88 
10 51.7 69 74.6 66 67.4 72.1 
11 65.4 78.1 84.2 61.1 62.7 67.7 
12 72.3 82.4 85.4 77.7 80.1 81.8 
13 60.1 71.2 82 81.3 83.1 84.6 
14 50.7 64.6 69 64.7 65.4 72.9 
15 67.8 85.3 88.2 90.4 91.7 93.2 
16 40.5 65.5 71.4 46 46.1 46.8 
17 31.4 43.9 46.3 48.6 48.6 49.8 
18 66.9 80.3 89.7 72.5 74.3 76.9 
19 55.7 71.5 77 76.1 77.2 79.1 
20 64.1 74.5 86.4 67.1 67.4 67.7 
21 50 69.1 79.3 26.1 26.1 26.4 
22 36.3 72.3 80.9 37.6 38.2 38.5 
23 55.7 70.5 73.3 84.1 85.5 86.5 
24 79.2 87.3 94.1 94.8 94.8 94.8 
25 47.2 55.1 60.2 61.3 62.6 64.6 
26 63.2 68.6 72.4 79.5 81.1 83.2 
27 90 95.6 98.6 97.5 97.6 97.7 
Average 59.4 72.4 78.5 70.2 71.1 72.8 
Table	6.14	:	Timeline	results	
Table 6.14 above highlights that in the first time window (i.e 30 seconds), there is about ½ of 
participants that have achieved a promising performance where their TPIR more than the 
average (70.2%). In fact, amongst this group there are some users that acquired a positive result 
where their performance is over 90% such as users 4,8,15 and 27. In comparison, fusion 
technique in rank 1 has achieved just one user achieved performance above 90%. The system 
shows that more than half of the participants have correctly identified their traffic with accuracy 
attained 70% and more. By using this technique, forensic investigator can potentially find more 
traffic associated to a user, for instance users 4, 24 and 27 as illustrated in Table 6.14.  
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It is clear that by increasing the time window, the outcomes of the system are going to be 
improved and this is happened here for the majority of participants. The comparison between 
timeline analysis in second time window (60 seconds) and fusion result in rank 3 show that the 
performance of the second time window illustrates that about 60% of users achieved 
performances more than the 71.1% which is the average of time window, in addition, nearly 
1/3 of them achieved 90% and more accuracy. While in the fusion model where the average 
performance is 72.4%, there is about 40% of participants that have acquired TPIR that 
exceeded this amount of 65% and above.  
Similarly, by applying the time window of 240 seconds, the performance has increased. 
Although, each time window has recorded a positive difference in their performance, time 
windowing of 240 seconds has obtained the best. There are 3/4 of the entire participants has 
got TPIR more than 70%. Moreover, the majority of them the system is able to be identified 
their traffic correctly with performance 75% and more. Subsequently, this approach has 
investigated the event by using the original time of the event and using the most authenticate 
result (top three applications) as a fundamental basis for applying the timeline approach in 
order to raise the accuracy of the system and the beneficial of utilized this kind of correlation 
technique is clearly notable. 
 
6.6 Discussion  
Generally, using behavioral fusion approach has significantly improved the performance 
comparing with standard behavioral profiling. This kind of improvement was between 8 to 
10% in each rank. Also, classifying the dataset twice (fusion technology) has produced an 
additional feature that leads to more discriminative information, thus the system was capable 
to build a more accurate user profile based on user interactions. Accordingly, by initiating a 
correlation between fusion behavioral results of the top three applications and timeline analysis 
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based on different time windowing an accurate user profile has been produced as demonstrated 
above in timeline result. Indeed, the timeline analysis results proved that the result that got in 
30 second time windowing was almost better than behavioral fusion result in the first three 
ranks where the average user's performance attained 70.2%. 
 
There are different applications that have achieved a high TPIR using behavioral fusion 
technique, such as Skype and Outlook. In fact, skype application continues to score the best 
application performance in both approaches. However, the level of its performance has 
increased in the fusion mode and achieved almost 100% in all ranks due the nature of its 
signatures were quite precious and the higher number of user action identified. In contrast, 
Dropbox application achieved the lowest performance using fusion model with 66.6 % TPIR 
(but still better than what the system got it from the standard approach by almost 10%). It is 
arguable that the reason behind this low in the performance because of the level of unique 
features inside this application was not enough for the system to be able to distinguish its users' 
traffic. 
As can be seen in Table 6.2, fusion behavioral technique has performed better than behavioral 
profiling in terms of individual perspective. In fact, there are a numbers of participants who 
achieved a good performance in rank 1 such as user 4, 9, 24 and 27, where their TPIRs are 
between 80% to 90%. This is due to the fact that it has been utilized almost by the nine services 
that were included in this experiments and high level of number of interactions especially in 
the most accurate applications such as skype, Outlook and Google. For instance, user 9 has 
experienced the nine services and with massive number of interactions attained more than 
30,000 interactions as discussed in the previous chapter. Similarly, user 27 has achieved TPIR 
of 90% and by considering the number of services and interactions, we found that all services 
have been utilized by the user and the total number of interactions is about 120,000. 
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The lowest user identification rate in rank 1 was achieved by users 17 and 22 when their results 
were 28.4% and 19.1%. These outcomes reveal that the uniqueness of information from those 
users’ interactions was not quite enough to differentiate them from others, and in this case there 
are potential reasons: lack of user interactions in accurate applications or lack of applications 
used or both of them. As mentioned above the total number of user 17 interactions’ was 2586 
from five applications and the majority of interactions come from YouTube application while 
YouTube is considered as the second lowest application in level of accuracy. In the same vein, 
user 22 has experienced just four of the nine applications (i.e Facebook, Google, Twitter and 
YouTube) with total number of interactions 5,314 and more than 72% of them obtained from 
YouTube application as well.  
 
In timeline analysis approach, four-time windows (i.e 30, 60, 120 and 240 seconds) were used 
in the analysis phase to explore to what extend the system can identify the related interactions 
in variety time windows as can be seen in Table 6.14 above. In general, the time line analysis 
approach has achieved a better performance by using 30 seconds time windows; comparing 
with first three ranks of the fusion approach. In fact, an accurate user profile was built by this 
approach which helped the system to score 70.2% as an average user identification rate in the 
first time window and this number has continuously increased each time window until achieved 
72.8% in the last one. With reference to Table 6.14, the system could successfully identify 
some users’ interactions with an excellent performance for instance, users 4, 8, 15, 24 and 27 
where their accuracy was over 90%. Moreover, the majority of the rest participants’ 
performance was achieved more than 50% in time windowing 30 second and this result has 
improved in the next time windowing (60 sec) as illustrated in Table 6.14. 
 
To conclude, using these two approaches has produced an accurate performance results. These 
result means, it is possible to apply these approaches to link the user interactions to the 
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individual with high accuracy which aids organisations to identify the insider misuse. It should 
be noted however, the time window can only be set to a period where the underlying 
assumption that the traffic still belongs to the same user holds true. To pick a period window 
that is too large will suffer from misclassifications. Due to the nature of the data collection 
approach used to collect and label the traffic used in this research, it was not possible to increase 
the time window further to investigate this – as the result would simply have improved further 
(as the samples don’t include different users using the same IP). 
 
6.7 Conclusion  
In general, utilizing the fusion behavioral and timeline analysis approaches can achieve a good 
level of accuracy and provides better classification performance than using behavioral 
profiling. By employing fusion behavioral profiling technique based on user interactions 
derived from the application level, the results show that a number of users have achieved 
average TPIR of more than 80%, in addition to the level of accuracy in different applications 
attained 100%, such as Skype. 
Based on the success of these experiments results, the timeline analysis has been implemented 
upon fusion results with a specific time windowing in order to link more interactions to the 
associated individuals. The results show that this technique has significantly improved the 
average of user identification rate to score a result (70.1% with 30 seconds), better than fusion 
behavioral profiling. Subsequently, it is evident that it is possible to creating a user profiling 
from user actions derived from applications level with a high level of accuracy, thus an 
encouraging solution for attributing the insider misuse to the associated person through their 
interactions on different Internet services applications and overcome on the limitation that exist 
in the response model.  
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7 Conclusion and Future Work  
  
The chapter concludes with the achievements of the research, highlights the limitations and 
opportunities for further investigation and research. The research aimed to determine whether 
it was possible to identify individuals from network traffic meta data. 
 
7.1 Achievements of Research  
Insider attack has become a serious problem for organizations and recently researchers sought 
to develop an applicable countermeasure to overcome this issue. The existence proposed 
solutions have to rely on the anomaly detection technique to analyze network traffic while there 
are serious limitations in this approach. Consequently, this research has overcome of these 
limitations by focusing on the user interactions of the user rather than the IP. 
The following points are the main achievements of this research: 
1. A feature extraction process was developed focusing on identifying and classifying 
user-level interactions with Internet-based applications. A significant contribution in 
this research was to only focus upon the metadata and not seek to perform any form of 
deep packet inspection. 
2. An experimental investigation and evaluation of user behavioural profiling that showed 
that it is possible to successfully identify a good proportion of the users given the pattern 
in which they interact with Internet-based applications. Importantly, this was achieved 
by not using the user's IP address in any form. In order to aid scalability, a multi-
classifier based approach was devised to complete N two-class problems, where N is 
the size of the user population. 
3. The application of fusion to the biometric multi-classifier in order to aid and refine the 
classification and decision stages of the biometric system. 
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4. The creation of a timeline algorithm that utilizes the IP address as a basis for grouping 
interactions over short periods of time. The final outcome from the technique has shown 
a significant improvement in performance.  
7.2 Limitations of Research  
Despite the research objectives have been accomplished, a number of limitations linked to this 
research can be identified. The following list highlights these limitations: 
1. The experimental dataset was limited in terms of participants and the duration of the 
collection period. Ideally, more participants and a longer profile period would have 
provided a more reliable measure of performance that could be achieved in practice.  
2. Whilst it is not imperative for the proposed technique to have interactions extracted 
from every web-application (as the timeline experiment showed), having more 
applications modelled would have provided a richer and more comprehensive set of 
interaction signatures from which to extract from the dataset. 
 
7.3 Future Research 
A number of opportunities exist for further research and/or enhancement. These are outlined 
below: 
• The underlying classifiers utilised in the classification stage were based upon the 
traditional feed-forward networks. Further exploration and investigation of alternative 
models and seeking to optimise them could provide for improvements in the recognition 
accuracy. 	
• The dataset could be expanded importantly in the number of participants – as this would 
permit further investigation of the scalability challenges of such an approach in practice. 
However, it would also be good to increase the duration in order to better understand 
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and model the changes that exist with regards to the permanence of the reference 
template.	
• Automation of the identification of interactions from Internet-based applications. 
Whilst not required for the approach to work, the more applications are modelled and 
the resulting interactions signatures are extracted, the more accurate and reliable the 
resulting identification is likely to be. It will also provide a basis for creating revised 
signatures when existing applications are updated. 	
 
7.4 The Future of Behavioral Monitoring for User Identification  
Internet services applications are becoming part of the daily lives of individuals and 
organizations, with more than three billion users now using internet services across the world. 
Unfortunately, with this rise in internet use comes increasing rates of cyber-related crime and 
insider misuse is considered one of the main threats that many organisations experience. 
Although many techniques currently exist for detecting or preventing insider misuse, this 
research highlights the need to go beyond the detection stage and provide a new mechanism 
that is able to attribute misuse actions to the individual who committed the crime. This research 
programme has, through an in-depth investigation of different user interactions, drawn from 
the applications level and built a means of behavioural-biometric profiling capable of 
identifying users.  So, the depending on behavioural monitoring of user interactions is going to 
be highly required for identifying the identity of the individual. 
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